

Local Cooperation: Self-Organisation in the English Planning System

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Abstract

This thesis examines the 'new' approach of urban governance that has come to the fore in the English planning system since the turn of the Millennium. This new approach has seen an apparent rejection of the previous methods taken towards urban management, with moves taken towards a more 'grass roots' tactic in creating and applying policies in land management. Specifically, this has entailed a reduction in the level of central government involvement in local planning matters, through the removal of layers of governance and policies such as Regional Spatial Strategies. In the gaps that have emerged through this process, newer local-led initiatives have been interjected into the planning system, with the aim of creating urban management policies that are more bespoke to the areas that such projects are born within. The policies that have emerged in recent years, particularly in the years of the Coalition government and afterwards, have seen a marked swing in approaches to land management, policies that were brought about through the 2011 Localism Act.

This represents a stark contrast to the traditional centrist-led approach that planning has based itself on in this country for the decades previous, from the end of the Second World War to the culmination of the 20th Century. The research starts by illustrating how, over a period of 50 years, devolution has been a very gradual movement in planning, a programme that has nevertheless sped up dramatically since the installation of the Blair administration in 1997. During the course of this devolution, spaces have arisen for local collaborations of actors to come to the fore and exert a greater influence on the physical environment they call their home. In particular, this research focusses on two levels of local governance; that of local authorities cooperating with each other despite the lack of regional guidance from above, and of neighbourhood planning, a policy still in its nascent years following its introduction in the 2011 Localism Act. This study illustrates how traditional theories of local urban governance are inadequate in explaining exactly how these groups of individuals behave when coming together to form coalitions in the space generated by financial cuts and the removal of higher governing bodies.

Through an experimental methodology, incorporating the toolkits of behavioural sciences in the form of game theory and the Volunteers Function Inventory, this investigation illuminates how actors at each level behave as a part of these partnerships. Local authorities are shown as not dependent on the central government instrument of the Duty to Cooperate in order to clearly communicate with each other on cross boundary issues, and rather that they appear to be flourishing in self-appointed and self-sustaining coalitions built on trust,

and strengthened by structures that allow all districts to achieve their individual objectives. At the neighbourhood level, the VFI is implemented to ascertain the traits inherent in volunteers who are actively part of neighbourhood forums. This policy is reliant on a supply of 'citizen planners' to enact its aims, and consequently this research identifies the behavioural personalities that are common between those participants that do volunteer, in addition to exploring what their personal aims are for their respective neighbourhood forums.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 The context of the English planning system

In the decades that have followed the end of the Second World War, the landscape of urban planning in England has been in a constant state of flux (Denters & Rose, 2005). Due to the severe damage that beset some of the country's biggest cities and towns following the atrocities of war, a major revamp of the physical environment was due. Added to this, Britain encountered a period of vast economic expansion owing to an increased national output and the resulting drop in unemployment. Population levels grew in response to an increased level of immigration from the Commonwealth countries to cover the labour shortages that increased levels of manufacturing and industry brought to the fore. All in all, a major refurbishment of the physical stock of Britain's cities was due. With this, successive governments proceeded with a plethora of different planning and regeneration focussed policies to bring about the desired change in both urban centres and the peripheries of these areas (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002). Initial programmes in the 1960s and 70s started this mass overhaul of the physical environment, with these policies very much led with an attitude that saw planning professionals as the 'experts' to lead this revolution, and the general population seen as a bystander to this development (Hall, 2014). Such an outlook from those in power resulted in landscapes designed solely by planners and architects, and that had lacked any input from those who were to call these areas home.

Over a period of time, there was a realisation in the corridors of Westminster that a change in direction was required, with policies such as Community Development Projects initiated in order to encourage citizen participation in planning issues of the time (Tallon, 2010). Though these were intended as a step in the direction of encouraging citizens to have more of a say in how their urban areas were to be regenerated and managed, these policies remained a strictly state-centric tool of urban administration. Such a centrist position continued to be taken into the 1980s, with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative party, and a succession of policy instruments that were designed to marginalise the role of local government, particularly those metropolitan councils that were predominantly governed by the ideologically opposed Labour party (Thornley, 1993). Such strategies were implemented across the political span of control held by those in power in the corridors of Whitehall.

From the 1990s, devolution started to occur at an accelerated pace. The introduction of schemes such as City Challenge that promoted competition for funding between individual cities started to instigate the notion of partnership working between powerful elites in each area in order to secure government funding and resources. Though not a perfect system, with criticisms made of the competitive nature of the project and the strict bid deadlines (Davoudi, 1995; Tallon, 2010), these projects signalled a change from the traditional system of central government dictating where investment and redevelopment should occur. The incoming Blair Government of 1997 brought with it the 'New Deal for Communities', a central government proposal that, crucially, required projects to be led by community groups rather than local authorities. Again, whilst there were criticisms of this policy (Dinham, 2005), it signalled further reduction in centrist input at the local level, and signified the direction in which urban policy was to go, even if at that time the powers that be may not have known just how far this devolution would go.

It is this further level of devolution that has occurred since the dawn of the new Millennium that this research is now focussed upon. Building upon the momentum for bottom-up governance that had garnered pace over the previous decade, the 2011 Localism Act stands as a major turning point in the timeline of how cities and urban centres are governed. The 'Big Society' doctrine that the 2010 Coalition government brought about looked to promote a system with less levels of authority, and scrapped the then Regional Spatial Strategies that had been responsible for directing development across the regions of England. In their place, spaces have emerged for new forms of partnership working, at both the macro and micro scale. At the macro scale of local governance, the removal of these regional strategies has resulted in a landscape where coordination between individual local authorities has become paramount for national economic development. Local plans individually engineered by separate authorities are still required to meet the needs of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). Yet without a regional body to coordinate this, a 'Duty to Cooperate' has been introduced to help bridge this gap. Though not a 'duty to agree', this policy instrument has been parachuted in to help facilitate interaction between different districts. Yet, without the need for authorities to agree on cross-border objectives, how does this mechanism function effectively? And, as cross-boundary discussion has existed at the local level before its inception, is it a necessary tool? It is one of the aims of this research to uncover this.

At the micro level of neighbourhood planning, it is key to the government's proposal that citizens be willing to participate in neighbourhood planning. Without this desire to

contribute to the management of one's local area, this proposal cannot function. With this then, it is essential to ask; why do people choose to volunteer? Whilst there are a plethora of reasons why individuals choose to volunteer in other organisations, such as charity work and running sports teams, there is little literature to suggest why people should engage in becoming 'citizen planners'. This creates a space for this study to fill. That is, why are citizens drawn to volunteer their time towards creating a legislative plan that will write the future for their community. Over 2300 communities across England are now in the process of writing a neighbourhood plan (Gov.uk, 2018), with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government pledging an extra £23 million towards the initiative in March 2018. Clearly, this is an area where there is plenty of activity currently. With this in mind it is essential to explore the question; what motivates individuals to engage in the neighbourhood planning process. This is the other key aim of this research.

1.2 Research Objectives and Questions

From the text above then, it is clear to see why investigation is required to uncover how this 'new form' of political governance is functioning in the contemporary English planning system. More specifically, the objectives that this research will look to explore are as follows:

1. To critically review existing literature on theories of cooperation in local governance, and establish the conceptual and policy framework of the research through a policy review of post-war policies enacted in England.
2. To ascertain the importance of trust, both in its emergence and longevity, in local authority planning practice.
3. To investigate what the most significant drivers are in community participation in neighbourhood planning practice.
4. To synthesize the results of the empirical work within the research to inform policy recommendations and future research in this area of planning.

With particular attention to objectives 2 and 3, which form the core of the empirical work in this research, the following research questions will be asked:

- a. With respect to local authority planning practice, how does trust become established in coalitions of actors?
- b. To what extent is the 'Duty to Cooperate' a necessary condition for local authorities to coalesce into a coalition?
- c. What is the role of leadership in ensuring coalition stability?
- d. What are the behavioural dynamics that explain community participation in planning, and why do those who volunteer in neighbourhood planning choose to do so?
- e. To what extent does a sense of place attachment drive community participation at the neighbourhood level?
- f. To what extent does the composition of neighbourhood planning forums accord to the perception that they are skewed towards communities who are defending against unwanted development?

1.3 Outline of the research

The outline of the study will now be outlined. As can be seen from Figure 1-1, this introduction chapter will be followed by an extensive contextual chapter, in which previous theories of governance will be discussed, along with new directions for theory to take. The UK urban policy landscape will then be highlighted upon, before moving onto a methodology chapter that will outline the procedures that will be used to gather data from the two very different forms of bottom-up planning that we see in use in the UK planning system presently. Analysis of both levels of investigation will then be conducted, before the discussion and conclusion chapters bring this thesis to a close. A more detailed introduction to each chapter is sketched out below.



Figure 1-1 Progression of Thesis

Following this introductory chapter (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 will begin with by focussing on partnership working at the local level. Specifically, existing theories of collaborative working in the planning realm will be assessed here. Three of the most pertinent theories, Urban Growth Machines (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987), Urban Regime Theory (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989) and Communicative Planning Theory (Innes, 1995; Healey, 1997) will all be raised and assessed, outlining the main branches of these concepts. During this process, the impact of these studies will be noted, and the impression that they have left on the planning literature. Yet the shortcomings of all three will also be noted. In particular, the ‘stretching’ of the theories of growth machines and urban regimes will be highlighted, and

how these concepts, though doubtlessly useful in studying how urban partnerships function over space and time, are still very centred on the US model of public governance. That is to say that private interest hold more weight in political spheres in the US than they do at present in Europe and UK. In the case of communicative planning, its normative outlook on the world of real life planning will be presented. Its focus on rational discourse over reaching settlement, and lack of accountability for the power structures that are inherent in the English planning system will rule communicative planning theory out from being the most appropriate method with which to test neighbourhood planning and the Duty to Cooperate in the context of this study.

Following this review of existing theories, the second half of Chapter 2 will propose new forms of analysis that will be used to assess how these two new forms of governance are operating in the contemporary planning system. It will ask, firstly, why citizens should be interested in participation in planning. Given how the central state has held power in matters of the physical environment in the decades previous, why should communities now feel enamoured to take up ownership of their own bespoke plans? After illustrating how a space has been created for citizens to take up this opportunity, the notion of heightened levels of mistrust in public institutions will be emphasised. This chapter will argue that a mistrust of these institutions, of which planning is a part, has led to a greater desire for citizen participation in providing services for communities. But why do people volunteer? To answer this question, previous theories of voluntarism will be outlined. The main facets of egoism (Phillips & Phillips, 2011), altruism (Titmuss, 1970; Allen & Rushton, 1983), collectivism and principalism (Batson, 1994) will be outlined, and their shortcomings for analytical discussion summarised. Following this, functional theory will be introduced as the most appropriate tool to decipher why people choose to volunteer. In particular, the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) will be introduced, with its 6 motive approach to measuring voluntarism assessed. It will be illustrated, through a review of previous usage of the theory, that this instrument is the most equipped to answer the research questions about neighbourhood planning that are mentioned above.

Yet, at the local authority level, the VFI is unsuitable itself as a data analysis method. The VFI is a tool that can be distributed to groups of participants in one setting to assess their own individual motives for volunteering. Yet this is methodologically unsuitable at local authority level. Local authorities are made up of thousands of employees working at different levels and in different disciplines. With this in mind, a qualitative method will be implemented

here. Vitally though, this method will be informed by the literature of behavioural insights and behavioural economics. Rather than the descriptive concepts that the previous theories of coalitions (urban regimes, growth coalitions and communicative planning) in planning have presented, behavioural insights and behavioural economics will be introduced as a new method by which we can further understand how coalitions occur at the local authority level. In particular, game theory will be argued as the most appropriate method by which to assess these collaborative working arrangements. The literature of both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory will be reviewed here, as both typologies of the theory can help us to understand how and why particular coalitions can be started up and how they can sustain stably over time.

Chapter 3 will focus more on the contemporary world of UK planning, beginning with a review of the various policy instruments that have been introduced in the decades post the Second World War that, as outlined above presents a myriad of different mechanisms that have been implemented by successive governments. The frameworks of each of these mainstream strategies will be outlined, and the outcomes and success or failure of them duly noted. This chapter will illustrate how, mirroring the physical state of the country in these years, the instruments devised by policymakers have ebbed and flowed, and how the aims and objectives have been altered through passing generations. This literature review will demonstrate how a gradual relinquishment of centrist state control has been exemplified by programme's that, having originally been designed to keep control in the hands of the very few in overall control in Westminster have slowly filtered down to the local level. This has involved the devolution of control to regional boards through the years, and gradually down to the local level.

Chapter 3 will then continue this aim of assessing the various policy instruments that have been used to manage urban governance and development, with a focus on the contemporary tools that have been implemented. The acceleration of the devolution process in Britain, particularly since the dawn of the new millennium, will be the main focus of this chapter, in particular the 'new' approach to urban management that has been exhibited by greater partnership working at the local level. Three instruments will be reviewed. Firstly, the privately led initiative of the Business Improvement District will be assessed. Though not a firm focus of this research, this mechanism will be looked at as it is one of the first, and most prominent, examples of local elites working together in order to effect change and manage their own particular physical environment. Following this, two of

the main urban planning policy instruments introduced under the 2010 Coalition governments 'Big Society' will be evaluated; namely, Neighbourhood planning and the Duty to Cooperate. Neighbourhood planning was introduced as one of the flagship policies under the new governments promise to give more power back to the people, allowing citizens in communities across England the power to form a coalition and write their own plan that can be written into planning legislation in their local authority, subject to passing various tests of soundness and referendums. At the higher level of inter-local authority negotiation, the Duty to Cooperate was brought in by central government as a mechanism to aid communication and cooperation between neighbouring councils. This instrument was brought in as a reaction to the devolution of powers away from central government through continued devolution that had resulted in the abolishment of Regional Assemblies between 2008 and 2010, and the Regional Spatial Strategies for which they were responsible. This chapter will illustrate how an erosion of the central state in planning affairs has created a space for these local partnerships to emerge, and how they operate.

Chapter 4 will dig deeper into the exact methodology that will be used in this investigation, and introduce the case studies through which it will be framed. The local authorities of Greater Manchester will be presented as not just an example of successful partnership working, but the *definitive* example of how local districts can function collaboratively in the absence of central guidance. At neighbourhood level, the criteria of selecting neighbourhood forums to be selected for the research will be presented. This is vital, as there are now thousands of neighbourhood forums in existence across England, and choosing a representative sample is of key importance to this research. Methodologically, the VFI will be further explained and modified to fit more with the particular details that urban planning brings to the fore. Contextual questions that are designed to further support the VFI will be introduced at the point also. At the local authority level, qualitative interviews informed by the literature of behavioural economics and insights will be broken down and exhibited as the most appropriate technique with which to answer the research questions relating to local governance that have been outlined above.

Chapter 5 will then be the first of two sections that will analyse the data that has been collected for this research. Here, the results of the qualitative interviews conducted with planning officers in the districts of Greater Manchester in addition to its parent combined authority, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) will be analysed. Firstly, the role that the state-injected Duty to Cooperate will be assessed, and whether or not it is a

necessary policy instrument for these local authorities. After this, game theoretical reasoning and concepts from behavioural economics will illustrate how certain dynamics that exist between the constituent authorities of the GMCA define how and why cooperation is stable between these districts, and has been across several different generations and public policy interventions. Concepts from the behavioural science literature, such as the presence of a 'leader', repeated interactions and 'rules of the game' in this particular combined authority allow cooperation and collaboration to flourish, despite differences across the physical environment and political chambers in the wider county.

Following on from the analysis of the interview data, Chapter 6 will analyse the results of the VFI in the setting of neighbourhood forums and town councils responsible for writing their areas respective plan. The core motives that drive citizens to volunteer in their respective neighbourhood forum will emerge, and will be backed up by contextual questions devised to complement the VFI. Key themes will be deciphered, based upon the characteristics of citizens who are currently engaged in the activity, such as age demographics, socio-economic groups and gender. The contextual questions will also allow the research to illustrate how communities interact with outside parties such as developers and their local authority, and how the concept of place figures in the take up of voluntarism in this activity.

Chapter 7 will discuss the findings of both Chapters 5 and 6 in greater depth, with this discussion revolving around findings that relate to the research questions that have been outlined above. This discussion will show how trust emerges through 'repeated games' in the behavioural science sense, or repeated interactions over time in the contemporary world of planning. Furthermore, in relation to the authorities of the GMCA, it will be argued that the presence of a leader (Manchester) is a binding mechanism for the entire combined authority. Though there may be feelings between the authorities that Manchester is sometimes afforded 'greater' status than the other authorities, ultimately Manchester's high profile is beneficial for the entire area and helps to keep disagreements between individual authorities to a minimum, owing to the benefits that association with this prominent partner brings. In relation to neighbourhood planning specifically, the discussion will illustrate that care for the local environment and community is the main driver for voluntarism, in addition to a desire for a greater understanding of how the planning system can affect citizen's respective residential areas. Furthermore, place attachment will be shown to play a strong role in motivating people to become involved in neighbourhood

planning, and that enthusiasm to assist elsewhere declines if they are asked to lend their skills to neighbourhood fora elsewhere. Finally, the notorious issue of NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard) will be addressed, and it will be argued that, though neighbourhood planning is seen as some as a vehicle to stop development in their area, the mechanism cannot be merely thought of as a 'NIMBYs charter'. Rather, there appears to be an appreciation that development is necessary, and that neighbourhood planning gives communities a platform to influence development rather than to stop it altogether.

Chapter 8 will conclude the study, reiterating the key themes that the study has drawn out through a novel approach to studying these new forms of planning legislation that have become engrained in the system since the Localism Act 2010. From these findings, recommendations will be offered in order to promote better partnership working across the regions of England, in order to attempt to replicate the 'Manchester model' that has served the authorities of Greater Manchester so well over the last few decades. Such a model can be implemented not only across other city regions, but in other policy areas where partnership working is essential; the Northern Powerhouse, which itself is based upon the model that has saw the GMCA prosper, is one notable example of this. At the neighbourhood level, recommendations will be made in order to offer more advice for areas where neighbourhood planning is not as active compared to other parts of the country. Such recommendations will be made more to local authorities in order to establish neighbourhood planning as a tool that can assist council planning departments, rather than be seen as a hindrance. The limitations of the current research will also be discussed, as it is always possible for more findings to be achieved in the areas of both local governance and neighbourhood planning. From these limitations, recommendations for further research will be offered. Whilst this investigation has delved deep into the subject of local governance and planning, there is doubtless more that can be achieved in this area.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Theorising urban development has been the subject of a rich vein of academic literature. From elite theory (Higley, 2010; Lowell Field & Higley, 1980) and pluralism (Judge, 1995) to urban regime theory (Stone, 1989) and growth machines (Molotch, 1976), academics have constantly sought to unravel the complex set of processes that influence the shape of the built environment. From the perspective of urban management, we have seen a gradual movement from central governmental control to that of a devolved state, in which partnerships at the local level have been responsible for development (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006; Tallon, 2010).

With respect to partnership formation in local politics, three theories stand out as having particular resonance with this subject; namely urban regime theory, the growth machine thesis and communicative planning theory. These have been three of the most influential doctrines in academic literature concerned with how power is spread across urban arenas. The concept of coalition building is inherently rooted in these three particular theories, and they have formed the basis of a multitude of studies that have taken place at the local level, across many national contexts.

Embedded into the fabric of both urban regimes and growth coalitions is the importance of ‘human agency’ in the decision-making process at the urban level (Harding & Blokland, 2014), and they take into account that forces beyond the immediate locality can have an impact upon the various parties involved in these local political spheres. This human agency aspect is also a central concept of communicative planning theory (CPT). Derived from the work of Jürgen Habermas, CPT envisions a political model in which decision-making is shared between all of those individuals involved in that context. Its rise in the 1980s Britain, against the previously accepted rational comprehensive model of planning, represented a marked change in how planning was imagined and implemented, and its impact upon the planning landscape in the UK.

In what follows, all three of these highly influential theories will be examined, with their suitability as an analytical framework scrutinised. Urban regime theory and the growth coalition thesis share certain similar aspects; both are borne of the US political system, stress the importance of partnership building between public and private interests, whilst business interests are held up as a privileged group who are able to control opportunities in their area

(Harding & Blokland, 2014). As a result, they are both explained separately here, illustrating the differences that do exist between them, but analysed together to illuminate their strengths and weaknesses as a theoretical framework from within which to base this investigation. CPT, which arose in dissent against the rational comprehensive model that was at one point the dominant paradigm in British planning, will then be analysed: this will be taken separately from the previous two theories owing to its methodological and contextual differences, yet its significance in the understanding of human agency in urban land management means that it too should be considered as a theoretical framework for this particular investigation into self-organisation.

2.2 Urban Growth Machines (Growth Coalitions)

The urban growth machine thesis indicates that growth in the city is the key component in bringing together divergent interests of various stakeholders in urban areas, and is embedded within a wider theory about the management of place, with place in this context identified as land valued both economically and socially (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987). The core foundation of the thesis is that these coalitions of actors and organisations from within the city (making up the growth machine), who all share a common consensus regarding the economic growth of the city in question and the effects that this will have on the valuation of land in the vicinity, will compete with growth machines located elsewhere for mobile capital investment, whilst also bidding to win the support of the local population and agencies for such growth (Rodgers, 2009).

In the 1970s, the American sociologist, Harvey Molotch, put forward the idea of the growth machine in response to what he perceived to be the shortcomings of the theories of the time, theories that did not take into account what he saw as an essential dimension of the social structure of place; that of “power and class hierarchy” (Molotch, 1976, p309). As a result of this, he stated that:

“Sociological research based on the traditional definitions of what an urban place is has had very little relevance to the actual, day-to-day activities of those at the top of local power structure whose priorities set the limits within which decisions affecting land use, the public budget, and urban social life come to be made. It has not been very apparent from the scholarship of urban social science that land, the basic stuff of place, is a market

commodity providing wealth and power, and that some very important people consequently take a keen interest in it” (Molotch, 1976, p309)

Molotch speculated that growth was the essential aim of any US urban arena, and so strong was the desire for this outcome that it would act as the key enabler in the reaching an agreed consensus between local elites, irrespective of their political standpoints. Growth can be indicated by a constantly rising urban area population (p310), indicative of an initial expansion of basic industries resulting in an expanded workforce, followed by an increased scale of retail commerce, more intensive land development, a higher population density, and a resulting higher level of financial activity in the area. Reaching this objective is the core issue for those who are in a position to bring about transformation in their area. The presence of this group of land-based elites, for whom the primary concern is maximising land value through land-use intensification, is the key driver behind urban growth (Molotch, 1976; Logan, 1976). Molotch proceeds to assert that land parcels must be conceived as a ‘mosaic of competing land interests capable of strategic coalition and action’ (1976, p311).

Any given plot of land is seen to signify an interest (e.g. the well-being of the owner of the plot). Grouped together, these plots create an aggregate of land based interest (Molotch, 1967; 1973). If the ownership of a plot is simplified - that is, single ownership of the assembled land as a whole - the relationship between the future of the plot and the owner’s well-being is straightforward: an increase in the land value, the greater the profit for the owner. However at other times the relationships may be more indirect. One or more landowners may become concerned with harmful activities on neighbouring plots if it may harm the long term financial future of their own land. It is this concern for the future of the aggregate set of plots that fosters a sense of community between the neighbouring landowners, an ideology at the core of the original growth machine principle. As opposed to viewing each geographical area as segregated areas of legal, political, social and physical features, they should also be seen as interconnected areas of competing land interests, capable of strategic association and action.

Growth coalitions come together to stimulate economic development, both internally by encouraging a climate conducive to business growth, but also externally by attempting to attract footloose capital to their locality at the expense of other areas. At the micro level, two shops within the same residential area may compete against each other in order to gain amenities close to their premises that are likely to increase consumer activity for them, such as bus stops. At a higher scale, cities and regions across the globe, particularly in North

America and Europe, have competed against one another for the funds and resources to build close highway routes, airports, industrial contracts and urban renewal schemes, to name but a few. This is clearly evident in the UK, where schemes such as City Challenge and the SRB have fostered a competition-based approach to the distribution of resources and finance with regards to regeneration in major urban areas. The thesis notes that though the activity of coalitions of actors may fluctuate, and interest in the aims of the group may rise and fall at separate times, they can be recognised as “*identifiable, ongoing communities*” when the coalitions display a degree of endurance (Molotch, 1976, p311).

Yet the nested nature of communities within wider areas creates intriguing coalitions between various groups that, at other levels, may be in direct competition with one another. The potential for such coalitions can act as a constraint on any prospective confrontations at more micro-scale levels. This epitomises the importance of coalitions within the growth machine; though there may be disputes at a lower level over the future of particular parcels of land, and that of the wellbeing and potential outlook for the owners of these areas, there is a recognition that such differences are of minor importance when compared to the future of the wider area, and the potential for the maximisation of exchange values when compared to land within other, competing growth machines.

Important to note in any discussion on growth machine is the impact that the private sector has on communities. When major corporations, both international and domestic, are interested in locating an area for offices or branches, the perceived power of such organisations can set the tone for land use in the surrounding area. However it is still essential to note the importance of governmental decisions in this process. Policy decisions can affect the decision of organisations to locate in one particular zone as opposed to another. Labour costs and tax rates all play a role in and location planning decisions. Infrastructure and communication facilities are also factored into any decisions, whilst policy regarding expenses such as pollution laws and employee safety standards will also figure.

2.3 Urban Regime Theory

One of the most significant theories used to explain the internal dynamics of urban politics is that of urban regime theory, a thesis brought to the fore in the late 1980s by Stephen Elkin (1987) and Clarence Stone (1989) with their work in the US urban arena. Urban regime theory seeks to embed the city within a wider economic, spatial and economic context

(Mollenkopf, 1983), and was most widely studied in the context of the main cities of the US and the UK during the late 1980s and 1990s (Barlow, 1995; DiGaetano, 1989; Elkin, 1987; Harding, 1994; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994; Stone, 1993; Stone, 1989). It developed partly through the development of the critical pluralist community power debate, framed within the neo-pluralist tradition of the 1960s (Lindblom, 1977). Lindblom appreciated that economic growth was a key concern for governments in capitalist societies, and that in a free market environment it was the private sector that could control the major decisions in the market, with the public sector playing a much reduced role. Decisions taken at this level affect every citizen in that society, yet such decisions are not subject to any democratic controls or checks. With this recognition, it can be seen that the pluralist notion that everybody has equal access to decision making is flawed (Lindblom, 1977).

In a similar vein, Stone (1987) recognises that there is a division of labour between the state and the market in an urban regime, in that possession of productive assets rests with the private sector, whilst the apparatus of government is subject to democratic controls (Davies, 2002a; Davies, 2003; Elkin, 1987). Stone (1989) initially started with a somewhat generic approach to regime composition, stating that “the study of urban regimes is ... a study of who cooperates and how their cooperation is achieved across institutional sectors of community life” (p.9) before later introducing the role of corporate interests that control the “systemic”¹ power that is central to urban governance (Pierre, 2014). With this, regime analysis recognises that power both within and across the urban area is fragmented (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001), and its primary concern is the interactions between the public and private sector, with the regime as the frame within which the relationship between control of the political process and the private decisions regarding the economy is controlled (Davies, 2002a; Stone, 1993; Stone, 1998).

In his notable work *Regime Politics* (1989) studying over 40 years of politics in Atlanta from 1946 to 1988, Stone looked to gain an insight into why racial polarisation was not a dominant force in the city’s public life, a situation that was unlike that found in many of the other larger cities in the southern states of the US in the time after the end of the Second World War (van Ostaaijen, 2013). Stone commentates on the process of negotiations between those in

¹ Systemic power is defined by Stone as: “that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the situational element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the intergroup element) in ways predisposing public officials to favour some interests at the expense of others (the indirect element) . . . Because its operation is completely impersonal and deeply embedded in the social structure, this form of power can appropriately be termed “systemic” (Stone, 1980, p. 980).

power at the municipality and the local business elite, and studying how the coalition(s) that had been formed was able to pursue an agreement that would be mutually beneficial for all parties involved. In the context of Atlanta, he illustrates how the differing priorities of the groups involved saw them come together to reach jointly profitable conclusions; the private elites looked to develop the city in such a way that would be conducive to the burgeoning technological advances of the time, whilst the predominantly black and middle class electorate sought to reduce the exclusion of blacks from public life and gain more access to housing. Business elites controlled access to private investment, while the black middle-classes provided the political leadership. With both groups possessing resources needed by the other, it became clear that a coalition between these sets of actors would be beneficial to both in order to achieve their objectives; it is this arrangement that Stone labelled as being an urban regime. Later on in his work, Stone gives the definition of an urban regime as being *“the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions”* (Stone, 1989, p. 6).

To Stone, there are several conditions that must be fulfilled for a coalition to be characterised as an urban regime. The term urban regime refers specifically to the informal arrangements that surround the formal procedures of government (Stone, 1989, p3), and is concerned with the formation of new ties between organisations and establishments, and about how the norms that exist within those organisations relate to those of others when working together in the new coalition. This informal group needs to be relatively stable and have access to the institutional resources that are needed to fulfil the plan of the regime. However, for a coalition of interests to remain durable, it must provide incentives for all parties to remain committed to the association (Ward, 1997; van Ostaaijen, 2013). Initially, agreement between parties over values and beliefs is not central to the regime; rather it is about participation between coalition members in order to take advantage of ‘small opportunities’ (Stone, 1993, p11). However, over time, the established patterns of interaction and the resources that the coalition possesses will see the regime become more stable, and subdues the differences in preferences between various parties, leading to a stronger consensus over issues such as policy.

Although the representation of regimes in public discourse is through the way in which local actors seek to determine relevant issues such as economic development, the focus in the analysis is that of the internal undercurrents of coalition-making, the informal routes of communication and coordination across institutional lines and “civic cooperation” (Stone,

1989, p5). In Stone's work on Atlanta (1989), the internal dynamics of the coalitions were explained using the social production model of power. The political power sought by regimes is a 'power to' act rather than a 'power over' others, otherwise known as social control. However, in order to achieve the ability to act is not a given; cooperation between parties needs to be realised and maintained (Stone, 1993). In order to overcome any potential issues of collective action within the coalition, and to safeguard continued participation, the regime might encourage cooperation amongst its members through incentives, such as contracts for companies, jobs and facilities. It is important to point out though that such cooperation is not merely *de facto*, rather it needs to be fostered and realised over time, and regimes cannot be anticipated to be present in all cities (DeLeon, 1992).

Stone comments that political leaders try to identify and enter into coalitions that have realistic objectives and the resources available in order to fulfil them: "in order for a governing coalition to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda" (Stone, 1993, p. 21). With this, Stone (1993) outlined four different types of regime: *developmental regimes* attempt to develop and expand the city, and as a result are heavily reliant on heavy funding and the involvement of city elites; *middle-class progressive regimes* look to protect the environment and seek more affordable housing and amenities; *lower-class opportunity expansion regimes* look to expand the choices available to the working classes through improved coordination of available resources; and *maintenance regimes*, which look to preserve the status quo, with their main task to maintain the delivery of core routine services, with less requirement for private sector input.

However, the identification of these categories of regimes has itself been open to criticism. Stone himself admits that maintenance regimes, though a frequent occurrence in previous years, are not as prevalent as they once were. The reason for this is that, whilst the demands are small, so too are the rewards. For the private and non-governmental sectors, maintenance indicates satisfaction with the current situation, even if the current situation is one of gradual deterioration, whilst for public representatives, this form of low demand regime doesn't allow for them to stamp their own air of authority on their locality (Stone, 1993, p18). Domhoff (2006) points out that development regimes, in seeking to develop and grow the city, require an increased amount of private investment; such a regime is, in essence, a growth machine (Molotch, 1976). Meanwhile, middle-class progressive regimes are dismissed as being relatively infrequent, and can be explained through a unique set of circumstances, such as the instillation of environmentalists into the area as leaders of

neighbourhood coalitions, and are most successful in smaller cities with upmarket neighbourhoods (Domhoff, 2006).

The principal criticism of regime theory has been that it is sometimes descriptive and 'middle range' in that it describes how coalitions come to be within specific urban settings rather than providing general insights that might be more widely applicable. The four types of regime alluded to above, whilst offering interesting frameworks from which to view different types of urban management models, are given as descriptive replicas of how cities and neighbourhoods could potentially be organised. There is no real attempt made to explain *why* different parties in each coalition choose to coalesce with each other in a way that is beneficial to themselves and the area that they are responsible for. The behavioural aspects of all the members of each coalition are not discussed at any great length, despite these aspects being central to how any partnership of actors may come into existence, operate, and ultimately endure.

In a discussion about UK governance, and the introduction of the SRB into the policy arena in 1994, Ward (1997) highlights that regime theory has two key flaws when attempting to apply it to the UK context. First, the way in which the theory was initially conceptualised by US academics has limited its application, as those who have attempted to theorise change in the UK through the use of this thesis have tended to focus predominantly on the outcomes in policy, rather than identifying the means that have led to the establishment of regimes. Additionally, it has been stressed that it is the local conditions that lead to the formation of regimes, with macro-scale processes considered only as externalities in policy outcomes;; this, it is argued, means that urban regime theory cannot be used to explain the changes in the structure of urban governance (Jessop, et al., 1999). Secondly, the differences between the political-economic systems of the US and the UK create difficulties in cross-national comparisons between the two; despite the continued devolution of power from Whitehall to local governments in the UK, there is still less autonomy afforded to these local authorities when compared to the federal US structure, despite the increasing levels of urban policy initiatives being copied into UK politics from its US counterpart (Atkinson, 1995; Wolman, 1992).

2.4 Criticisms of the regime theory and growth machines

Thus far, there would appear to be several similarities in the two theories described above. Yet the most important difference would be that the regime theory argues that there can be

more than one type of regime, whilst the growth machine approach posits that there can only one be coalition in a set locality (Harding & Blokland, 2014). However, both theories share similar dimensions in that they are “descriptive-empirical” (Stoker, 1995, p. 17), through attempting to explain particular ‘facts’ by discussing the array of ‘variables’ that cause them (Harding & Blokland, 2014, p. 107). They too can also be considered as decidedly normative, attempting to prescribe a particular way of building coalitions to function in an ideal fashion. It is this normative dimension that limits the applicability of these theories to this investigation, as they are unable to fully explain behavioural traits of individual members of partnerships. Whilst they can point to deficiencies in existing regimes or growth machines, or suggest a better model of how urban partnerships can work, they nevertheless make no attempt to explain why particular members of these coalitions act in certain ways. Incentives are highlighted as being the most successful way in which to keep the coalition intact as a single entity, yet this is in itself a utopian way of analysing the union. Members being offered incentives may not necessarily accept said enticements for a variety of reasons e.g. incentives offered outside of the partnership are better, mutual distrust between members, change of priorities etc. In a similar vein to that of regime analysis, the growth coalition thesis takes a descriptive standpoint in its assessment of urban politics. Whilst offering the main premise that coalitions of urban elites come together to stimulate local growth, again there is little attention paid to the actual behavioural traits of individual members of the coalition.

Economic restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s in European cities resulted in weightier roles for the private sector in these metropolitan contexts. With this, regime theory was seen as offering a common outline under which research into these changes could be framed (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). Regime theory was recognised as being more applicable than the growth coalition thesis in that it allowed for various types of regime, rather than just one coalition across all contexts (Harding, 1996). However, one of the core criticisms that has been levelled at these two theories is that they are both heavily ethnocentric, embedded within their original US contexts. Being initially devised in the American political space, they are based upon structures and procedures that are inextricably tied with the federal system of the US, and the power relations that exist between the different layers of government and business across the Atlantic. What this means for studies outside of the American context then, including this research, is that these two theories do not account for the potential for stronger levels of governmental power in the make-up of coalitions; put another way, there is little recognition that businesses hold less power in local politics in other global arenas, particularly Europe, than they do in the US, and that local governments

and politicians are not as reliant on private funding in order to stand for office or implement particular (land use) policies. This dilemma has placed critics into two broad camps regarding how to overcome these issues (John & Cole, 1998). There are those who have simply denied the value in using them to describe and analyse practises from outside of the US (Davies, 2002b; Pierre, 2014; Shaw, 1993; Wood, 1996), whilst others have attempted to improve the applicability of the theories to other national contexts. Indeed, there is now a multitude of studies dedicated to the study of regimes outside of the US setting (Brown, 1999; Dowding, et al., 1999; Harding, 2000; John & Cole, 1998; Lawless, 1994; Menahem, 1994; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994; Strom, 1996).

Such an approach has involved retaining the aspects of both theories that are in line with liberal democracies, notably the idea that coalition building between different levels of government and the private sector is crucial to the politics of production. At the same time however, attempts have been made to strip away the US-specific assets of both urban regimes and growth coalitions, through placing greater emphasis on bargaining between the different levels of the governmental hierarchy, or linking both theses to other theories that are more receptive to cross-national analysis (Harding, 1996). With regards to the UK, previous studies have sought to shed light on whether this framework can be used to explain the proliferation of urban regeneration partnerships (Davies, 2001; Harding, 1994; Harding, 2000; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994). Yet, such studies have been accused of straying too far away from the original formulation of Elkin and Stone and that the conceptual framework that they once shared has been stretched so far as to render comparisons difficult to quantify (Davies, 2003). Davies argues that regime theory 'is not a fruitful approach for understanding partnerships between local political and business elites in the UK' (Davies, 2003, p253). He then proceeds to detail how regeneration partnerships are sustained by different variables to those that are central to an urban regime; whilst regimes usually depend on an interdependence of financial sources, the underlying foundation within regeneration partnerships is the collaboration between parties in a specific local authority in recognition that market-led growth is the only way to realise continued regeneration for their community. Additionally, whilst a telling component of an urban regime is the set of informal networks fostered between individual parties, regeneration partnerships are administrative structures under strong governmental control with clear lines of formal communication (Davies, 2003, p254). Furthermore, international comparison of the growth coalition thesis has encountered problems, due to it originally being embedded deeply in the context of the US political system. This has not prevented scholars attempting to debate

its applicability in a variety of non-American contexts, across Europe, Asia and Australasia. The origins of the theory being in the US however, and the factors that are described in the formation of a coalition in that context, create difficulties in applying it to other political systems, such as Britain (Harding, 1991).

Built into both regime theory and the growth coalition thesis is recognition that private interests hold more sway in the political arena than those of the public sector. American cities exist within an entirely different political spectrum to that of those in Europe, as US counterparts are more heavily reliant on cooperation with the local private sector in order to fund and resource projects such as urban renewal (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). The diluted planning powers of the local state in the US political system compared to that of their European equivalents (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1993) means that US local authorities are more dependent on finding their own sources of investment and, consequently are increasingly sensitive to capital mobility and investment, whereas European local authorities are able to count upon public resources from central government, although, particularly in the case of the UK, these resources have and levels of funding have been witnessed cuts since the global economic crisis of 2008.

Yet despite this, the fabric of local governance in Europe has remained relatively intact, with local cabinets and committees retaining power over a series of functions within their localities, such as planning, housing, education and social services (to name but a few). Furthermore, when such functions are overseen by managerial boards of local businesses and policymakers, such as those implemented through City Challenge and Urban Regeneration Companies, local authorities still play a key role in the organisation and implementation of these boards. This remains at odds with the American system, where the private sector plays a heavier role in urban and economic development (Harding & Blokland, 2014). Business figures have long been directly involved in politics at all levels in the US system, and tend to have a say in which political figures will stand for office. The influence that private interests hold in the local political sphere often results in political leaders pursuing policies that are complimentary to business interests (Elkin, 1987).

Public ownership of land also places European public sectors in a position of greater control of their territories compared to their American counterparts (Harding, 1997). Such powerful positions of public authorities in the European context would appear to hinder the applicability of regime theory. It can also be argued that the applicability of regime theory may be hindered by the level to which it is immersed in the context of 20th Century Atlanta.

Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta (Stone, 1989) is a forty year investigation into the leadership of the city, and it has been noted that some of the conclusion drawn by Stone may very specific to this city itself (Nichols Clark & Southerland, 1990). Though this has not prevented the theory being widely used elsewhere, it is possible that though being such a deep account of politics in Atlanta, that the coalition's found there are deeply embedded in that particular context.

The main focus of the thesis being on property and development is a major obstacle to the thesis being used as a theory within which to frame this investigation; the focus here will be on partnerships at differing scales. Whilst particular partnerships at a city and regional level may be concerned with property development and urban transformation, those at lower levels, the so called "bottom-up" planning groups may be concerned with conservation and land management as opposed to bringing about urban development. Growth may not always be the core incentive as to why these groups come together, rendering parts of the growth coalition thesis limited in their applicability.

Pointing out a key debate in the argument over the growth machine, Rodgers (2009) highlights the lack of a clear methodology behind the thesis, stemming from how the original research was based upon an amalgamation of various previous studies as opposed to one piece of original research. Perhaps most crucial for this investigation however is that most subsequent studies on the original research by Molotch has avoided the study of actual coalition building, and the dynamics involved in building long lasting partnerships; rather, the focus has been on case studies studying the relationships between various parties involved in urban partnerships such as development projects. There has been a lack of insight into the behavioural dynamics of coalitions formed in the urban policy arena, and whether there are a particular set of circumstances that need to be present for them to come together. Does there need to be a driver in the formation of such alliances, such as the state, or can the come together organically from the ground up? And are there particular internal power dynamics that help to drive the coalition? Given the nature of such case study based investigations as regime theory and growth coalitions, the sets of conditions and agents that are required to build a successful coalition remains a largely under researched area.

Regime theory also falls down on this issue. Its constant evolution by various scholars and across different localities has left the theory somewhat watered down and undermining its influence. It has also been shown by various researchers that regime analysis does not take

into account for the behaviours of how coalitions form or act. Regime theory does not reveal the reasons why arrangements may form in the first place, or the mechanisms by which such a procedure may occur in the first place, whilst there is no accountability of how the coalition's change over time or the structures that hold partners together (Macleod & Goodwin, 1999; Ward, 1996). Furthermore it has been argued that, though highlighting the power that the local business elites of Atlanta held within the regime, Stone does not look to delve into the conditions that are present in shaping the priorities of the assembled coalition (Hankins, 2015). With this recognition of the fallacies of using these two theories, we now turn our attention to another theory that has been widely researched with respect to partnerships and coalitions in planning, that of communicative planning theory.

2.5 Communicative Planning Theory

Communicative Planning Theory (CPT) emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, focussing on how social processes at the urban and regional level could influence how the planning process functions at these levels (Forester, 1980; 1989; Innes, 1995; 2004). Based moderately on the work of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1989) and the Frankfurt school, CPT centres on the notion that participatory processes, when designed properly and involving various stakeholders, can help to generate consensus on overarching social issues, fostering the required political drive to instigate progress (Irazábal, 2009). Its increasing popularity throughout the 1990s led some researchers to suggest that the approach had begun to become the 'dominant paradigm' in planning theory (Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995).

Its arrival challenged the then widely accepted rational model that had dominated planning thought from 1960s and which had become thoroughly incorporated into planning education by the 1980s (Innes & Booher, 2015). Its dominance was so much so that theorists of the discipline called it the 'only theory of planning, and proceeding to state that it should 'envelope' all other theories in planning (Faludi, 1973). The rational model was viewed as being particularly scientific in nature, with expert planners using logic to envisage what could be achieved through hypothesis testing. Input from the public was limited, often just to advise on preferences. However, criticism of the approach had started to rise, with a key concern that, by bowing to the scientific will of trained practitioners and focussing on the 'narrow, technical rationality' (Allmendinger, 2009, p. 63), planning had lost sight of the more unprompted aspects of humanity, such as intuition, experimentalism and local knowledge, much to its own detriment (Healey, 1993; Sandercock, 1998).

In response to this, CPT showed that planners were rarely able to truly apply the rational model as the necessary condition needed for it, such as agreement on principles and goals, were rarely met (Innes & Booher, 2015). CPT introduced applied methods to the planning process, such as dialogue and deliberation between multiple stakeholders involved in particular planning decision, methods that were foreign to the accepted theory of the time; indeed it is models of planning that are interactive, conflict-mediating and, perhaps most importantly, consensus building, that are central to CPT (Sager, 2002). Research carried out by CP theorists was used to illustrate how more robust, fair and indeed, rational, outcomes were possible through using collaboration in planning (Healey, 2006; Hoch, 2007). Interpersonal skills of communication and negotiation together were seen as key to the successful implementation of plans and policies. A core aspect of CPT is that every situation is viewed as unique; planning takes place at various scales, and is not just concerned with political discourse, but also with numerous different stakeholders. It is for this reason that no clear guidelines for the practice have been offered up by theorists of this persuasion (Innes & Booher, 2015). Rather, it is suggested that constant learning and interaction should be linked with knowledgeable judgements to arrive at specific responses and end points for each particular issue framed within the precise context that the decision is made within. Values and interests that given stakeholders cannot be held as fixed and unchanging, and positions taken and values held by stakeholders can change intermittently (Barabas, 2004). It is this importance of interpersonal skills in such situations that gave rise to the new 'turn' of communicative planning theory (Sager, 1994).

In summarising their support for CPT, researchers have drawn upon the research of Habermas, and his work on communicative action. According to Habermas, particular conditions are required to have been met for two or more people to effectively communicate with each other, without which we may not be able to claim that we are actually attempting to engage in communication (Low, 1991). The four presuppositions are:

1. *Comprehensibility* – that the information being communicated from one person to another is understandable;
2. *Truthfulness* – that the information being passed from one person to another is assumed to be factually true;
3. *Sincerity* – for one person to communicate to somebody else, it must be they themselves who communicates the message (these three 'validity claims' mean

that, under Habermas's stipulations, the speaker should not be trying to deceive those who are listening);

4. *Legitimacy* – the speaker must be looking to come to an understanding with those listening, and therefore must convey language that is appropriate under the given context and conditions (Taylor, 1998, pp. 123-4).

Following on from this then, CPT should look to fulfil these criteria; yet in reality accomplishing these conditions is a major task, akin to a 'utopian' vision (Irazábal, 2009). Rather than, communicative planning should attempt to achieve the above principles through dialogue that is typified by:

- Interaction that is free from domination (the exercise of power by particular parties);
- Interaction free from strategizing by the parties involved;
- Free from deception, of both others and self;
- All parties being able to equally and capably make and question arguments;
- No restrictions on participation;
- The only authority should be that of a good argument (Dryzek, 1990, cited in Allmendinger, 2009).

At first glance, studying the new form of self-organisation in urban policy that we are seeing in contemporary Britain through the lens of CPT may be appealing. Sager (2005) raises several points why CPT has gained momentum over the past two decades, and which can certainly be applied to the UK, and European, context:

- Many Western societies and cities are becoming more multicultural, diverse in their ethnic and cultural make up. With this comes a need for further negotiation and communication in preparation of public plans and projects
- The citizens of these countries are more educated than ever before and have an increasing desire to be heard in public spheres
- There are a large number of citizen organisations and social movements strong enough to challenge political decisions (Sager, 2005, p. 2).

Furthermore, the very essence of CPT is grounded in communication with stakeholders outside of the traditional realms of government. It represents an ideal of the planning process founded on realizing open and fair community-based consultation, concluding with consensual agreements between all parties involved in the process (Gunder, 2010).

However, one of the major criticisms that have been levelled at the emergence of CPT has been its reliance on Habermas's 'communicative action', and the degree to which agreement must be reached under the conditions highlighted above. For example, self-interest, as highlighted by Allmendinger (2009), is always a possibility when various parties are called together into discussions. The retort to this by Habermas (1984) is to state that the communicative rationality, the basis for communicative planning, is there to provide only a theoretical procedure for how disputes can be settled, and how principles in such quarrels can be created (Dryzek, 1990, p. 17). Furthermore, he comments that differences in opinions are adequate on condition that they have been reached in a rational manner. Such a response though would appear to negate the foundations of what communicative rationality is built upon, and apparently looks to be more committed to the process of rational discourse than reaching a settlement between parties that do not see eye to eye. Understanding the process and suggesting ways of incorporating more viewpoints, particularly that of the public in the context of planning is an admirable concept. However to do this without the aim of arriving at a just and fair agreement on land-use decisions weakens the basis of the theory; furthermore, it has been argued that the theory remains too abstract (Low, 1991), hindering its application in a practical setting.

The normative roots of CPT are also a central concern. Communicative theory is, in essence, a theory of how planning ought to be in a utopian world, where the lines about what constitutes good and bad planning are clear, whilst also maintaining that all parties consulted in the communicative process will be given equal significance under conditions of unrestrained dialogue. However, realistically this is very rarely the case, unconstrained discourse being an "admittedly unattainable" ideal by proponents of the theory (Sager, 2006, p. 227). Sager continues to comment that ideally all those who take part in any discussion should be able to do so freely and equally, yet that such a situation would need to satisfy conditions that are improbable (p. 227). In the real world, coercion and influence upon the powerful institutions that exist at the urban level can be used to marginalise less dominant groups, with outcomes favouring those powerful groups (Flyvberg, 1998b; Hillier, 2003).

Though proponents of CPT counter this through the "ideal speech situation", where debate occurs in an environment where the power structures are flattened and set aside and arguments are based on honesty and sincerity, this still appears to be a very idealist way of viewing how planning should be. When it comes to most, if not all, planning decisions in

contemporary life, stakeholders will come from various (class) backgrounds, holding different views and opinions and able to project different levels of influence on the traditional institutions of planning. The theory appears unable to explain the consequences that will occur when differences of opinion and influence are exhibited in planning decisions and debates. Indeed, research into collaborative decision-making processes has identified how it often takes place in environments in which participants bring their own interests and values to the process (Bradshaw, 2003; McGurk, 2001; Paulson, 1998). This ties into the concern identified by Outhwaite (1994), who reasons that Habermas's theory of communicative action, whereby common concerns are to transcend self-interest and benefit in the planning process, is in direct opposition to the literature mentioned above that sees any collaborative social action driven from an original position of (rational) self-interest (Murray, 2005).

As Abram (2000) contends, CPT is inadequate as a method for increasing democratic discourse in planning as it does not take into account the power structures that planning takes place in in the UK, and how interests between different stakeholders contrast. Though proponents have tried to temper this criticism by contending that disparities can be surmounted through structured decision-making focussed on attaining agreement from all parties, the idealistic nature of this argument has been dismissed by opponents as a weak counter-argument (McGurk, 2001). For the collaborative approach to move towards providing a justifiable theory, power, and the intrinsic relationship that it has within decision-making, needs to be accepted as part of the process, with theories and practice reshaped to offer insight into how to operate within such an environment (Flyvberg, 2002; Hillier, 2003).

It can be seen then that CPT is not the ideal theory from which to frame the research within. Its lack of comprehension for power relations within the planning system ties it to its normative sphere, and lends limited use in the study of the new approach to self-organisation that is now being experienced in England. Furthermore, it has been argued that, by not only taking into account power relations in the planning process, neither does CPT take into account that participants can act strategically (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998; Woltjer, 2000).

2.6 New theories of cooperation in planning?

From this review of three of the dominant theories in collaborative action and coalition formation in planning, it can be seen that all three have great theoretical strengths and weaknesses. The growth coalition has been beneficial in studying partnerships in urban politics, having been thoroughly researched since its inception into academic literature in the 1970s. Similarly, urban regime theory has been one of the most influential notions in urban politics. Both are grounded heavily within empirical research, with very little exploration of the behavioural dynamics involved in the formation of coalitions of actors who share similar and differing interests at the same point in time. At the same time, communicative planning theory, though widely commended for bringing to the fore the importance of greater public participation in the planning process, and for recognising that communication in the development of plans should be more than the one way procedure that it was under the rational view of planning in the 1970s, has weaknesses. Such weaknesses include the inability, and apparent reluctance, to recognise the influence that power and influence have on the system. Self-interests and motivations (behaviours) of parties involved in the process in any given context have been largely left unexplored.

The empirical and normative studies that have taken place so far, in the guise of the three theories discussed above, though highlighting communication and identifying ways in which it is possible that coalitions of actors can come together, do not answer some of the behavioural questions that can be asked of these partnerships. Such questions include:

- What explains the nature of coalition formation in urban policy?
- What internal power dynamics do these coalitions exhibit?
- What is the importance of a leader within the main coalition?
- What conditions are required for the coalition to exist over prolonged periods of time?
- Are they stable, or does the size and make-up of the coalition fluctuate? And does this impact upon the aims of the group?

With such questions, it is possible to turn to a strand of mathematics and economics that is concerned with the study of models of cooperation and conflict between rational decision makers; namely, behavioural economics, theories of voluntarism and game theory.

2.7 Behavioural Sciences

Following the breakdown of current theories on urban governance earlier in this chapter, it is appropriate for us to consider alternative theories that speak more clearly to behaviour between different parties. In particular, the field of behavioural sciences lends itself strongly to this research. Behavioural science incorporates various disciplines and explores the various activities and interactions that take place between different beings, be they human or natural. Its methodology is to abstract empirical data with the aim of investigating the decisions and communicative behaviour that occur between various actors in a social set. Behavioural science theories can identify certain characteristics of individuals, and the context or environment in which these characteristics are set, that are causally related to behaviour. This information can then be used to guide policymakers' selection of differing tools in order to implement appropriate interventions in their respective field (Jackson, 1997).

Behavioural economics is a strand of behavioural science that has been used extensively to inform the methods implemented in this research. In short, behavioural economics is the study of the effects of psychological, cognitive, emotional and social factors upon economic decisions. It is the study of psychology relating to the (economic) decision making processes of both individuals and institutions. This chapter will introduce the theories from behavioural sciences to the questions with which this research is concerned: what are the principal drivers of and barriers to the cooperative behaviour that is essential for so much of the 'new' urban policy agenda in Britain to work. In what follows, a case is put forward to develop a 'behavioural insights' approach to planning practice. At the neighbourhood scale, the Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI) is introduced as a previously unexplored way of measuring voluntarism – the essential ingredient in Neighbourhood Planning. The VFI represents the promise of being able to uncover the underlying motivations and complex behavioural determinants of why some citizens volunteer to be a part of a neighbourhood forum.

In a similar fashion, a case is equivalently made to investigate cooperation at a broader scale – that of the local authority. The Duty to Cooperate represents the perfect opportunity to investigate the degree to which true cooperation can be engineered through a policy such as this. Insights from cooperative game theory set out in this chapter imply a range of behavioural questions regarding whether an invocation to cooperate, such as the Duty to Cooperate, is necessary or whether self-cooperation can emerge through self-organisation.

2.8 Why should citizens participate in planning?

Why do individual actors choose to form a neighbourhood planning forum? Whilst the devolution of planning powers to the local level, and the abolition of the Regional Spatial Strategies, has created a space for this new form of participation in the planning process, what are the driving factors that have led some, but not all, communities to become involved in neighbourhood planning? Are there particular personal attributes that are needed to volunteer time and resources to this group project? Essentially, what are the personal motivations that drive people to become involved in neighbourhood planning?

The issue of variation in citizen engagement with planning is a perennial academic question, with its roots based in the work of Arnstein (1969) and the “ladder of citizen participation”. It has been described as a “contested concept” (Day, 1997), and is considered as one of the key topics in government decision making; precisely, how much participation can be deemed enough (Callaghan, 2007)? Some political scientists have argued that representative democracy is both more effective and appropriate than an ‘idealist’ direct democracy (Dahl, 1989), and that most people lie at the extreme ends of the spectrum: self-interested and fervent, versus passive and indifferent (Stivers, 1990). However, for those who champion the idea of direct democracy, an increased role for citizens in decision making processes leads to a better educated citizenry, increasing the chances of deeper involvement (Barber, 1984; Mansbridge, 1990; Pateman, 1970).

The discussion of communicative planning theory earlier in this chapter sought to shed light on how citizens can become involved in the planning process, and the facilitative role that planners might play in this process. According to communicative theorists, (ideal) planning practices should be open for all to make a contribution, allowing differing parties to understand the needs of others, enriching the discussion that is had and leading to outcomes that are suitable for all (Healey, 1992).

Yet, as the critique of CPT in earlier illustrates, some assumptions of the theory struggle to hold true in the practical application to real-world planning processes. As Tewdwr-Jones and Allmedinger comment:

“The assumption that all stakeholders within the communicative discourse arena are striving for enhanced democracy for communities is a value judgment and one that does not hold water; the stakeholders present within the arena of discourse will possess different aims and values and

professional agendas. There is also a difficulty in questioning how far values are held in common, and what assumptions can be made about this. The ethic assumes that all those who present themselves into the discourse arena would share the same desire to make sense together. This assumption does not relate to the nature of the human psyche; why should consensus among all those attending be regarded as a positive attribute when clearly different agendas and different objectives form the very essence of the planning argumentation process?" (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998, pp. 1979-80)

CPT does not take into account the possibility that consensus will not always be reached between different stakeholders. There is also no explanation offered as to why individuals should be motivated to place themselves in the process of planning in the first place. It has been argued that planners can stimulate a wider involvement from a range of stakeholders by inviting more groups to become involved, and through providing clear openings for discourse between professionals and citizens (Burby, 2003). Again though, in such a scenario the potential for disagreement between the two parties is unexplored. Furthermore, it has been argued that by expanding the prospects for citizen participation in planning may not always be the most desirable option, as non-cooperative behaviour may become incentivised within collective action problems (Rydin & Pennington, 2000). A result of such mixed opinion on how best to incorporate public participation can lead to both parties seeing it as an unsatisfactory process (Glass, 1979).

When addressing the question of citizen participation in planning, it is important to understand what the landscape looks like for those seeking to become involved in the process. Inch (2015) argues the inequality in skill sets between planners and citizens can be a barrier to participation from the latter, with deliberation through written representations and dialogue between the two groups being neither fair nor inclusive. In reaction to this, citizens may choose to engage in action designed to directly influence decision makers. Yet even this move may be doomed to fail against a planning system that is designed to withstand such political movements (Inch, 2015, p. 418). The lines of "us" (the citizens) and "them" (planning professionals) can become entrenched in such scenarios, leading to two very different positions on how planning should occur. Such attachments to these adversarial positions may lead to a breakdown in the relationship and communication

between the two groups, harming the potential for open channels of interaction (Healey, 2012).

Yet, in the post-2010 planning polity citizens have a mechanism to take a central role in the planning process, namely neighbourhood planning. This space, designed for use at the micro level in urban governance, has been created with the aim of allowing citizens to actively manage how their local area is managed and how it will look both physically and socially, with planners available to apply their skills to ensure that the neighbourhood plan is written in an appropriate manner. Yet will they seize this opportunity? To answer this question, it is clear that we need new insights that are not available through the prism offered by theories that have already been applied to planning – such as Habermas-inspired communicative planning theory, urban regime theory or the growth machine thesis. Instead we must turn to behavioural sciences where the question of motivation and human agency has a rich history.

2.9 Volunteering in neighbourhood forums

From a policy perspective, the motivation to become involved with neighbourhood planning may appear to be simple. As Parker (2017) notes, the appeal of creating a statutory plan itself must be a key motivator in the uptake of the policy, as many communities have chosen to do so, despite the effort required. Indeed, there has been both academic and professional research into the uptake of neighbourhood planning around the country. Parker et al (2014), in research based upon telephone interviews followed up by focus group meetings, have provided evidence on the neighbourhood plan process during its formative years. Whilst the primary focus of this research is on the process by which plans are developed, the research also briefly explores, albeit in a cursory manner, why participants had chosen to undertake the process. The two key reasons behind this uptake are understood as “reinvigorating the local area (usually through providing a vision for the future), and protecting the desirable characteristics of the area” (Parker, et al., 2014, p. 18). These motivations are centred on the policy itself, and appear innate to the planning system. Indeed, quotes taken from the research appear to illustrate that it is the opportunity to engage with the planning system itself that draws people into engaging with the policy:

‘What we want to do ... is to have genuine involvement of local people in planning decisions, it’s just the sheer process of involvement’ [Int. 36]

'We wanted to stop situations where we weren't being listened to, and give the community a voice.' [Int. 3] (Parker, et al., 2014, p. 19)

Again, later in the report it is clear that being engaged with the planning system and thus being able to have more input into the management and design of their local area is a key source of motivation for stakeholders in the process, with aims of the studied groups centring on "wanting to influence planning decisions and shaping the future of the neighbourhood" (Parker, et al., 2014, p. 60).

Other evidence on the issue can be found in the work of the Planning Advisory Service. Here, PAS (2015) summarises some of the reasons why communities may be choosing to get involved in making a neighbourhood plan. Incentives to initiate a neighbourhood plan are mentioned, with several case studies highlighted. Such incentives include long term housing trends in Exeter St. James, neighbourhood-level housing problems in Upper Eden, maintaining a vibrant market town character in Thame and urban regeneration and reducing levels of physical dilapidation in East Preston (PAS, 2015).

General spurs for communities are suggested as resting upon the notion of recognising local priorities. Other motivational aspects linked to this are the awareness of regeneration possibilities that can be influenced locally, through bringing key stakeholders together in order to stimulate growth in a positive way for the community.

All of these motivations and drivers to become a part of the neighbourhood planning process are intrinsically linked to the concept of planning itself. This is rational, as it can be reasoned that people will want to become involved in the planning process if they have a genuine interest in the planning matters that affect their local (and sometimes even broader) area. However, the literature on behavioural sciences shows that there are other reasons why people volunteer, that are not necessarily driven by the inherent objective cause itself. Personal objectives, that may or may not be necessarily aligned with the respective project, can also serve as drivers for volunteerism. Such motives for voluntarism have been researched in many areas of society, with this voluntarism recognised as essential for the success of many organisations and schemes (Bang & Ross, 2009; Rotolo & Wilson, 2006).

2.10 Assumed voluntarism

The introduction of neighbourhood planning to the English planning system seems to indicate that the Coalition government of the time envisaged an untapped voluntarism in local communities. At the very least the introduction of the policy implies an assumed willingness amongst communities to facilitate the management and development of the built environment in their respective areas. Fundamental to the success of any such public participatory method is the notion of volunteering. Whilst town and parish councils can lead on neighbourhood plans in their areas, those communities that do not have such a focal point to rally around will need to create a neighbourhood planning forum in order to manage the plan making process. It is clear that the architects of the policy had a good deal of faith both in local communities initiative to build the network that underpins such an institution but also their willingness to demonstrate this initiative voluntarily (Blond, 2010).

But voluntarism bears costs. At its most rudimentary this can be the opportunity cost of expending time on neighbourhood planning that might have been devoted to some other activity. Indeed, this was reflected in the official DCLG guidance that accompanied the policy's launch where any citizen entering the plan making process should expect to make a 'significant commitment in terms of time and energy, over a period of months or years' (DCLG, 2016).

Government's expectation that the levels of voluntarism necessary to make neighbourhood planning successful would be apparent in society is perhaps surprising. In recent decades there has been a growing literature on declining in trust in society, the political process and the institutions of government. O'Neill (2002, p. 11) comments upon a "looming atmosphere of mistrust" in society, and this lack of trust has also been used to question the level of faith which the public should invest in institutions that are meant to serve citizens (Offe, 1999). It is regular occurrence for the media to comment upon a lack of public trust in institutions that do not appear to be acting with full transparency, with perhaps the recent Brexit referendum vote serving as a prime example of citizen rejection of established systems (Hobolt, 2016). The introduction of the "Big Society" by the 2010 Coalition government was superficially intended to act as a response to this culture of declining trust, its emphasis on devolving political power to communities also neatly dovetailed with cuts to public spending. Some have argued that the austerity that accompanied the 'big society' has led to a deeper mistrust of political elites and the decision making process (Levitas, 2012; Milbourne & Cushman, 2013; Taylor, 2011).

This notion of decentralisation and local empowerment was partly borne out of apparent crisis of trust in the British political system that at the time was straining under the pressures of the global economic crisis that had taken hold in the late 2000s. This added to a further mistrust that had been directed towards politicians in the corridors of Whitehall, with the 2009 expenses scandal involving Members of Parliament adding to the apathy shown to mainstream politics by the wider public (Tait & Inch, 2016). Owing to such mistrust in central politics, Localism was rolled out under the “Big Society” banner by the Coalition government, and as such can be seen as a further devolution of power to the local level that previous New Labour governments had attempted to instigate with earlier policies.

Planning is a service that has not escaped similar criticism (Swain & Tait, 2007), with it noted how some citizens do not believe that their respective local planning authority (LPA) operate “*equitably and honestly*” (Silvester, 2002). This has not been an entirely new phenomenon in the English system, with a mistrust of planning being reported decades ago through notable works by Davies (1972) and Jacobs (1962). Yet it is noted that there has been an increasing level of disapproval aimed at the system (Swain & Tait, 2007).

The concept of “public involvement” in planning is an appropriate example of how deeply embedded mistrust is in this institution. Participatory approaches initially came about through discontent with the traditional, centrally expert-led system of planning: it was viewed as out-of-touch with citizen’s general needs, creating an atmosphere of “us and them” between the public and planning professionals (Davies, 2001). Essentially, planning had lost the trust of the people whom it was designed to serve (Swain & Tait, 2007). Thus participatory models were an attempt to reestablish trust into the system, creating spaces intended for the public to contribute to the planning process and decisions. Such moves, through the delegation of powers, exchanging ideas transparently and valuing the knowledge of others, can be seen as moves to generate trust between all members of the process (Kumar & Paddison, 2000).

Yet, as discussed earlier, this participatory approach has not always been successfully integrated into planning systems, in terms of being truly citizen-focussed. Established citizen participation practices included referenda, public hearings and consultations, public advisory committees, focus groups and the use of social media to reach out to greater numbers of society (Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Hartz-Karp, 2005; Kleinhans, et al., 2015). Yet barriers to such participatory methods, such as time and cost restraints, weak citizen skill

sets, citizen indifference and the difficulties in including marginalised groups, still continue (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Roberts, 2004).

In planning processes in particular, participation has been accused of being tightly designed by central government through the creation of a rigid framework of rules that restrict the level of civic engagement (March, 2010). This has led to some researchers questioning the level to which governments are actually engaging with their citizens, with Maginn (2007) describing participation as being “designed in” by governments, creating an illusion that officials are effectively communicating with residents and community groups, rather than actually having an impact on how decisions are reached. This has led to a “crisis of participatory planning” (Monno & Khakee, 2012). Furthermore, it has been argued that this crisis exhibits itself in a narrow minded system, used sparingly by governments to conceal pro-growth agendas whilst neglecting core issues regarding fair distribution and access for all to essential social infrastructure (Purcell, 2009; Legacy, 2017). Despite these limitations though, ‘meaningful’ participation is still seen as a way of empowering communities (Natarajan, 2017).

This can be seen in the case of the English planning system. Reforms to English planning in 2004 emphasised a greater need for effective engagement with communities and other stakeholders (Baker, et al., 2010). Though initiatives such as Labour’s New Deal for Communities aimed at putting the wishes of citizens first, there were still administrative and control issues that hindered this policy. Strict funding deadlines and the imposition of boundaries on communities reduced the level of impact that this initiative could have (Dinham, 2005). Elsewhere, work conducted with several planners in England uncovered that public participation was an exercise that was routinely carried out as it was the “right” thing to do, but with it being less clear as to “why” this should be carried out, with public scepticism of such practices being a by-product of this (Campbell & Marshall, 2002).

Against this backdrop of mistrust in institutions then, and the devolution of power in planning that has occurred in England, has been the creation of these neighbourhood plan spaces for communities to have a greater input into the management of their area. Committing to being a part of such a group though, evidently incurs some form of cost. For the most part, this is likely to be a time-related cost. As part of a steering group, members have to commit time aside out of their normal lives for various plan related activities. Meetings may be held to first initialise the plan making process, with regular follow up meetings to ascertain roles and responsibilities through the process, and also updating

fellow stakeholders in how the plan is progressing. In addition to this there may be meetings with planning professionals in order to gain a greater insight into the formal aspects of the plan making and adoption processes themselves. Such consultations can also serve to uncover whether the forum's own plan is both watertight and clear, whilst also being in accordance with their respective local plan (if this document has been devised). Community engagement is also necessary in the completion of an evidence base for the plan. This in itself will involve a great deal of time, through canvassing opinion soliciting community opinion through meetings where local residents and stakeholders can learn how the plan is progressing and offer input. This can actually start from the very first steps of the neighbourhood planning process. In determining what communities will fall into the neighbourhood area, it will be necessary to speak to local people living in the area to uncover their views on the plan, and whether or not they want to be included in it. Time will also need to be spent with the council to discuss exactly what areas can and cannot be included in the neighbourhood forum. This is not just the remit of forums that are formed in the absence of a parish or town council. The latter forms of governance may choose to create a neighbourhood plan for a smaller, more focused area of their jurisdiction, or in the case of smaller parishes, may elect to join forces with neighbouring parishes to create a joint neighbourhood plan. Indeed, there have been instances of this already in this still nascent form of planning.

Even informally, after an area has been defined by those looking to bring in a neighbourhood plan (this could be one person who acts as a 'first-mover', or perhaps is recognised as being a necessity by a larger group of people, such as a residents association) there is still work to do to assemble a forum, where a minimum of 21 active members is required. After this has been created, the canvassing of local residents and stakeholders is necessary to complete the community engagement side of the plan, and to influence what it will look like. Are their particular developments that locals want to see? Maybe there are developments that they don't want to see? All of these questions should address be during the community engagement stage of the plan.

Clearly then, it is essential that for the neighbourhood plan to have any chance of coming to fruition and being written into local planning documentation, local citizens will need to volunteer for the cause. Both time and other resources are called upon to create the plan. Further time may need to be volunteered to indirectly assist in the formation of the plan e.g. fundraising events to subsidise expenses and consultant fees for expert advice. Not only is

there a duty for stakeholders to volunteer their time and resources, this personal sacrifice is also likely to be a long-term commitment. Neighbourhood forums, once designated, have a duration of 5 years (DCLG, 2016), though the process need not take this long. However, there is a general consensus between differing local authorities that the process will typically take up to two years to complete, from designation of the area (and forum if applicable) to referendum of the plan².

2.11 Previous theories of volunteer motivation

Given that voluntarism is at the core of neighbourhood planning, it makes sense to ask how the human tendency has been understood in the broader behavioural sciences literature. Over the previous two decades, there has been an increase in interest in voluntarism in the academic sphere, and thus there have been more and more studies conducted into voluntarism. It has long been recognised by researchers that volunteering is different from paid work. This is not only in the absence of any monetary reimbursement or associated benefits, but also in the motivational aspects that drive people to give up their time and energy to any given cause (Hustinx, et al., 2010; Phillips & Phillips, 2011). It is also recognised that understanding the motivations that drive volunteers to become involved in the first place is essential, particularly for the recruitment and retention of said volunteers (Bang & Ross, 2009; Clary, et al., 1998; Handy, et al., 2010; Hustinx, 2010; Hustinx, et al., 2010; Phillips & Phillips, 2011).

Defining both voluntarism and volunteer may, at first glance, seem an arbitrary task. Yet misconceptions of what both entail are common. As Freeman notes (1997, p. 140), “while some may think of volunteers as society ladies who give an hour or two a week to the Junior League, much volunteer activity comes from employed persons with high productivity and opportunity costs”. As such, defining both terms should be an essential first step in studying this phenomenon. A volunteer can be defined as an individual who has chosen to serve in a role that helps others, doing so of their own free will (Cnaan, et al., 1996). Yet attempts to define voluntarism have been the subject of some debate (Fyfe & Milligan, 2003). At a broad level, voluntarism is accepted as referring to the sector of society that involves formal, non-profit distribution of services, whilst being a self-governing, independent entity (Taylor,

² A look through the FAQ pages of various Local Authority neighbourhood planning webpages indicates that this 2 year period is the typical length of time that it takes to bring a new neighbourhood plan into legislative force.

1992; Milligan, 2007). In a similar vein, voluntarism has been defined as the contribution of one's resources and/or time to individuals or groups that require assistance without expecting to be reimbursed financially, either through profit or compensation (McClintock, 2004). What appears clear then, is that voluntarism involves giving up time and energy for a cause that helps others, without a monetary reimbursement for this effort.

Though there have been various theories of motivation presented over the years, few have developed around the more specific realm of *volunteer motivation* until recently (Phillips & Phillips, 2011). Gradually, research in the area of volunteer motivation has emerged, focussing on drivers such as altruism (Unger, 1991), egoism (Schervish & Havens, 2002), and functional theory (Clary & Snyder, 1999). According to the authors, the earliest research conducted into volunteer motivation viewed such motivation as existing in a contrast between egoism (motivation for self-serving reasons) and altruism (motivation for selfless reasons) (Schervish & Havens, 2002).

2.11.1 Egoism

Egoism, or behaviour that is designed to benefit one's self, is frequently suggested as being the core of all rational economic decision making (Phillips & Phillips, 2011). According to this approach, every act, including those that superficially appear to be altruistic, is carried out for some form of future benefit. Furthermore, it is assumed in some specific branches of broader disciplines such as psychology, sociology and economics that all human action (voluntarism or not) is directed towards a self-serving objective (Mansbridge, 1990). People are motivated to help others through benefits, both tangible and intangible, that they may gain at some point, be they direct or indirect. Such a school of thought essentially rejects altruism as a true driver of volunteering, with only satisfaction and later benefits being the real motives of volunteers (Clohesy, 2000). Furthermore, egoism has been described as "the most obvious motive for acting for the common good" (Batson, et al., 2002). Whilst such conclusions may appear to have merit, this approach does not take into account other emotional processes of the volunteer, such as feelings of empathy towards the person or subject that said volunteering is designed to help. In addition to this, if this behavioural view holds, then the notion of community involvement, and more precisely those persons looking to promote such involvement, have only selfish instincts driving this cause.

Egoism can take several forms. According to Mueller (1975), there are several ways in which volunteers are compensated for their work. Firstly, the attraction of a particular collective

good can be both a payment and motivator to volunteer ones time to a particular shared action. Olson (1973) states that participating in such voluntary groups goes against the rational interests of the individual members of said groups. In larger groups, where all members receive the collective good, the opportunity to 'free-ride' - to share in the proceeds but not the collective work of the group - reduces the incentive to contribute.

2.11.2 Altruism

Other research suggests that this account of human behaviour with respect to voluntarism is too narrow. Though self-interest is a powerful driver in any activity, there has been a significant amount of research carried out that suggests that this is not the only driver in behaviour (Batson, 1991). Altruism, the motivation to increase the welfare of others, has also been identified. In various definitions of altruism, as noted by Haski-Leventhal (2009), emphasis is placed on the 'other', whether this is an exclusive orientation or not. Batson (1991) defines altruism as "a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare", whilst it has also been defined as "behaviour intended to benefit another, even when doing some risk or entail some sacrifice to the welfare of the actor" (Renwick Monroe, 1994, p. 862). Allen and Rushton (1983) present evidence of an 'altruistic personality', whilst others have commented on cases of self-sacrifice and urge to help those who need it (Flashman & Quick, 1985; Titmuss, 1970).

However there are those who extend the view that altruistic behaviour is carried out in order to increase the satisfaction of the person(s) who are engaging in said behaviour (Smith, 2000). Furthermore, Smith has claimed that pure altruism does not exist and is driven by a form of egoism (Smith, 1981). Again though, such a view doesn't take into account feelings of empathy that are felt within people, and doesn't explain why the helper feels that they must act rather than rely on others to lend assistance. Intangible benefits though may be drawn from altruistic behaviour, with a notable example of this being the 'warm glow' of helping (Andreoni, 1995). This has been seen as 'impure altruism', in that instead of being motivated solely by improving the welfare of the recipient of their generosity, these 'warm glow givers' also receive a form of utility from the act of giving. Such warm glow is usually associated with the emotional uplift people feel through assisting others.

2.11.3 Other motives

For a prolonged period, the study of volunteering motivation was limited to the dichotomous views of altruism and egoism (Phillips & Phillips, 2011). The pre-conceived view was that people volunteered under the altruistic concept through a sense of empathy for the cause that they were helping with, or egoistically in order to gain something for themselves. The strength of empathy as a sole motivator for voluntarism, however, has been questioned. Batson, et al (2002) suggest that empathy induced altruism appears to be more generally directed towards individuals than groups, and it is less likely that empathy will be felt for an abstract category of people rather than towards an individual person. Furthermore, empathetic feelings are likely to waver and reduce over time (Batson, 1987; 1991). Egoism too has been questioned as a sole driver of voluntarism for the public interest. Batson et al (2002) summarise this when commenting that though egoistic motives do offer potential for promoting the common good through their implicit connection to enhancing oneself, the resulting issue is that such motives are inherently capricious. Should the individual discover that their self-interest can be fulfilled in other ways that are not linked to the enhancement of the public service, then that commitment to the common good may find itself jettisoned by said individual. Other motives to instigate voluntarism have been discussed, particularly in the realms of community involvement. Batson et al (2002) discuss two such motives; namely *collectivism* and *principlism*.

The collectivism motivation is based upon the notion that increasing the welfare of a particular group is the end goal of voluntarism (Batson, 1994). Such explanations for acting in the public good have often been linked to social identity theory, highlighting acting on behalf of the group rather than for one's self (Tajfel, 1978). If a collective's welfare is threatened or can be bettered in any way, then the collectivist motivation may be triggered, leading to action that is designed to benefit the group. The benefits may boost the welfare of all members of the group, it may boost the welfare of only some of the group, or perhaps only one person in the group; yet if enhancing the entire groups welfare is the end goal, the motive can still be viewed as collectivism (Batson, 1994). Yet collectivism can still fall foul of the pitfalls of egoism as a motivation to volunteer for public benefit. If members of the group envisage a route to increasing their welfare without regard for that of the wider group, the collective may find itself in a position where it loses members, potentially limiting its ability to achieve its common goal. Further to this, people typically have greater regard for collectives that they are a part of, creating an *us*. Such recognition of an 'us' inextricably

leads to a notion of a *them*. The resulting issue with such a motivation is that the drive to meet *our* needs may lead to nefarious actions against *them*.

Principlism is motivation that is concerned with the upholding of a moral principal as its objective (Batson, 1994), such as a form of justice or equality for all. Yet such a motivation may be flawed from the outset, as Batson (1994) himself concedes that there is no concrete empirical evidence that principlism exists in its own right, or whether it is merely a nuanced form of egoism. The major obstacle in any case would be to know when and how any given principle should hold up and apply in a particular situation. It would be rational to expect that a universal set of moral principles should always apply, yet this is not necessarily the case. An example would be that of recycling. It is widely accepted that recycling is a 'good' action. Yet not everybody recycles, as it may require an individual cost (perhaps separating recyclable from non-recyclable items). It can be argued that moral principles serve the purpose of disapproval, or admiration for the acts of others rather than motivate action to enhance the public good.

It can be seen then that each of the motivations mentioned above may be individually unconvincing as a sole explanation for why *all* people volunteer in every case. In practice there may be a suite range of psychological factors that prompt an individual to volunteer. Whilst some individuals may believe that they volunteer for truly altruistic causes, others may volunteer at the same time, for the same cause, but for other reasons, perhaps egoistic in nature. Such a realisation leads to an evolution in theory, namely into functionalism.

2.12 Functional theory

Functional theory, proposed through the work of Smith et al (1956), suggests that individuals are unique in the way that they experience various situations, and that, driven by their own particular principles, their motivations to participate in such situations are different too. When applying this approach to the study of volunteers, several factors need to be taken into consideration (Clary, et al., 1996; Clary, et al., 1998; Clary & Snyder, 1999). Firstly, a motivational perspective allows the researcher to attempt to uncover the individual and social procedures that make people want to both commence and then continue to volunteer. Secondly, different psychological functions for different individuals are stressed. Functional theory proposes that two separate individuals may appear to behave in a very similar way but for extremely differing reasons. It is this focus on the varying psychological

drivers that can motivate a person to exhibit different behaviours that has seen the case for functionalism to be applied to the area of voluntarism, specifically looking into understanding why people volunteered (Clary, et al., 1998). Thirdly, matching an individual's original motivation to the purpose of the task is important for both initiating and maintaining voluntarism to the cause for a prolonged period of time.

2.12.1 Measuring the impulse to volunteer: the Volunteers Function Inventory (VFI)

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that there are many reasons why individuals volunteer – from 'pure' to 'warm glow' altruism across the full spectrum of self-interest. To understand the motivations that lie behind voluntarism in a more fine-grained fashion, the Volunteers Function Inventory (henceforth, VFI) was developed. The VFI grew out of the functionalism approach, and its research on attitudes and motivation. It was developed specifically to analyse the drivers of voluntarism in people (Clary, et al., 1998), and places emphasis on the breadth of motives that underpin volunteer behaviour. It illustrates how volunteering for the same cause can serve to meet different functions for different people. Clary and Snyder (1991) identified six prime motives for volunteer service:

- Expression of Values – a way to express ones altruistic values, such as helping those less fortunate
- Expression of Understanding – a way to gain new skills and knowledge, and exercise skills that are rarely used
- Career motive – a way to improve one's career prospects through related experience
- Social motive – a way to develop social ties and relationships
- Self-esteem (Enhancement) motive – a way to develop the ego through involvement in volunteering
- Protective motive – a way of protecting the ego from negative feelings, such as guilt, through volunteering.

Previous research that has focussed on the motivation to volunteer has been concordant with the functional approach's emphasis on numerous motivations (Van Til, 1988). As such, the VFI is recognised as being one of the most influential pieces of work in the study of underlying motives in voluntarism (Law, et al., 2011), with the researchers praising the

strong conceptual roots of the framework that elevate it above earlier theories. Support for the model has been emphasised by other researchers in the field (Agostinho & Paco, 2012), and it has had a wide array of applications; from the motivations of food bank volunteers (Agostinho & Paco, 2012), youth sport volunteers (Busser & Carruthers, 2010; Kim, et al., 2010), university student volunteers (Francis, 2011; Gage III & Thapa, 2012), motivations in older populations (Brayley, et al., 2014; Okun, et al., 1998) and motivation of volunteer tutors (Caldarella, et al., 2010). Consequently, it is widely considered as one of the most suitable mechanisms through which to measure volunteer motivations (Petriwskyj & Warburton, 2007).

Volunteering for a cause is rarely motivated by one specific reason for individuals, with volunteers in previous research recording that they have perhaps two or three driving factors behind their decision to volunteer (Clary, et al., 1996; Clary & Snyder, 1999). These reasons are typically based on the various considerations for becoming involved in volunteer activities. For example, some people may volunteer their time in order to satisfy a Value function, through humanitarian work or altruistic concerns. Other people may volunteer to gain relevant knowledge for their chosen career path, thus serving a Career function. Volunteering may provide other individuals with the satisfaction of the Enhancement function, through enhancing one's own esteem. The Understanding function may be fulfilled by those individuals who are volunteering in order to further their knowledge of the subject that they are engaging with through voluntarism, and developing skills that would go unused in other aspects of their lives. Still, others might be volunteering their time in order to allow them to integrate and fit in with social groups, both new and existing, that are important to them, in turn satisfying the Social function. Finally, some people may choose to volunteer in order to soothe inner conflicts and anxieties that they may have, perhaps feelings of inferiority or guilt. Such actions can help to protect the ego, and simultaneously satisfy the Protective function.

2.12.2 Influence of varied demographics

When researching voluntarism, it is important to approach the subject from the point of view of the volunteer rather than the organisation they are giving their time to, as this is crucial in uncovering what encourages volunteers to continue to commit, or return to, voluntary action (Bussell & Forbes, 2003). Yet it is also important to be aware of various demographic characteristics that may play a role in voluntarism (Martinez & McMullin,

2004). Therefore, it can reasonably be postulated that different causes that rely on voluntarism may attract different types of volunteer demographics. Two specific demographics that can influence this practice are gender and age. Research has shown that, when controlling for other independent variables such as age and income, volunteering behaviour can be influenced by gender (Mesch, et al., 2006). This study illustrated two key findings; firstly, that single women were more likely than single men to donate money and time to voluntary organisations, and secondly, men who were in a relationship, married or otherwise, were more likely to donate than single men. Such results echo previous work in this area (Wilson & Musick, 1997). Elsewhere, research has shown that males and females may volunteer in different ways. Male volunteers have been reported as preferring to volunteer in tasks that require independent working, whilst females prefer to work in sociable groups (Bryen & Madden, 2006).

Relatively few studies have examined the effect of age differences in motivations to volunteer. A notable exception to this is the work by Black and Jirovic (1999), who discovered that, but for the desire to keep active and busy, motives that were expressed by volunteers for becoming involved in such activities are similar across all age groups. Linked to such a concept is the notion of retirees involving themselves in volunteering. Holmes (2003) comments that retirees can have reasons to volunteer that are distinct to those who have not yet retired. The research found that retirees become involved in volunteering in order to stay active after they have left full time work, rather than looking to gain work experience from the activity, unlike younger volunteers.

Besides these demographic variables, others too can influence levels of motivation to volunteer. Education increases levels of volunteering as it enhances awareness of problems and can increase empathy towards the cause (Rosenthal, et al., 1998). Education also leads people to be more frequently asked to volunteer, as they are more likely to have developed appropriate skills applicable to specific voluntarism opportunities (Brady, et al., 1995; Brady, et al., 1999). Meanwhile, the opportunity cost of income from an individual's paid job has been shown to have an inverse relationship with the probability of them volunteering (Freeman, 1997). Although demographic characteristics may not be able to be used as predictor variables (Manzo & Weinstein, 1987; Smith, 2004), they are still useful to explore, as they help to give context to any research that is investigating who volunteers, and what motivations lie behind this behaviour. Such knowledge can inform governments and

organisations on who volunteers, so that they can have a greater understanding of these groups and what it is that motivates them.

2.12.3 Application to neighbourhood planning

As has been discussed, the VFI has been applied a wide range of disciplines since its initial inception, with it being deemed one of the most suitable frameworks through which to measure volunteer participation (Petriwskyj & Warburton, 2007). As such, it has been deemed as an appropriate tool to measure voluntarism in neighbourhood planning fora. The language of voluntarism speaks directly to that of neighbourhood planning, as it is one of the key facets that is necessary to allow this new policy to flourish. Without a ready supply of citizens who are willing to give up their time and resources for the objective of writing a neighbourhood plan, the policy is doomed to fail. As such, it is essential for the personal factors that lead to citizens into volunteering to be uncovered.

Application of the VFI to planning in this context is a new frontier for both the method and the discipline itself. Other research has sought to discover how the policy is performing in its formative years in terms of how it is able to be utilised effectively and how it is functioning for different communities (Parker, et al., 2014). Elsewhere, others have looked to assess the legitimacy of these new forms of planning processes, and the extent to which higher levels of governance can influence these lower tiers (Sturzaker & Shaw, 2015), and the political identities and ideologies that have resulted in the moves towards localism (Bradley, 2015).

Yet the personal motivations to volunteer in the process have thus far been neglected by the literature. Though Parker et al (2014) briefly touch upon some planning-related motivations in their research, this was not their main topic of investigation, and specifically began from the assumption that the subject of the cause, neighbourhood planning, was the explanatory variable. It is the purpose of this part of the current research to ascertain a fuller understanding of why citizens feel personally obliged to become “citizen planners”, and to uncover whether there are particular inherent, personal senses that neighbourhood planning speaks to more than others. The 6 motives of the VFI, and the quantifiable, analytic nature of the tool allow it to be the most appropriate instrument in order to reveal the personal motives that drive voluntarism in this context.

2.13 LPA Planning Practice: a behavioural economics approach

The VFI promises to provide new insights into the underlying psychology of why individuals might volunteer in neighbourhood planning. However, despite the devolution of some planning powers to communities, much of planning practice still takes place in LPAs. Are there insights from behavioural sciences that could elucidate some aspects of LPA planning practice?

The Duty to Cooperate, which was introduced in 2011 provides a contemporary planning policy that, at the scale of the LPA, mirrors aspects of neighbourhood planning – namely the invocation by central government for LPAs to self-organise around specific cross-boundary issues and cooperate. Clearly, as this would imply institutional rather than individual cooperation, the VFI would not be an appropriate methodology to employ.

Behavioural science incorporates various disciplines and explores the various activities and interactions that take place between different beings, be they human or natural. Three of the most relevant disciplines that fall under the umbrella of behavioural science include psychology, anthropology and sociology. Yet it is also considered relevant to a host of other, diverse disciplines: these include the ‘hard’ sciences such as zoology, genetics, anatomy et al, to the social sciences such as political science, history, demography, economics and statistics (Bauer, 1967).

Within this broad umbrella term of behavioural science is behavioural economics. Using the toolkits of one of behavioural sciences most pivotal disciplines, psychology, behavioural economics analyses the decision making processes behind some economic outcome, such as the factors that play a part in allowing a customer to decide what product to buy over another. Unlike classical economics, where decision making is based on the assumption of rational thought, behavioural economics allows for irrational behaviour to enter the fray, and in doing so attempts to understand why this is the case. The study of this discipline includes analysing how market decisions are made, and the mechanisms that steer public choice. It has been claimed that behavioural economics increases the explanatory power of economics itself through providing it with a more representative psychological base (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2011).

The main toolkit of behavioural economics that this research will use is that of game theory. Game theory is a branch of formal mathematics that is concerned with the study of cooperation and conflict in decision making (Peters, 2008), where such decisions, and the

actors taking these decisions, are known to be interdependent. It can be used to evaluate situations amongst two or more players (individuals or institutions) where the outcome for one player not only depends on the actions that they take themselves, but also relies on the decisions taken by the other participants in the game (Carmichael, 2005). In such circumstances, the strategies of the participants will be dependent on expectations of what other players in the game are doing. With this, game theory can be seen further as a theory whereby decision making between all of the participating players is *interdependent* (Samsura, et al., 2010).

Game theory 'arises in almost every facet of human interaction' (Barron, 2013), with every interaction between individuals or groups involving aims and objectives that are in opposition to each other, or bring about the potential for cooperation. As Binmore (2007) points out:

Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain-hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm and a union negotiating next year's wage are playing a bargaining game ... in brief, a game is being played whenever human beings interact (p1).

Game theorists study the situations involving two or more actors where the interests and potential outcomes for each player are interdependent, or interconnected, and games can take a variety of different forms; some light-hearted, such as poker and the parlour games that many of game theories toy games are represented within, or more serious, such as salary bargaining or even war (Zagare, 1984). One of the key underlying factors in game theory is the presumption that players will behave in a rational way; in game theory, rationality is said to mean that a player will act in a way that will lead to them trying to maximise their potential payoff in the face of other actors who are also attempting to maximise their own potential payoffs. It is worth pointing out that, though these rational players look to maximise their own personal payoff, this should not be interpreted as 'beating' the other player (Dodge, 2012); 'winning' the game is not what players are aiming for, rather they look to achieve the best possible payoff for themselves in the face of moves made by other players in game.

Yet the classical economics interpretation is that games will be played with players looking to maximise their payoff through rational thought. It operates under the assumption of the rational *homo economicus*, as self-interested individuals who seek to optimal, utility (value)

maximising outcomes. Yet people do not always act in self-interested fashion. *Behavioural game theory* therefore extends classical game theory by taking into account players thoughts about the payoffs that both they and other players receive and the effects of learning (Camerer, 2003).

The Ultimatum game is an early example of research that has discovered how normal assumptions of rationality can be violated. In this 2 player experiment, one player (the allocator) is endowed with a sum of money and asked to split it between themselves and the other player (the recipient). The recipient may accept the allocator proposition or reject it. In the case of a rejection of the offer, neither player will receive anything. In the traditional interpretation of the game, the allocator need only offer a tokenistic amount for the recipient to accept it, as both will make a positive gain from the transaction, regardless of the amount offered. However, in a manner that behavioural game theory is able to accommodate, results have shown that most allocators offer more than just a minimal amount, with many going as far as to offering an equal share of the pot. In other examples, the recipient declined the offer made, suggesting that they were willing to make a self-sacrifice when they deemed the deal being offered to be unfair (Güth, et al., 1982).

Game theory is the underpinning logic for the Behavioural Insights Team, an organisation that has applied behavioural economics and game theory to governmental schemes in order to further improve policy. This group, made up of professionals and academics from the sphere of economics, psychology and research methods have used behavioural science across a wide range of public services. They have undertaken research that has helped to increase satisfaction of job seekers by studying the processes involved in the system of getting people into work, and offering solutions based on behavioural sciences, changing the course of interaction between employment advisor and job seeker from a course of penalty avoidance to job attainment (BIT, 2018). Behavioural insights have also investigated how policies can be improved through a greater understanding of human behaviour. Pension enrolments have increased by 9 million additional workers owing to a study conducted by behavioural insight researchers, in which legislation was passed by which citizens had to 'opt out' of the scheme as opposed to 'opting in' (BIT, 2018). Further research by this team of academics has been take on in conjunction with the Department for Transport in an attempt to improve decision making in the building of key infrastructure. They note how infrastructure costs are often over-budget, and how this occurs through decisions made on costs that have already been incurred yet will have no impact on future outcomes. Applying

behavioural sciences, they illustrate how decisions made on future trends and realistic objectives, rather than costs already incurred, should be at the heart of any decision making of this type.

2.13.1 Game Theory - History and first workings

The first major text in game theory was *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), and interest in the study of games has soared ever since this seminal work, with constant evolutions in the understanding and application of the theory taking it beyond the realms of just mathematics. The contributions of John Nash in the 1950s doubtless played a major role in this wider appreciation of game theory (1950; 1951; 1953), with his graduate thesis based on the concept of Nash equilibrium now regarded as ‘the basic building block of the theory of games’ (Binmore, 2007). A Nash equilibrium, put simply, occurs when all of the players within any specific game make a best reply to the replies of all the other players in the game, so much so that they have no motivation to deviate from such a strategy (Binmore, 1992; 2007; Carmichael, 2005; Lord, 2012; Osborne, 2009).

However, as Carmichael (2005) points out, it was not until the 1970s that game theory began to be used across various disciplines to analyse situations strategically, from economics and politics to business and biology. Since this period, some game theorists have advanced the viewpoint that their specialism can be a unifying force in the social sciences, bringing together many difference strands of sociology, economics, politics, business and anthropology, in an attempt to create sub-departments of a wider “science of society” (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004, p. 1)

2.13.2 Applicability to the real world

Game theory, the methodological instrument of information economics, has been widely applied to various fields both inside and outside of its traditional mathematical and economical underpinnings. It has been used as a framework for observing behaviours in auctions (Laffont, 1997), insurance markets (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), stock exchanges (Zingales, 1994), agriculture (Stiglitz, 1974) and labour markets (Stiglitz, 1975). Moving further afield from those uses tied chiefly to the realms of economics, and mentioned above, the scope for application of this tool kit has been widened. Disciplines that have undergone

game theoretical treatment include those of sociology (Peterson, 1994; Swedberg, 2001), politics (Brams, 2004; Jervis, 1988; Morrow, 1995; Ordeshook, 1995), international relations (Snidal, 1985), biology and human biology (Broom & Rychtar, 2013; Colman, 1995; 2003; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998; Weibull, 1997) and medicine (Tarrant, et al., 2010). Such workings of the theory have allowed researchers in their respective fields to gain valuable insights into particular behavioural mechanisms. It has been used to design auctions, with a famous example being that of the British telecom license auction in 2000 (Binmore & Klemperer, 2002), whilst military operations have also been analysed using game theory (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991).

The wide scope of game theory has displayed itself to have led some to call for it to be applied further afield still. Early calls were made in the decades following its original workings for it to be applied to the field of planning (Batty, 1977), and it has since been put forward by planning researchers as a more appropriate way in which to study the behaviour underlying the negotiations that are so central to planning practice (Lord, 2009; 2012; Samsura, et al., 2010). Whilst the three theories mentioned previously in this investigation, those of urban regimes, growth coalitions and communicative planning, present ways in which planning could and perhaps should be carried out, they remain highly normative and descriptive. Healey and Barrett (1990), writing from a communicative planning standpoint, critique previous theories grounded in the neo-classical school of thought. In relation to the assessment of costs in the British planning context, they comment that:

“Such models presume negotiation among agents as necessary but unproblematic in the processes of exchange, and assume certain structuring parameters, such as private property and a particular form of agent rationality. Thus, they do not explore negotiative processes empirically. They also tend to focus on selected distortions to ideal supply-demand relationships (such as the distortions of state intervention), rather than seeking to identify the range and relative significance of different distortions” (Healey & Barrett, 1990, p. 92)

Yet in a further comment of the communicative turn, in particular, it has been recognised that it itself does not offer any further answers on how power relations between various parties involved in planning decisions affect the specific outcomes of negotiations and bargaining (Lord, 2012). Yet these questions are at the forefront of the information economics approach. Information economists are chiefly concerned with negotiation and the influence that power relations have on final outcomes. The mechanism used by

information economists, game theory, is concerned with the study of how individuals and groups within a coalition behave, and under what particular circumstances, if any, these actors come together. As has been pointed out previously, game theory allows questions that have been asked previously by planning academics to be recovered; questions such as do parties (or in game theoretical terms, *players*) behave cooperatively or uncooperatively? What tactics do they employ? And what are the end results of these strategies? (Lord, 2012, p. 64). By analysing them through the lens of game theory, we are able to give a more methodical overview of how players behave and act within the planning realm than the more descriptive and normative theories such as regime theory, growth coalitions and communicative planning would allow us to do so.

2.13.3 Basic concepts

As indicated above, game theory is the study of interdependent choice between players in a particular game at any one time. Whilst the simplest game to be studied would be a one player game, where a player makes a decision in the face of their environment, it has been two player games that have been studied with more enthusiasm by social scientists, as games involving two or more players tend to exhibit the most stimulating situations for investigation (Zagare, 1984). Like other scientific disciplines, game theory consists of a number of 'models' (Osborne, 2009), used as abstractions of the real world situations that we seek to gain a further understanding of. Before delving deeper into how game theory works, firstly some basic concepts of games will be introduced and defined here.

5.7.3.1 Game

A game occurs when a set of circumstances arises where the result of such a situation is dependent upon the actions of two or more decision makers, otherwise known as players. In representing games, theorists attempt to abstract the essential components of a conflict in order to map the potential moves available to each player, and the potential consequences to each player of a particular set of moves. What can be considered to be the essential components of a game are primarily up to the specialist undertaking the study and the structure of the game itself, but in general necessary factors in games include:

- The players taking part,
- the strategy of each player,

- the possible outcomes for each player in relation to the others, and their preferences for each outcome relative to their other potential results.

In planning terms, a game can be seen to be occurring whenever two parties concerned with the built environment come into a situation through which they are interacting with each other. This can easily be realised as two or more local authorities negotiating on cross-boundary issues such as housing and infrastructure, or residents or businesses who make up a neighbourhood forum negotiating what particular legislation they envisage as being part of their plan.

5.7.3.2 Players

Players are independent decision-makers whose decisions influence the development of each other's strategies throughout the course of the game. They can be identified in any situation that involves two or more individuals or groups interacting with each other and their environment, be it political leaders of different countries contemplating going to war with each other, or a footballer and a goalkeeper facing each other at a penalty kick. Players value the potential outcomes of games differently to each other depending upon their own personal preferences. A basic principle of the theory is that players will make *rational* choices when they are called upon for a decision in order to secure their best potential outcome. In the context of planning, players can be recognised as local authority planners or officials, or residents and local stakeholders involved in a neighbourhood forum.

5.7.3.3 Strategy

A strategy is a complete plan of actions that will be taken by a player given a particular set of circumstances that may arise during the game. It specifies how, theoretically, a player will act in the face of other moves by competing players, with players able to choose between taking a number of different strategies, dependent on the size and structure of the game. It is noted that there are similarities between the game theoretical meaning of strategy and that of the business definition of strategy (Samsura, et al., 2010); whilst business strategies contain long term goals, and a plan of how to achieve such ends, game theoretical strategies see players aim at particular objectives, namely utility maximisation, and adopt a strategy that will allow them to do this. In game theory, we assume that each player's objective will be to maximise their own pay off, which is measured on a utility scale (Myerson, 1991). Von

Neumann and Morgenstern (1947, cited in Myerson, 1991, p2) illustrate that, using assumptions about how a decision maker should behave in a rational way, there must be a way of assigning utility via numbers to the potential outcomes that are possible for the decision maker in a game, such that they will always choose the option that maximises their expected utility. Whatever this 'something' that players wish to maximise may be (potentially money or happiness), it is called utility (Binmore, 2007). Strategies in planning could be related to the policies taken with regards to new development in particular areas, or policies implemented to improve the aesthetic and economic outlook of a geographical area.

5.7.3.4 Outcome and Payoff

As Samsura et al (2010) point out, it is important that there is a clear division made between outcomes and payoffs. An outcome of a game is the end state which results from the particular moves and decisions taken by players. The payoff of an outcome is the value assigned to that outcome for a particular player. Player's payoffs may be valued in terms such as time, money or happiness, dependent upon the situation that the game is being played within. However it is convenient to simplify payoffs in terms of *utility*, an abstract, subjective concept that is used widely in economics (Carmichael, 2005, p. 6). The modern source of this idea goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstein (1947), who showed that, by using some very basic conventions about how a rational person should behave, there must exist some way in assigning utility values to the various possible outcomes that each decision maker cares about, and that they will always pick the option that will maximise their expected utility. Payoffs can be ranked in either an ordinal (the different options are ranked in order of best outcome to worst outcome for that player) or nominal way (different outcomes are ranked on an absolute scale, such as in monetary units). Conclusions made on cardinal utility scales require stronger assumptions about the utility preferences of each of the players, whilst this can be more general in the case of ordinal utility scales (DeCanio & Fremstad, 2013).

Payoff values assigned to specific outcomes will vary for each player, as their own personal preferences will influence what outcome they see as best and those outcomes that are not as desirable. The players preferences regarding each outcome are represented by way of expected utility, or as they are more commonly referred to in game theory, their payoff functions. Rational players are expected to prefer more utility as opposed to less, and

therefore in a strategic game the payoff function that carries a higher value utility will be preferred to a lesser one. Such strategies taken by players indicate that they are self-interested and therefore look to pursue personal aims (Carmichael, 2005). However, the interdependence of players that runs through (most) games ensures that any players preferred strategy will ultimately depend upon what they think other players at the table will look to do themselves.

It is this difference in preferences for particular outcomes, and with this, payoff functions that makes conflict so key to game theory. The best outcome for one player may be the worst for another, and it is situations such as these that makes the study of decision making using game theory such an intriguing lens to use.

2.13.4 Classic examples

2.13.4.1 *The Prisoners Dilemma*

The two most recognised forms of illustrating games are the strategic (or normal) form and the extensive form (Figure 2.1). In the strategic form, the moves and payoffs available to each player are presented in a matrix. Payoffs are shown, as is usually the case, by way of a pair of integers for each outcome of the game. In Figure 2.1, Player A's payoff is shown by the first integer listed in any outcome of the game, with Player B's payoff represented by the second. It clearly illustrates a single interaction, or *one-shot game* (Lord, 2012) in which it is possible to see what action each player may take in relation to the other and the payoffs to each as a result of these actions. The strategic form allows quick analysis of each potential outcome of a game, and the payoffs that each respective player will receive. The strategic form is the favoured method for presenting simultaneous move games, such as rock, paper, scissors, or a prisoner's dilemma, an explanation of which follows below.

The extensive form presents an alternative way of presenting game, and is often presented using the analogy of a tree (thus a game in extensive form is displayed via a *game tree*). The root of tree relates to the first move in the game. The branches of the tree correspond to the choices that can be made from this move. At the end of the branches are nodes that represent each move available at that point. Finally, the leaves of the tree represent the final outcomes of the game, and as such the payoff to each player is stated at each of these leaves. Illustrating games in this extensive form also requires the game tree to show which player moves at each node, and information sets are also included at these points. Information sets represent each player's knowledge about their place on the tree, and with this, the

information available to that player regarding any choices that have been made by other players previously in the game (Zagare, 1984).

The extensive form is useful not only in that it allows us to display games originally displayed in the strategic form in a different, and sometimes more clear way, but it is also better suited to show games that are difficult to illustrate in the strategic form. An example of this would be chess, where any matrix would soon become unwieldy after just a couple of moves, owing to the sheer number of moves available in this game (Binmore, 2007). Yet its prime use is in illustrating games in which players make their moves alternatively, as opposed to simultaneously, and thus the choices available to each player can be shown at each decision point (node). A well-studied (military) example is the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (see Zagare, 1984, for a detailed analysis).

a) Strategic (normal) form

| | | Player B | |
|----------|---------|----------|-------|
| | | Confess | Deny |
| Player A | Confess | -5,-5 | 0,-10 |
| | Deny | -10,0 | -1,-1 |

b) Extensive (game tree) form




Figure 2-1 The Prisoners Dilemma

Probably the most famous parlour game of all, the Prisoners dilemma, is shown in Figure 2.1 to illustrate both forms of the game. The game presents a scenario where two suspects are suspected of committing a crime, and are being held separately by the police. Each is

questioned individually and has one of two choices: confess to the crime, in turn implicating the other accused party, or denying any involvement in the crime. In this game, the payoff values are negative as they represent years in prison. Furthermore, they are each told the following stipulations:

- If both suspects confess, they will both be imprisoned for 5 years;
- If both don't confess, both suspects will be convicted of a minor charge with a jail term of 1 year, and;
- If one suspect confesses whilst the other continues to deny, the suspect who confesses will be rewarded for helping the state and be set free, whilst the other will receive the harshest possible sentence for refusing to cooperate – 10 years in prison.

Supposing that in this case, each player is playing the game with only their self-interest as their sole concern. Furthermore, both players must make their decision without knowing what their partner will do, so they must consider their partners options, and anticipate how these decisions will impact on their own fate (Davis, 1970). Looking at the game from one player's point of view (Figure 5.1), say Player A, it soon becomes apparent that confessing is the strictly dominant strategy. Should Player B confess, Player A can only deny the charges, resulting in a 10 year sentence, or confess, leading to a 5 year sentence. Similarly, should Player B deny the crime and remain silent, Player A will serve a minor prison term of 1 year, or will walk free by confessing. In either case, Player A's best rational choice is to confess. As the game is symmetrical, the same reasoning applies to Player B, and their optimal choice is to choose confess. The conclusion drawn from the Prisoners dilemma is that it incentivises individualism in players, as confess is the only Nash equilibrium in the game. A Nash equilibrium occurs when all players in the game choose a best reply to the strategy's chosen by others; in other words, all players cannot gain by changing their own strategy if the strategy of all other payers remains unchanged.

Yet it is worth pointing out this; we are assuming here that the two prisoners are, firstly, interested only in securing the best outcome for their individual self and, secondly, that they do not possess any information about what their counterpart will do. Yet if these assumptions are relaxed, it is possible to reach an alternative optimal outcome. If the prisoners think collectively, it can be seen that their best solution is for both to deny involvement in the crime, resulting in a sentence of 1 year each (a collectively better result than the 5 year term apiece for admitting to the charges). As this is the best *collective* outcome, we label this as Pareto efficient; that is, it is the optimal solution where no player

can improve their final outcome without simultaneously making another player in the game worse off.

But we can also now imagine the following scenario: one of the prisoners is extremely confident that, given the cooperative understanding that they have, their counterpart will deny involvement. This creates a situation where the best individual choice is now to confess to the crime, double crossing the other prisoner and leading to a result where the confessor is set free whilst the denier receives the full jail term of 10 years. With the game being symmetrical, we can conclude that it is never individually rational to choose the cooperative *deny, deny* strategy in a one-off game of the Prisoners dilemma.

As Lord (2012) points out, the Prisoners dilemma, though a simple parlour game, illuminates a couple of core concepts. It provides us with two different versions of optimality, depending on whether we are behaving individually or cooperatively, and shows us that the two approaches may lead to differing outcomes. It also displays the value of information, and who holds it. It casts an intriguing light on whether players should behave cooperatively or individually, honestly or deceitfully when they have more information than any other players in the game. These concepts are key to this investigation, as planning presents situations where information between parties may not always be equal, or where there may be opportunity for defection in cooperative arrangements. One area in planning that has been extensively researched through a game theoretical lens is that of resource management, water in particular, with studies stretching worldwide from Europe (Šauer, 2003; Szidarovszky, et al., 1984; Thoyer, et al., 2001), North America (Loáiciga, 2004; Rosen & Sexton, 1993; Wang, et al., 2008), Australia (Tisdell & Harrison, 1992), Japan (Suzuki & Nakayama, 1976), and Africa (Elimam, et al., 2008; Wu & Whittington, 2006).

2.13.4.2 The Stag Hunt

In order to demonstrate the applicability of the theory to planning, and particularly with respect to the self-organising facets of planning that are so central to this investigation, one of the most famous games in game theory will now be presented: the Stag hunt. It has previously been applied to a wide range of fields, from international relations (Stein, 1990), human biology (Saposnik & Johnston, 2016) and primatology (Bullinger, et al., 2011). With such a wide ranging scope for application, its use in planning decisions will be illustrated here.

In its original writing Rousseau (1755), describing the problems of achieving collective action, used the analogy of a stag hunt to illustrate how particular social situations had the potential to stimulate cooperation between members of a group, or individualism (Dixit, et al., 2009). He painted the picture of a pair of hunters who are posed with the following predicament: should they cooperate with each other to catch a big prize (in this case, a stag), or individually choose to hunt a lesser prize entirely for themselves (in this case, a hare). Game theoretical analysis allows this situation to be studied in a clear way, illustrating how both parties best choice is dependent upon the choice of their counterpart. Figure 2.2 shows the game theoretical interpretation of this game between 2 players, A and B.

| | | Player B | |
|----------|------|----------|------|
| | | Stag | Hare |
| Player A | Stag | 5,5 | 0,4 |
| | Hare | 4,0 | 2,2 |

Figure 2-2 The Stag Hunt

In this game, there are two possible Nash equilibria, shown in the top left and bottom right corners of the table. Should Player A choose to hunt a hare, Player B's best reply is to hunt a hare also (2 is a better individual payoff than 0). Similarly, if player A chooses to hunt a stag, Player B is better off doing the same, as in this case hunting a stag will yield a greater payoff (5) than hunting a hare (4). This illustrates an important lesson for planning practice. There can often be two different best responses for players when it comes to planning decisions. The Stag hunt game could, potentially, represent a real life situation such as two neighbouring authorities debating whether or not to go into partnership with each other to attract mobile investment, or to develop their own independent strategies, with 'stag' representing cooperation and 'hare' representing individualistic working. Though working together may be give a greater payoff to both authorities, they may still choose to work alone owing to various reasons, perhaps longstanding rivalries. The Stag hunt game teaches us an important lesson in attempting to reach the more beneficial situation of *cooperate, cooperate* from *individual, individual*; the importance of trust. Should Player A attempt to convince Player B to cooperate, such an arrangement depends on Player B trusting that Player A will do the same. Should they defect on this agreement, Player A stands to gain a healthy payoff (4) whilst Player B will suffer a poor payoff (0). Again, as this is a symmetrical game, the same outcome holds sway if Player B defects and Player A cooperates. Trust in

this case may be garnered through implementation of some form of rulebook, or sanctions imposed upon any authority who looks to defect on any brokered deal.

2.13.5 Types of Game

The types of situations that are studied using game theoretical modelling can be described using various levels of detail, and can fall into two broad categories; cooperative and non-cooperative games. Cooperative game theory involves the examination of coalitional games with respect to the different levels of power held by players within the coalition, or how the partnership should divide its earnings, and is most normally utilised to investigate situations that arise in political landscapes and international relations, where power issues are vital (Turocy & von Stengel, 2003).

Non-cooperative game theory is concerned with the strategies and tactics used in a game that is set in a competitive environment, and models how players will behave towards each other when the coordination with each other is not at the forefront of their strategies (Glumac, et al., 2015). It has been seen as the ‘fundamental’ approach out of the two in terms of research over the last 40 years (Binmore, 1992), and requires a full description of the rules of the game in order for the strategic opportunities that are available to each player to be studied in detail. The aim of non-cooperative game theory tends to be to find a set of equilibrium strategies to be labelled as the solution to the game, should such an equilibrium exist in the respective game.

It has been noted that the use of terms such as “cooperative” and “non-cooperative” in game theory can be misleading (Binmore, 2007; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009), as critics and those who are uninitiated with the theory mistakenly believe that non-cooperative theory is concerned exclusively with conflict whilst cooperative theory is totally focussed on collaboration. There are times when non-cooperative theory can be used to model situations where some of the players in a game may have a common shared preference, just as cooperative theory can apply even when the interests of all of the members of the coalition differ from each other. The central difference between the two branches of game theory can be stated “that in non-cooperative game theory the basic modelling unit is the individual (including his beliefs, preferences, and possible actions) while in coalitional game theory the basic modelling unit is the group” (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009, p. 47).

2.13.6 Applicability to planning

With the aim of this research to investigate how coalitions in planning form and function over time, and in light of the literature above, both cooperative and on-cooperative game theory will be applied to analyse these occurrences. It is particularly relevant to the planning process as the management of land is often open to many different interests. From the macro scale, where two or more interested parties e.g. neighbouring local authorities may have a vested interest in a large scale development on land that crosses more than one jurisdiction, to the micro level e.g. various homeowners in a particular neighbourhood concerned over the management of their local area, land is often under multiple different ownerships. At all levels, it may be necessary for actors to come together, be they in competition or share the same opinions, for their 'greater good'. The prime outcome should result in development that is in line with the wishes of the majority of the coalition, in respect of what is realistically possible, with such results being the result of a collective act.

Such coalitions will always be intrinsically specific to the context within which they are set. Differences may be encountered between land management practices between rural and urban areas, wealthy and poor areas, the fabric of the governing bodies that preside over these areas, and the views and beliefs that individuals hold. Yet there are commonalities between them, and issues that occur in one particular area may often occur in other geographies, regardless of scale, demographics or land ownership. Issues like commitment to the coalition can occur within any coalition, and are not fixed to one particular context. Here, game theory can be utilised to model how these issues manifest themselves in the first place, and also to offer guidance on potential ways to circumvent such situations.

Cooperative game theory can be of great use to inform how the coalitions that have become so integral to urban planning in the UK. It has been noted that this is particularly true of the real estate development process, with land often under the ownership of multiple parties, and as such, in need of being 'assembled' before development can commence (Lord, et al., 2015). As the authors note, particularly with regards to planning, competition between rivals in their interactions can produce costs that are particularly negative in the planning process, and they note how the opportunity for cooperation and coalition formation is rich and potentially lasting (p10).

All coalitions share the viewpoint that they should look to stay stable over the time period for which they are required to be functioning, whether they have short or long term lifetime. In order to keep a coalition stable, there surely needs to be an incentive for actors to remain

in the game. In cooperative game theory, the value of such an incentive is measured by the Shapley value, devised by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 to evaluate a numerical value to playing a game (Roth, 1988), and is considered as the most useful way of illustrating how a fair distribution of utility can be spread amongst players. It is a cooperative concept, and it dictates that each player in the coalition should be given a payoff that is equal to the average of the contribution that they make to each coalition that could possibly exist (Dixit, et al., 2009). This concept that each player's payoff is proportional to their contribution can appeal greatly, as it dictates that a player in the coalition has to make a genuine effort to generate the contribution, then this type of payment scheme incentivises such an effort to be put into the overall objectives of the grand coalition.

Coalitions in planning can be drawn from several, potentially very differing, interested stakeholders; public sector bodies, private businesses, third party organisations, pressure groups and the general public, either as supporters or protestors against any said development, will all undoubtedly have a particular interest in the development process. In fact, the process of negotiation that is required to ideally deliver physical improvement that is in the best interests of all, socially, economically and environmentally, will inevitably require collective action. Such coalitions will vary from context to context, and may be the mechanism used to overcome a first mover problem, as explained above, or may be required to stay functional (and perhaps change shape) over a prolonged period of time. They will often have different aims and objectives from each other. However, some fundamental questions will remain constant throughout the formation and operation of them all:

- Will there be a first mover?
- How stable is the coalition, and what is needed to ensure that participants are not tempted to leave to coalition for further personal gain?
- Do smaller coalitions emerge in the grand coalition?

Such questions are central to understanding the roles that individual parties play within building coalitions in many spheres, and planning is no different. Within many partnerships and groups, be they national, regional, local or even at the community level, certain dynamics exist that help to bind the greater coalition together, and allow it to continue to function over time.

2.14 Summary

This brief introduction into the discourse of behavioural economics, and more specifically its use of both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, has served to show its potential use in application to planning. Planning is a nascent area of study for game theory, particularly when compared to the levels of engagement that it has had in other disciplines such as international relations, biology and anthropology, to name but a few of the subjects highlighted earlier. One such application has been to use game theory to analyse how the decisions of various actors in the Dutch land and property development sector interrelate with one another, and how decisions prompted particular outcomes (Samsura, et al., 2010). The authors found that game theory could prove useful in the process of land development by showing the payoffs earned by each stakeholder in the land development 'game', as well as illustrating the equilibrium strategy that would be best for all of the stakeholders to follow. Though there have been other applications of game theory to the realm of urban planning (Asami, 1985; Lord, 2012), this does not constitute a plethora of literature.

As has been seen in this chapter, there has long been a tradition of partnership working in urban planning, particularly in the UK. Therefore then there is a great scope for behavioural economic approaches to be applied to planning in this context, in order to research the relatively underdeveloped area of stakeholder engagement and behaviour in these disciplines. Most notably for this investigation, its application to occurrences in planning where coalition is a pre-requisite in decisions being made at numerous scales of governance will be investigated. The shortcomings of traditional theories of urban governance, most notably urban regimes, growth coalitions and the communicative turn, to interpret how coalitions come to coalesce, the conditions needed for them and their durability over time, have been noted.

Behavioural economic reasoning and theories of voluntarism will now be applied to those newer forms of governance that we have seen emerge in the UK over the last decade. Specifically, Neighbourhood Development Plans at the micro scale will be assessed using the VFI, in order to ascertain the reasons behind citizens choosing to volunteer their time and effort into creating a legislative plan for their community. At the macro (local authority) scale, the role of the Duty to Cooperate will be assessed, as well as using game theoretical inspired reasoning to deduce how local authorities communicate and cooperate with each other in the absence of central government guidance. Issues of how these coalitions come to coalesce in the first place, whether first movers are required, and how the partnerships

endure over time will be investigated through this lens in order to provide insights that other theories are not equipped to do so. The emerging policies of neighbourhood planning and the Duty to Cooperate lend themselves perfectly to the new approaches proposed in this research. By rejecting the more traditional theories of partnerships and coalition building in the urban arena and embracing the approaches of behavioural economics, this research has an opportunity to exhibit genuinely new methods of analysis in the discipline of urban planning, and to apply them to mechanisms themselves that are still in a relatively nascent stage of their lifetime. To understand why the instruments of governance that this research will assess are so new in their nature, firstly we must look at the policy context of UK planning. To do this, the thesis will now summarise the context of planning in the UK since the end of the Second World War, and illustrate how different policies have left a lasting impact on how urban planning has been managed, leading to the landscape that we see in the UK today.

Chapter 3 – Policy Context

3.1 Introduction

Recent times have seen a fundamental change in the design of urban policy in the cities of the West (see Denters and Rose, 2005, for an in depth commentary on various public management reforms across the globe). Such changes have occurred both in how urban areas are governed, and by whom – a transition often summarised as the shift from government to governance. Of course, such changes in the fabric of how we manage our cities differ between national contexts, as noted by previous research (Harding, 1997; Denters & Rose, 2005). However, moving away from the approach that has, particularly in Europe, been dominated by the institutional legacy of welfare states (Cars, et al., 2002), there has been a greater commitment to investigate the potential for devolved governance, particularly to city level and below (Coaffee & Healey, 2003). A multitude of international studies dedicated to investigating participative practices and partnership working, implemented at various scales and across many differing agendas, have been undertaken throughout previous decades (Abers, 1998; Balducci & Fareri, 1998; Coenen, 1998; Hastings, 1996; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998).

This movement away from the central controlling hand of the state to a more devolved urban governance system has perhaps been witnessed at its most intense in the US and Europe, with many regions and cities gaining individual responsibility for the management and administration of services in their respective areas. Indeed, the inclusion of neighbourhood associations in the upgrading of Barcelona's Old Town in 1988 ahead of the 1992 Olympic Games (Garcia, 2006) stands as an example of the notion of public participation - in urban governance and planning - that has had a place in European city politics for a prolonged period, whilst the studies of urban regime theory (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989) and growth machines (Molotch, 1976) have documented partnership working in the US over the last 50 years. Accompanying this literature there have been a number of theories of governance that have shaped the way in which cities are perceived, with much of this work focussing on the coordination of public and private resources (Dowding, 1996; Elkin, 1987; Stoker, 1998; Stone, 1989), strategies that have become widely embraced by local authorities in Western Europe (Pierre, 1999).

However, in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, there has been an acceleration in urban public/private partnerships, and of continued devolution to more local scales of

decision making as national governments attempt to reduce costs whilst still being able to provide core statutory functions and services. Whilst this process has accelerated following the events of 2008, such devolution had started previously, with financial constraints in the 1990s forcing central governments to pass responsibility to local authorities. The underlying logic of this devolution of powers and responsibilities was intended to give their local representatives more freedom in their work, yet under much tighter financial scrutiny (Elander, 2002). The same can be said of planning, with central governments now more willing to allow their regional and local counterparts to play a greater part in urban land management, whilst still fitting in with national objectives. Such motives are arguably no more greatly espoused than in the context of the UK, where the myriad of policies that have been implemented over the past 50 years have had an indelible impact upon the shape of the country today. From the rational comprehensive view of planning that was the central standpoint taken by successive governments in the years after World War II, to the devolved landscape of localism and the 2010 Coalition government's "Big Society" doctrine (Cameron, 2010), it is clear that there have been major steps taken over this time to gradually delegate planning power away from the corridors of Westminster and Whitehall to the 'local' including the urban street scale.

This chapter seeks to chronicle the process by which consecutive governments, of varying political persuasions, have come to a consensus that devolution of planning powers to local scales of decision making is desirable.

3.2 Urban Policy in the UK

Urban policy in the UK has seen marked changes over the last 50 years; indeed, it has been argued that the enduring feature of urban policy over this timeframe has been the "endless experimentation with new and often disconnected initiatives" (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p290). Originally based on a state-centric view that 'government' was best placed to identify the inter-connected complexities of urban problems and design correspondingly joined-up corrective interventions, the intransigence of urban deprivation and the often limited effects of repeated attempts to address and readdress the same issues has caused some to question from first principles the entire approach from which urban regeneration policy has been conducted for decades (Atkinson & Moon, 1994; Leunig & Swaffield, 2008; Lever, 2011; Oatley, 2000).

Reconsidering how we design policy for cities has prompted a range of prescriptions. Devolving decision making powers and control over resources from central government to scales beneath – the region, city-region, and neighbourhood – has been a commonly cited theme (HM Government, 2010; DCLG, 2011). Such an agenda is not an entirely new theme in British urban politics, as over the last 20 years (at least) various governments from different ideological standpoints have declared their intentions to situate power closer to communities (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012). Greater public participation through the sphere of representative democracy has been advanced as being a central component of planning in England, as seen by its influence on reforms introduced by the then Labour government in 2004 (DCLG, 2001; Shaw & Lord, 2007). However there has been serious doubt as to whether the Labour government of this period were committed enough to decentralise power seriously enough and the extent to which mechanisms were put in place to encourage communities to be involved in the planning process (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012; Inch, 2010).

The logic behind devolving power downwards to new tiers of decision making has proved extremely persuasive to the British political establishment (Miliband, 2006), particularly as a mechanism to further involve third and voluntary sectors. However the emerging landscape of politically-empowered city regions, assembled from the long-standing geographies of local government, and neighbourhood planning for communities present a new set of challenges. Such challenges can be envisaged through encouraging cooperation between groups who may not have worked together under previous planning arrangements, and the step into the relative unknown of “bottom-up” planning potentially bringing about unexpected and difficult results.

A wide array of measures now exists to allow citizens, businesses, even cities and their outlying regions, to cooperate in exerting a level of control over new developments in their area, utilising various financial instruments, designed to be independent of centralised interventions and bureaucracy. This has come about through legislation such as the Localism and Decentralisation Act (2011), introduced as part of the 2010 Coalition governments bid to foster a ‘Big Society’. Incorporating a theory of social solidarity with the free market (Walker & Corbett, 2013), seemingly in stark contrast to the earlier Thatcherite beliefs in individualism, and distancing itself from the ‘no such thing as society’ principles of the Conservative governments of 1979-1997 (Kisby, 2010; Scott, 2011).

Charting the change from centralised state controls over policy, to the gradual devolution to the local level in contemporary UK planning, this literature review will give a detailed analysis of the political forces that have seen UK planning arrive at the localised state that it is in today. Defining the limits of what counts as urban policy is, as Cullingworth & Nadin (2002, p290) point out, problematic. The differing political agendas of successive administrations has resulted in various policies that have had a material effect on British cities – not all of which have been explicitly directed at confronting a specifically urban agenda. The policies discussed in this section, and the agencies that are responsible for implementing urban policy interventions, have been restricted to only those that are avowedly ‘urban’. Policies originating in the late 1960s onwards that focussed on social aspects of inner city decline, such as deprivation and unemployment, and urban regeneration are introduced, before the large scale partnership projects of the 1980s are discussed, before moving onto the questioning of this approach of the 1990s and the movement towards more localised views of planning in the present day. The state-centred facets of each programme will be highlighted, detailing the issues that have, time after time, forced a change in approach in the way governments have looked to handle how urban areas are managed; changes that have occurred usually owing to the failure of attempting to enforce centralised thinking on local problems. It will be shown how policy has evolved over the last 50 years from being a particularly state-centric tool of government to the present day landscape of greater autonomy for the various levels of governance that exist at the sub-national scale.

3.3 Context of planning in the 1950s and 1960s

In the years after the Second World War, serious problems faced the incoming Labour government: the public deficit of £443 million presented a significant obstacle to their plans to institute a programme of nationalisation and exert a greater role for the public sector in the economy-more widely (Rydin, 1998, p28). Yet, by the end of the 1950s, Britain had entered a period of national economic growth based upon the principle of broad political consensus; a faith in Keynesian economics to deliver a consistently increasing national output and falling unemployment. In tandem with this economic climate came various social changes; population levels increased in response to the interruption of the war years, whilst immigration from Commonwealth countries increased in response to labour shortages. The changing human face of urban Britain prompted a response in the physical fabric of the country’s cities: industrial, office, retail and residential developments flourished relatively

evenly across the nation. Growth in central urban areas, coupled with the upturn in levels of car ownership, triggered decentralisation of (wealthier) populations to newly-built suburbs. However, despite this period of unprecedented economic growth, it was increasingly being realised that the mixed economy approach that had been adopted had not solved all of the problems of the post-war urban experience. Inequality and deprivation continued to exist, potentially more widely than before, prompting a renewed policy focus on cities and, particularly, the newly-identified scale of the 'inner cities'.

Several programmes were launched during this period to deal with issues in various policy areas, with the government pursuing an approach to the management of cities in which decentralisation was seen as key, promoting to residents and industry the benefits of moving away from inner-urban areas (Bowen & Pallister, 2001). Perhaps the most substantial proposal applied was the New Towns Act 1946, indicative of the then Labour government's politics of increasing state intervention in management of the economy (further evidenced by the introduction of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947). The 1946 Act instigated the building of 13 New Towns across mainland Britain between 1947 and 1950, in response to the devastation that had been inflicted on the physical environment of major urban areas during World War II, though implementation was slow, with the first new towns only being considered as being complete by the early 1960s (Cullingworth, et al., 2015). This policy would soon be suspended during the 1950s, with the focus being moved to the expansion of existing towns in order to manage the migration of the middle classes to the suburbs and the relieving effect on overcrowding in the inner cities (though 7 further new towns would later be commissioned through the 1959 New Towns Act). Yet this Act is a clear illustration of the governmental thinking of the time: along the principles of the rational planning approach, whereby the planner was seen as the expert with no opportunities for public participation, this was a strictly state-led initiative to deal with local problems. Taking the issue out of the hands of local people and placing the responsibility with a professional 'elite', these New Towns came about through a process that saw "top-down planning triumph over bottom-up" (Hall, 2014). Such a state-centric doctrine would hold true for the following decades, somewhat independent of whichever the governing party was at any specific time.

3.4 1960s and 1970s policies

3.4.1 Urban (Aid) Programme (1968-1995)

Issues identified across several socio-economic arenas, such as population change and suburban flight, amalgamated into a more general concern with problems that were being felt in urban areas across Britain at that time, and was to lay the framework for the multitude of regeneration schemes (and agencies) that we have seen implemented over the last 50 years or so in the UK. The initial seeds of urban policy of the 1970s were laid in 1969, with the introduction of the Urban Programme, a result of the 1966 Local Government Act and the 1969 Local Government (Social Need) Act (Rydin, 1998, p35). This was established primarily to correct the mistakes that had been created through the Comprehensive Development Areas Programme that had been instigated in 1947, involving the mass clearance of old terraced housing to be replaced by high-rise blocks of flats. This initiative, led by the state to correct post-war problems witnessed in the inner cities, failed to address socio-economic problems of the time, particularly unemployment, and added to the problems of lost communities that had been uprooted from their old neighbourhoods by policies that had been implemented in these areas by the state

The Urban Aid Programme was the project that took policy beyond just being a platform for town and country planning and housing schemes (Johnstone & Whitehead, 2004). Launched as Urban Aid in 1968 (latterly the Urban Programme in 1978 after the Urban Areas Act of that year), it was aimed at easing social tensions in urban areas (Tallon, 2010). Centrally led, the then Labour government distributed grants to local authorities to develop services in otherwise deprived areas of towns and cities with the aim of developing community projects and attracting opportunities to increase employment levels in affected areas. It was an area based proposal designed to assist those areas identified by the state that required 'special need' (Tallon, 2010, p38). However, the lack of official guidelines on what specified an area as 'special need', and the absence of a clear definition of deprivation severely hindered the programmes ambition and effectiveness.

Nevertheless, this programme remained one of the key tools employed by successive governments to tackle the problem of deprivation in clusters around the UK, whilst laying the foundations for subsequent initiatives, such as Community Development projects (discussed below). That the programme was seen as a significant mechanism by successive governments, from the leftist Labour party of the 1970s through to the *lassiez-faire* and free market approach of the 1980s Conservative government illustrates the encompassing view

of the political powers of the time; that state intervention was the way forward in dealing with urban issues.

3.4.2 Community Development Projects (1969-1978) and Inner Area Studies (1972-1977)

During the 1960s recognition increased that poverty remained as a major feature of life in the UK, particularly within urban areas. In an effort to combat this, the state looked to implement an initiative in which self-help and resident participation were seen as being key components of any potential resurgence in the city. The results were the Community Development Projects (CDPs) launched in 1969 as action-based research projects focussed on small areas, aiming to reduce the problems of disintegration that had been felt by residents in centrally-identified deprived areas (Tallon, 2010, p38). Twelve CDPs were launched as part of this project, with each scheme commencing at differing times.

Though investment from the state itself was small (Green & Chapman, 1992), this was an inherently state-led initiative aimed at stimulating local growth. Government appointed research teams were to investigate the root causes of the problems in the respective localities, work with local communities to experiment with ways in which these issues could be addressed, and assess the results that had been achieved using these techniques.

However the key flaw in the projects became apparent when the accumulated research was presented to both local and central governments. Research intended to assist in informing policy was largely ignored by central government, although the analysis of deprivation did, in time, proceed to advise the future policies of several of the CDP local authorities. The programme struggled to imprint itself on policy due to the ideological differences between researchers and government, and with these differences, the programme was closed down in 1978.

Similarly, the IASs, launched in 1972, were the third main urban policy of the 1970s, again directed by the state and imparted upon local areas that the then Labour administration had identified. Focussed on three areas experiencing from high levels of multiple deprivation, namely Toxteth (Liverpool), Small Heath (Birmingham) and Lambeth (London), research was undertaken not by academics, but by private sector consultants brought in by the Conservative Secretary of State Peter Walker. Yet despite this change to the make-up of the research team, the analyses remained very similar to that of the CDPs, with root causes of

deprivation linked to poverty, and structural confinements continued to hinder those living in distressed areas, though IASs were criticised for neglecting health concerns (Stewart, 1978). It was argued that health could not be separated from the wider problems of the inner cities, and could be correlated to other social phenomena, not least employment. Such criticisms could be held up to illustrate how, once again, a state-led urban initiative had failed to grasp the needs of the local area and communities they were designed to help.

This served to highlight two ideological points of the time. Firstly, the complexities of parachuting in state led initiatives. Deprived areas were seen as being *compelled* to depend on government programmes that were designed far from the site of their existence and thus not well tailored to meet place specific needs (McConaghy, 1978). Here, the teams that comprised the CPDs and IASs overwhelmingly embodied ideological positions at odds with the central state's understanding of deprivation, its causes and remedies. This approach to urban policy, led by the Home Office (who provided 75% of the (limited) CPD finance (Atkinson & Moon, 1994)), was far from equipped to deal with the peculiarities of each particular location. Secondly, it illustrates where the real power in planning lay: with the state. Presented with evidence that was at odds with their own ideology, the governments of the time reinforced their own power over planning; namely by bringing an end to these programmes that they saw as questioning their policies. Despite the concerns that state led-intervention was not having the desired effects, initiatives employed going into the 1980s would still lean heavily on this traditional method of authority.

3.5 1980s policies

The 1980s were defined as the decade of Thatcherism, a time when the UK was governed exclusively by the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher. The decade began with the aftermath of the economic recession of the late 1970s. The first and most palpable urban effects of the government's response to this situation were the civil disturbances in Brixton and Toxteth in 1981 (Rydin, 2003). Long-term unemployment and declining investment in industry saw inner city problems become entrenched; outmigration by the more mobile and affluent to the suburbs illuminated inner city issues more conspicuously.

Governmental responses to the deepening crisis was to further the ideological project of Thatcherism. The mixed-economy approach that had been embraced by successive administrations, both Labour and Conservative, in the decades following the end of the war

was abandoned. The perceived inability of Keynesian economics and welfare state policies to deliver results in these difficult times became the mainstream government view, with the emergence of the New Right replacing this mixed economy approach (Rydin, 2003). This (neoliberal) position emphasised the desirability of market processes, the importance of the private sector in creating prosperity, and the hazards of a powerful public sector. However, though there is little doubt that Thatcherism attempted to impart neoliberal thinking into planning during the 1980s (Thornley, 1993; Allmendinger & Thomas, 1998; Allmendinger, 2009), the main urban instruments introduced during this time still turned on central government's key position within urban policies, with an emphasis on centralisation of control with a greater reliance upon the market (Ambrose, 1986; Thornley, 1993; Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000). Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and Enterprise Zones (EZs), introduced through the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act were to be the flagship mechanisms to drive urban regeneration, and are examples of the Conservative vision of planning from that time; public sector financing to stimulate the weak market in order to kindle increased levels of private sector investment and involvement (Brindley, et al., 1996).

3.5.1 Urban Development Corporations (1981-1998)

With the introduction of two UDCs, in Merseyside and London in 1981, the Conservative administration introduced another major, state-led initiative aimed at regenerating and reinvigorating the inner cities. The scheme would, over its life course, operate over 14 areas across the UK, and could be called upon if the Secretary of State was of the opinion that it was required to further the national interest (Atkinson & Moon, 1994, p. 143), adhering to the then accepted model of centrally prescribed intervention. However, whilst being devoutly centralist in their make-up, in that they were Quangos chosen by the central state to concentrate on property led regeneration (Imrie & Thomas, 1993) with overriding planning powers (Oatley, 1989), UDCs can also be envisaged as the mechanism whereby control was taken at the local level, albeit marginally. These Quangos had now become responsible for the property-led regeneration of their areas, and operated at the ground level. They were, in a way, local, but remained state-centric in that they answered directly to the government. This central control was embellished with a marginalised role for local authorities, who had, in the words of Michael Heseltine (then the Secretary of State for the Environment), 'messed it up' (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000, p. 1381). That they superseded local authority development functions in governing planning applications (quite

often being their own) gives a clear example of the state exhibiting a high degree of control over local areas. At its peak in 1990-91, annual expenditure on the programme reached over £600 million, representing the largest share of regeneration spending at the time, and amounted to half of all inner city spending in 1992-93, again signalling the shift away from expenditure directed through local authorities (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002, p. 300).

3.5.3 Enterprise Zones (1980 – 2006, 2011 to present)

Given approval in the Local Government Planning and Land Act of 1980, EZs were set up in the UK as experimental projects to inspire enterprise in areas that were suffering substantial losses in employment. They were based around the ideas of the geographer Peter Hall, who argued that to overcome the failures of the inner cities, a 'free-market' approach should be utilised, by way of significantly reduced planning, employment, taxation and welfare legislation, creating an environment allowing small businesses to thrive whilst also attracting entrepreneurs and investors from outside the designated zone (Tallon, 2010, p. 49). EZs were to be brought into effect in small areas of land marked with economic decline and physical deterioration, again chosen by the state, and that the local authorities whose jurisdiction the areas fell into should be actively involved in the initiative. The policy was set within the wider context of a move away from traditional state-centre led initiatives to that of a more entrepreneurial standpoint, with private partner collaboration implemented to bring about change. Alongside the UDCs of the 1980s, the inclusion of local authorities and businesses in the management of the EZs illustrate how the scope for local involvement in the management of planning was slowly increasing at this time.

However, the policy was criticised for working against the apparent ideology of encouraging public-private partnerships. Despite the rhetoric of cooperation between local authorities and EZs, in practice the power of local authorities was reduced in these areas. The already fractious relationship between local authorities and the central Thatcher administration remained strained. Central interference at the local level undermined authorities, and cannot be seen as a true experiment with the free market in urban policy (Atkinson & Moon, 1994, p. 142), and illustrates the states reluctance to give power over to the local level at this point in time.

3.6 A crowded landscape

Throughout the regeneration efforts of consecutive governments during this time, the issue of coherence between different policies remained critical. Coordination between the multiplicity of policies and agencies was a commonly identified problem, summarised by McCarthy's (2007, p. 31) description of urban policy as a 'patchwork quilt'. This issue had its roots in the nature of central government organisation in which departmental lines of accountability were, and still are, strictly drawn. This departmentalism was particularly relevant for urban policy as no one particular department had complete control over urban policies, and responsibility for particular programmes was passed around between ministries. A prime example of such instability in urban policy is shown by the relocation of one of the flagship regeneration policies of the time, the Urban Programme, from the Home Office to the Department of the Environment, whilst the Departments of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Employment (DoEmp) were also heavily involved in the formation and implementation of the multitude of urban policies that were in practice. This in itself created further problems in that separate departments had differing priorities, leading to clashes over which policies should take precedence over others. Such issues appear to illustrate the desperation that successive governments, of differing ideological stances, felt in keeping the direction and implementation of urban policies and initiatives firmly within the confines of Whitehall. Indeed, it was noted in reports by both the Audit Commission in 1989 and the National Audit Office in 1990 that there was overlap between the various programmes concerned with the inner cities (Noon, et al., 2000, p. 72). Whilst City Action Teams (CATs) were set up in 1985 to take control of the coordination of multi-departmental schemes aimed at improving the inner cities, they were under resourced and ineffective (Lawless, 1989), and were replaced by Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) in 1994.

With the problems of coordination filtering down from the state level, there appeared to be no real strategic approach to the management of the varying schemes implemented to mobilise regeneration. The case of Manchester's 'partridge in a pear tree' (Robson, 1994, p. 216) approach to urban policy perhaps illustrates this most vividly: by 1990, its excess of strategies included six Urban Programmes, two Urban Taskforces, two Enterprise Zones and two Urban Development Corporations, amongst several others, in a relatively short period of only 12 years (Robson, 1994). Condemnation of such an uncoordinated landscape, and the apparent waste of resources, resulted in increased calls for change at policy level (Turok & Shutt, 1994).

3.7 1990s policies

3.7.1 City Challenge (1991-1992, 2 rounds)

With the urban policy environment having become increasingly crowded and difficult to coordinate in the corridors of Whitehall, there was a realisation that new forms of policy were needed. With this, the City Challenge (CC) scheme was introduced, and was hailed as being the most innovative and promising urban regeneration initiatives brought into effect by central government (Russell, et al., 1996). CC can be seen to represent another shift in policy focus, towards involving local authorities in a more inclusive way and shifting power to the local level, albeit slightly, as it:

“was neither private nor community sector-led, but was based on the theory that to regenerate local areas, and give them back a competitive “edge”, it was necessary to address the plethora of problems facing an area, to exploit opportunities, and to involve a range of local organizations and people in the design and delivery of a programme ... After years of sidelining local authorities, with City Challenge’s emphasis on notions of partnership, central government pulled councils back into the policy arena, giving them a central role in submitting bids and specifying their inclusion in delivery mechanisms of successful programmes” (Fearnley, 2000, p. 569)

The emphasis here can clearly be seen to be partnership working at several levels; central and local government, private sector and community groups, a stark contrast to the wide range of policies that had preceded it. CC inspired local authorities to be creative and comprehensive in their plans, incorporating physical, social, economic and cultural factors, and to achieve this by including local people, community organisations and the private sector, thus pointing to a clear change in previously (and stringently) state-centric policy that had seemingly failed to adequately cure the myriad of issues in urban politics in the decades previous. The novel idea behind CC that had not yet been encountered was the competitive nature that was brought to the fore: the bidding process that saw local authorities vie for funding to implement the plans that they had drawn up with their local partners created an entrepreneurial environment whereby authorities were required to be as creative as possible in order to be successful. Furthermore, it was considered that even those that were unsuccessful in the bidding process would benefit from the process and forge strong ties with their new partners across the private and voluntary sectors (Noon, et al., 2000, p. 72),

such a stance illustrating the government relaxing its grip on all control in local matters, and appearing to be happy for local actors within these areas to come together to effect change through partnership.

Despite criticisms over funding cuts and bid deadlines (Davoudi, 1995; Tallon, 2010), CC has been judged in a positive light, pointing out that it has gone on to inspire many other policies that have been used by successive governments since its inception in 1991 (Fearnley, 2000). In particular, it has been held up as an example of how partnerships at policy level can be used to implement positive regeneration (Oatley & Lambert, 1995; Russell, et al., 1996), and can be seen as the a watershed moment in UK urban policy, a moment in which the value and effect of local partnership could be witnessed by the state, with some of the principles regarding the formation of local coalitions being taken forward in later policy mechanisms.

3.7.2 Single Regeneration Budget (1994-2001)

Building on the competition and partnership-based qualities of CC, the SRB was introduced in 1994 to comprehensively overhaul and streamline the urban regeneration process, and to provide a more flexible funding system. The local level coordination and partnership working that had been encouraged initially by CC was promoted further; this focus had already been further reinforced with the formation of the Government Office for the Regions (GORs) the previous year, with devolution of power away from central government seen as key to ensuring local community involvement, and to keep a tighter control on spending (Noon, et al., 2000, p. 72). In a similar vein to that of CC, the SRB invited bids from local partnerships, which could comprise of local authorities, training and enterprise councils (TECs, now defunct), private and voluntary organisations, educational institutions and chambers of commerce. Central government would assess the quality of any bids made before making a decision on whether to award funding to partnerships, with GORs responsible for overseeing any approved schemes (John & Ward, 2005). Clearly then, the need for strategic thinking and partnership working was seen as key, and even though the value of local partnerships had been recognised by the state, this was still very much a centrally controlled programme. Indeed, central government remained in control of where funding was to be allocated, effectively keeping itself in control of both which areas could develop, and how. In response to this, the incoming Labour government of 1997 announced changes to the SRB so that a new emphasis was given to the most deprived areas included in the initiative, and that proposals should integrate more so with existing strategies, with a

more collaborative approach taken (McCarthy, 2007, p. 35). Yet despite the criticisms of the programme, the SRB has been seen to have had a beneficial effect in stimulating strategic thinking and partnerships towards holistic urban management, and being held up as a prime example of the benefits of coalition building across public, private and voluntary groups (Fordham, et al., 1999).

3.8 Late 1990s – 2000s

3.8.1 Continued devolution

The period since the start of the new millennium has been one marked by continued devolution, with the phase between 2000 and 2010 under successive Labour governments being particularly committed to regional devolution. With particular attention to planning policy, this was executed through the creation of three distinct levels of regional governance, as shown in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3-1 Organisation of regional government for planning (adapted from Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006, p57)

At a lower level of this system, more resources were allocated to regional assemblies by central government in order to perform their duties. Roles of the regional assemblies included inspecting the work of its respective Regional Development Agency (RDA), preparing the regional spatial strategy (RSS) and regional sustainability framework (RSF). RDAs were launched with their core responsibility being to stimulate economic regeneration, with funding for these activities coming via 'Single-Pot' funding, the union of

eleven separate funding mechanisms replacing the SRB (McCarthy, 2007, p. 36). More precisely, their remit included creating jobs, assisting new businesses looking to start up, and investing in particularly deprived areas of their regions, with compulsory purchase order powers given to aid this (Tallon, 2010, p. 93). Finally, at the top end, GORs allowed central government to have a more direct and integral role in regional politics. The formation of this system of governance indicated the Labour government saw regional devolution as being essential to delivering its urban policies, and that partnerships outside of central government would take on a greater role in urban policy (albeit still under command of the state, who would be able to relay their intentions to local counterparts through GORs).

3.8.2 Urban Regeneration Companies

The Urban Task Force report (1999), in looking to build upon and learn from past strategies, examined how local level regeneration schemes could be brought into action, concluding that partnership working was central to any potential plans for localised development. Thus Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs) were born as a means to bring together the key stakeholders to propel development in their respective areas. These recommendations were further supported by the Labour government, who established three pilot URCs in Manchester, Liverpool and Sheffield, with this number growing to 22 by 2008 across England, Wales and Northern Ireland (Tallon, 2010).

URCs were predominantly private sector-led bodies set up to drive redevelopment in their respective geographical areas through taking the lead in the coordination of investment for regeneration. As opposed to UDCs, which operated at the national level, URCs were designed to operate *“at arm’s length from local government”* (Henderson, 2014). They were met with positive reviews in both academic commentaries for their effective partnership working, particularly in retail and waterfront enhancements and also in governmental documents for their ability to win significant levels of private investment in their respective areas (Couch & Cocks, 2011; Couch, et al., 2011; Jones & Evans, 2013). Though formed from the centralised Urban Task Force Report (Urban Task Force, 1999), these companies were established through a partnership of local authorities, RDAs and other business and community stakeholders (Cullingworth, et al., 2015), and were designed to take into account local needs from a local standpoint. That a number of URCs were converted to, or submerged by, economic development companies during the 2000s, is indicative of the high regard in which they were held by successive governments. Such a change to the fabric of URCs was

symptomatic of calls for a more all encompassing regeneration organization with further powers (Lord, 2009).

3.8.3 New Deal for Communities (1998 to 2013)

The NDC, alongside the newly revised SRB, formed the crux of regeneration projects purported by the incoming Labour government, with both schemes offering the largest pools of finance and resources available for potential regeneration projects. The NDC was primarily intended to assist the most disadvantaged community groups in the country, through the unification of housing and regeneration programmes, and improving employment and economic prospects for deprived groups (Lawless, 2004; 2006). This was to be achieved by enabling community-based partnerships to apply for grants to aid neighbourhood development; however competition for funding, that had been typical of urban policy in the preceding years, was removed from the equation. Between 1998 and 2001, 39 'Pathfinder' projects were approved and established, with each project receiving between £40-50 million of investment over their 10 year lifetimes (Tallon, 2010, p. 84).

What is significant about the NDC is that it was explicitly instructed by central government that projects should be led by community and voluntary groups rather than local authorities, with the aim of elevating the role of these groups in their local areas, whilst authorities would be left to develop an overall strategy encompassing matters of (un)employment, education, poverty and health (Hill, 2000). There has been criticism in the past of the scheme, particularly with accusations that processes in the programme, such as applying for funding, were too quick, and the imposing of boundaries on communities, even though they may not correlate with the spaces that communities believe to be 'theirs' (Dinham, 2005). Such criticisms appear to illustrate that the state still held a significant degree of control over the development and delivery of urban policy despite the ostensibly lead role afforded to non-state actors, both private and third sectors. Nevertheless, the NDC is perhaps the clearest example of the mixed approach taken to urban policy, particularly throughout the Blair administration. Initial moves had been made to foster community ownership and involvement, long-term commitment to development and partnership working with communities. All of this pointed to a gradual (but not yet full) devolution of control to local groups.

3.9 Coordination and Evaluation

It is clear then from the myriad of schemes presented in this chapter that there has been a large degree of change and upheaval in UK urban policy over the last five decades, that has led to a landscape that is overcrowded, with various schemes overlapping in their areas of expertise. The challenge presented by urban problems is large in both scale and diversity, and it is within the context of these conditions that the multi-layered environment of initiatives has emerged, with a selection of such strategies having been open to criticism (see Chatterton and Bradley (2000), for a critique of strategies implemented by the 1997 Labour government). There has also continued to be substantial difficulties in addressing regeneration issues in a holistic fashion, with such issues tracing their roots in the way policy is delivered at both a local and national scale (Atkinson, 2003). Tallon (2010) points out that the Department of Communities and Local Government, the Department of Health, the Department for Children, Schools and Families, the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and the Home Office all have an input into urban regeneration schemes across the country, whilst at the local level, inequalities continue to persist between the North and South of England and Wales.

Moves made by New Labour during the 2000s looked to address some of the residual issues that had been left by previous political philosophies. This was primarily through the devolution of powers from the national level to the regional level; and as the next chapter will introduce, further moves to the local level were to be introduced at the end of the 2000s. The property and economic-led approaches of previous administrations were dropped to further involve local communities in regeneration schemes. There had been little evidence that property-led regeneration provided benefits for entire local communities, and that policies prioritising other aspects of regeneration would have had a more beneficial impact. In a study evaluating the overall effectiveness of central government urban policy in England over the previous 10 years prior to their investigation, Robson et al (1994) found that, amongst others, two core issues recurred frequently throughout:

- *Partnerships* – there was a common view held by senior figures in the private, public and community sectors that urban policy in the 1980s had restricted attempts to create partnerships at both the local and national levels, consequently reducing the ability for local authorities to enter into constructive partnerships with groups in their area.

- *Coordination* – in all three of the detailed case study areas of the report (Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Tyne and Wear), it was felt that there was a lack of coordination between departments within local and central governments, and between local and central government themselves. Specifically, the compartmentalised nature of both levels of government created problems in the allocation of funding, as one department viewed issues in a specific area in a way that differed from another department, hampering the ability to successfully coordinate projects.

The study drew several conclusions that can be seen as setting an early precedent in calling for greater partnership working at the local level and to improve coherence of programmes. Some conclusions that the report drew recognised:

- I. The importance of creating effective coalitions of actors within localities, with such coalitions more likely to occur with the development of mechanisms that encourage or require long term collaboration.
- II. Local authorities need to be given a greater opportunity to play a significant part in these coalitions, with a view as being enablers and facilitators.
- III. Local communities too need to be given a chance to be represented in these coalitions, with the need for such action required more urgently in deprived areas to bring communities into the decision making process and reduce the potential for polarisation between groups.
- IV. Improvements in coherence of programmes both between and within local and national government, achievable through an emphasised process of identifying strategic objectives guiding departmental priorities. In order to facilitate this, the report called for greater flexibility in the transferring of funds between departments when needed (Robson, et al., 1994, p. 55).

The conclusions given above can be seen as an early indication of the response needed at both the national and local levels in relation to urban policy, with points I to III particularly correlating closely with this research. However it was noted that such partnership working needed to be genuine, operating in a way whereby ‘partners learn how to trust each other, gain mutual respect and share the responsibility for bringing about change’, and moving away from past regeneration initiatives that despite being ‘well intentioned, such programmes were top down, frequently bypassed local accountability and trampled over local sensibilities’ (Ashworth, 2000). With such research, it had been recognised that past

initiatives that had hinted at partnership working such as SRB and NDC had not delivered in terms of empowering local communities. It is these shortcomings that have, in part, led to the implementation of governance mechanisms aimed at enabling genuine partnership across local groups and communities to have a greater input into how their area is governed, designed and maintained.

3.10 A 'new' approach: Towards devolved governance

From the mid-1990s onwards, there was a move towards a 'new' method of urban management. Stepping away from the top-down management model that had characterized British urban management from the 1960s, the new millennium saw new mechanisms created to facilitate a more localised model of urban management in UK cities. The driving vision behind these moves were linked to the urban governance model that advocated a reduced role for the state, with the relocation of duties for particular services to stakeholders located outside of the public sector, and emphasising the importance of successful partnerships and collaborations in the provision of these services (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001).

The first set of pressures to divest more power away from central government to the local level is North American in origin, with economics being the driving force behind it (Morphet, 2008). Studies have shown that, with the introduction of a multitude of smaller states over the last 60 years, such as the impact of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the states that have been created in this timeframe are becoming more homogenous in the population characteristics, given their size, with this homogeneity leading to a more concentrated market that is easier to govern, particularly in economic terms (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). This can be seen as an applied version of Putnam's interpretation of social capital (Putnam, 2000)³, with the nature of the smaller state fostering a community unity which creates a platform for a more socially engaged community. It is also stated that smaller states with lighter governing arrangements are less burdensome, more efficient and more responsive to their populations. The implication of this work is clear: the devolution of political and economic power to smaller state spaces may support the development of a more accountable and effective form of policy (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003).

³ According to Putnam, social capital refers to 'the collective value of all "social networks" and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other'.

In the US, interest in the size of government and the emphasis that it places on the importance of economic efficiency has been a consistent topic since the initiative to 'reinvent government' (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) undertaken by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s, with the aim to make government more transparent and 'customer' orientated. Such an approach takes the viewpoint that central government had grown over preceding decades to the degree that its size and distance of power from communities hampers the effective exercise of that power in communities interests or preferences.

There are other factors that have seen the drive for localism in the EU pick up the pace in the last decade. Low levels of electoral turnout in European parliamentary elections and the continuing nature of accountability have caused concern for governments, and have in turn led to a greater emphasis placed on investigating the relationships between the EU and sub-national levels of government, specifically national regions and communities (Morphet, 2008).

This devolution process has accelerated in the UK in particular since the turn of the Millennium, with the development of the 'Big Society' and the 2011 Localism Act giving an added drive towards newer forms of urban management detached from the traditional state-managed models of the past; the role of the neighbourhood and society as a whole in managing its own affairs has been brought closely into the spotlight (Bailey & Pill, 2011). Though it is debatable whether the sheer number of schemes that are now in operation across the real of public management is desirable (De Magalhães, 2014), there has been a wide proliferation of such systems; arguably the most developed of these tools is that of the Business Improvement District (BID), a private-led approach to city management adopted from the United States and Canada.

In what follows, this 'new' approach to urban management will be reviewed, focussing on the mechanisms of localised decision-making that have been introduced into British politics since the middle of the 2000s; mechanisms aimed at empowering agencies in the lower reaches of social and political space from self-organised city-regional territories to equally self-organised groups of citizens. In addition to reviewing policy surrounding the private-led BIDs, two further policies brought into effect by the 2011 Localism Act, those of Neighbourhood Planning and the Duty to Cooperate will also be reviewed. Such measures were introduced to 'help people and their locally elected representatives to achieve their own ambitions' and to 'achieve a substantial and lasting shift in power away from central government and towards local people' (DCLG, 2011, p. 1). In particular, from the discourse

emanating from the 2010 coalition government, it is clear that devolution of powers to the local level was a central aim of the Cameron administration.

3.11 Business Improvement Districts (BIDs)

As Dawkins and Grail (2007) note, BIDs are flexible funding mechanisms designed to improve the management system in well defined, typically local areas. They operate under a self-imposed levy on businesses involved in the BID, and are usually set up to cover a specific lifetime, with a government imposed lifeline of 5 years (Sandford, 2014). Originating in North America in the 1960s, there has been a widespread uptake of this model of urban management in countries around the globe, predominantly within Europe, Australasia and Africa (Peyroux, et al., 2012), with the UK version of the BID lending heavily on the experiences of a limited number of US BID models (Ward, 2006). It has been argued that BIDs represent the moves taken in the face of local government failure, and are 'part of the shift from managerial to entrepreneurial governance' (Mallett, 1994, p. 285), whilst advocates of this relatively new form of urban management maintain that it represents a clear rejection of past methods, and a critique of the Keynesian management methods used in the preceding decades (Mallett, 1994; Levy, 2001; Symes & Steel, 2003).

BIDs were first given legitimacy in the UK through the 2003 Local Government Act, and came into effect in 2004. They are based on the principle of charging an addition fee, through a levy, to be paid by all participating businesses and landholders following a vote on the BID proposal. Following the outcome of the (successful) vote, in which the majority of businesses must agree upon the number of taxpayers in and the proportion that will be paid towards the levy, the levy becomes mandatory for all businesses involved in the BID, regardless of whether they voted in favour or not. In governance terms, BIDs are contractually obligations for the management of the urban environment, through which some of the tasks traditionally taken on by the local government are transferred over to the private companies who form the BID (Peel, et al., 2009). Tasks such as the image of an area, and its cleanliness are amongst some of the duties that are transferred over to the private sector to monitor. The reasoning behind the transfer of such tasks to the BID is the idea that the quality of the built environment of those will impact upon the businesses in that areas. With this in mind, it is assumed that they will be more likely to invest in the physical and social make-up of the environment, more so than the local authorities would look to invest otherwise. Within such a context, it is possible to see the potential for coalitions between businesses, as they all

share a common goal to improve their environment, with the end point being an enhanced platform upon which their business will operate from. They are a clear demonstration of the way in which public policies can be articulated and brought into force by third-party governments⁴ (Salamon, 1981), whilst operating at a distance to normal democratic institutions, such as local government (Justice & Goldsmith, 2006). Though there have been criticisms of this approach to urban management (De Magalhães, 2014; Low & Smith, 2006; Ward, 2006), BID s have remained popular in urban policy, and have been credited as being one of the core mechanisms that have tackled the problems of inner city decline, (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007; Justice & Goldsmith, 2006).

Partnership working between both private and public sector interests remain at the core of UK BID s, negating the potential for the privatisation of space that has been witnessed in the USA (De Magalhães, 2012). Although they have primarily been established with the view to allowing the private sector to take on responsibility for their areas, BID s have been introduced into urban policy following the traditional British model of public-private partnership, and as such have not dispensed with the governing powers and responsibilities of the state (Steel & Symes, 2005). For BID s, the legal and political support of the state is seen as an enabler to success, and come with the benefits of any potential public sector grants. De Magalhães (2012), in a study of ten BID s across England found no evidence to suggest that the coalitions created in these areas had become self-directed groups at odds with their local authorities, or represented any attempt to usurp their authority or mandate. Such circumstances didn't arise due to the amicable relationships they had with their local authorities, and the relatively low amount of resources they could fund through what is a modest levy imposed on each business.

BID s can be seen as one of the first embodiments of moves in the UK to reorder the traditional approaches to governance that have persisted in urban politics over the last 50 years, embedded within the context of new regulations that have emphasised a shift towards a new model of 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Harvey, 1989). Central to entrepreneurial urban politics is the establishment of partnerships that strengthen the role of the private sector, and an increased importance assigned to the local level. BID s play a role in this form of urban management by allowing private actors to coalesce in order to strengthen the competitiveness of their area, and indeed, that of the wider city. With

⁴ 'Third party government' is said to encompass various institutional appliances used by the state to deliver public goods and services through intermediary organisations such as businesses and community associations.

coalition formation intrinsically linked to the establishment and operation of BIDs, this urban management mechanism is ideal to be considered as lens in which to study coalition formation in the new approaches to urban management currently being employed in the UK.

3.12 Neighbourhood Planning

With the election of the Conservative – Liberal Democrat Coalition government in 2010, and the introduction of the ‘Big Society’ doctrine championed by David Cameron, moves were revealed to further devolve powers of planning and regeneration further away from Whitehall, and to make provisions for local communities to have a greater input into how the areas they live in are laid out. The Prime Minister himself, in a speech in Liverpool at the start of his first term in office, noted that such a redirection in national policy was about:

‘a huge culture change ... where people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace ... don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face ... but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities’ (Cameron, 2010)

The Coalition vision to make a break from previous political practices was seen as a radical departure from the ideologies that had been prevalent during the previous Labour administration, and indeed, that of earlier governments. Whilst it is noted that there have been efforts in the past to devolve power away from central administration, in reality these attempts turned out to be prescriptive to the degree that control tended to remain largely within the realms of the national government. Labours NDC is mentioned as falling foul of this methodological fallacy, with claims made that the programme allowed community involvement in a way that the government decided how and why communities would be involved (Stanton, 2014), leading to low levels of community participation in the programme (Lawless, et al., 2010). The Big Society was forwarded as the means to break away from the “claimed statist centralising policies of the previous Labour government” (Leyland, 2012) and to give local communities legitimate recognition in decision-making processes, particularly in regards to shaping the built environment (Pattie & Johnston, 2011). Recognition was evident of the roles that local communities can play in the management of places and spaces, leading to subsequent moves to create mechanisms aimed at

empowering these groups. The 2011 Localism Act would create such tools, emphasising the theme of decentralisation.

The Act itself attempts to engineer this devolution of powers in a number of ways, most noticeably by granting general powers of competence to local authorities, and expanding the provisions for public referenda aimed at giving individuals more input in local decision-making. Building on these provisions created through the 2011 Act, Neighbourhood Planning (NP) and the community rights that are recognised with it came into effect in April 2012. NP set out to revolutionise the way in which neighbourhoods are developed, providing the much sought-after prominence for the local community that the Big Society doctrine had yearned for, with a greater potential for input from these local actors, whilst at the same time reducing the need for intervention from the state. Such a move was predicated on the realisation that there were flaws in the previous planning system:

“For far too long local people have had too little say over a planning system that has imposed bureaucratic decisions by distant officials in Whitehall ... We need to change things so there is more people-planning and less politician-planning, so there is more direct democracy and less bureaucracy ... These reforms will become the building blocks of the Big Society.” Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2010).

The alterations made to the planning system through the 2011 Localism Act enable local residents to group together under what is termed a neighbourhood forum to have greater input into how their local area will look, what buildings should be built where, and their appearance, and grant planning permission for the types of building they wish to see. When the neighbourhood plan is prepared and finalised by its respective forum, it can be put to a local referendum, which if successful, can see it adopted as part of the areas Local plan. The key stages of neighbourhood planning are laid out in Figure 3.2 below.




Figure 3-2 Neighbourhood Plan process (adapted from DCLG, 2015)

The ideology behind such moves is clear: with the abolition of the RSS's by the new Coalition government in May 2010, a mechanism upon which central authority could impose policies had been removed. In its place, the Coalition, and indeed the current Conservative government, is making a clear attempt to build policies from the bottom up, with the platform here being that of the local community presenting their own ideas as formalised plans to their local authority with the view to having such plans recognised legitimately.

Planning legislation in the UK sets out Development Plans to be used as guidelines for development, and to be followed when and where planning applications are made. Such Development Plans are made up of several core documents, of which Local Plans and Neighbourhood Plans are inclusive. From such a framework, it is clear to see how Neighbourhood Plans fit within and alter the established framework, giving communities more of a voice within the prevailing system (Stanton, 2014). Adding to this, the National Planning and Policy Framework (NPPF) set out by the government in 2012, outlined how local governments and communities could produce their own bespoke plans, whilst working

towards the national objective of sustainable development with matters relating to housing, transport, flooding, climate change and planning.

The NPPF plays a vital, but perhaps also conflicting role in directing how NP should be approached. It must “be taken into account in the preparation of local and neighbourhood plans, and is a material consideration in planning decisions” (DCLG, 2012, p. 1). In particular, in the context of local decision making, the NPPF states that:

“Neighbourhood planning provides a powerful set of tools for local people to ensure that they get the right types of development for their community. The ambition of the neighbourhood should be aligned with the strategic needs and priorities of the wider local area. Neighbourhood plans must be in general conformity with the strategic policies of the Local Plan. To facilitate this, local planning authorities should set out clearly their strategic policies for the area and ensure that an up-to-date Local Plan is in place as quickly as possible. Neighbourhood plans should reflect these policies and neighbourhoods should plan positively to support them. Neighbourhood plans and orders should not promote less development than set out in the Local Plan or undermine its strategic policies.” (DCLG, 2012, p. 44)

Whilst it is then clear that collaboration between communities and both local and central government vital, it is also worth pointing out that this also imposes potential limitations on the moves towards community based reform. There is potential for friction between the bottom-up thinking of community based plans, in this case through NP, and the top down policies set out at both the national and local level. Such tensions stem from the obvious conflict in trying to foster a community based approach to development in small areas, as is the government’s new agenda, whilst also trying to balance this with the homogeneity that comes hand in hand with nationally set goals and objectives (Stanton, 2014).

Such friction has the potential to occur at two levels; pressure from central government to align plans with national objectives, and the relationship between neighbourhood fora and their respective local authorities. Firstly, with NP’s relationship with central government, the promises made as part of the Big Society have been focussed on the devolution of power to provide communities greater power and responsibility for shaping their local areas. However, when analysing the frameworks under which NP operates with more scrutiny, it is clear that there are still many provisions in place that allow for centralist intervention, namely through the office of the Secretary of State. There is a feeling that the changes made

to the planning system fall short of the aim of giving community groups the necessary power they need to develop their areas in the way that had been envisioned and promised to them by the coalition (Stanton, 2014). There is also the need for community plans to fall in line with national objectives, primarily those contained within the NPPF; “the ambition of the neighbour should be aligned with the strategic needs and priorities of the wider local area” (DCLG, 2012, p. 44). Whilst this is necessary to stop groups diverging wildly from national prerogatives, it does also act as a constraint on what communities can and cannot do in their locality. This illustrates clearly the fine balancing act that needs to be managed between the wishes of locals and the central government that is responsible for the national framework. It also reveals that, despite the coalition’s rhetoric of giving real power back to the people, the provisions afforded to the Secretary of State to intervene in NP demonstrate how central government has retained a great deal of power in being able to supervise and manage ways in which local communities are allowed to draw up their own plans.

Secondly, the relationship between local authorities and their communities is also integral to any discussion on localism, and NP. As Bowes and Stanton (2014) point out, the Localism Act can be seen as a spur for local authorities gaining further powers within a system with less centralised though the general power of competence, granted to local authorities and enabling them to do anything an individual may do. However, NP has been a more intriguing issue, with LA’s being handed the role of administrators in the process (Stanton, 2014), with considerable power to decide whether or not specific areas and groups can be designated as a neighbourhood forum. This has been viewed as a potentially divisive issue in the rolling out of NP; on the one hand, it is perfectly logical that the respective authority will want to ensure that any development within its jurisdiction is not completely at odds with the objectives of its own Core Strategy. Yet at the same time, the rights afforded to local community groups by the Localism Act to shape their respective areas is still subject to approval by their LA, reducing the degree of decentralisation that was a core objective of the Act. It is clear from this example that maintaining a stable, positive relationship with the LA is key to any prospective neighbourhood forum, with any potential plans to be kept in line with local objectives, whilst the authority itself should strive to ensure that community-led development is able to prosper in a viable environment. Parish councils in the past have struggled to impose themselves on planning decisions (Gallent & Robinson, 2012; Gallent, et al., 2008), and certainly there have been warning signs that NP may still face an uphill battle in establishing itself as a recognised layer of planning legislation, with a case in Cringleford, South Norfolk, highlighted where plans to build new homes in the village were

approved by the local council despite being in breach of the villages approved neighbourhood plan (Dunton, 2015).

Yet, despite the degree of centralism still involved in NP, with community plans still needing to conform to both national and local plans, it can still be viewed as giving local communities more input into shaping their own areas. Whilst previously neighbourhood regeneration has been approached through centrally-created programmes delivered by state departments and unelected regeneration companies, NP has enabled a bottom-up approach to neighbourhood revitalisation and management. However, it has been recognised that there is a need for NP to remain as unimpeded by central government constraints as possible (Parker, 2012); if too much input is given by Whitehall into the development of plans, enthusiasm within communities may wane with their sense of power over their locality diluted. It is clear however, that coalition between various stakeholders involved in NP is at the very core of the system being able to function in a cohesive and ultimately effective manner.

3.13 Duty to Cooperate

The duty to cooperate was another legislative instrument created in the 2011 Localism Act, and places a legal duty upon local planning authorities (LPAs), English county councils and public bodies to openly communicate and engage with one another in a clear and productive, continuing manner in order to maximise the effectiveness of any potential Local and/or Marine Plans across juridical boundaries. The Coalition government have been keen to stress that the duty is not a duty to agree, but that some form of cooperation in strategic planning should be evidenced. LPAs should be able to illustrate that they have made every effort to explore and achieve the necessary cooperation on strategic cross boundary issues before they have submitted their Local Plan to the inspectorate for examination. Should a neighbouring authority refuse to cooperate, the authority attempting to engage cooperatively in its attempts to submit a Local plan should not be penalised in submitting their plan for examination. However they must demonstrate evidence of its efforts to cooperate with its neighbouring authorities.

Strategic matters in this case are defined as following:

- Sustainable development or use of land that has or would have a significant impact on at least two planning areas, including (in particular) sustainable development or

use of land for or in connection with infrastructure that is strategic and has or would have a significant impact on at least two planning areas; and

- Sustainable development or use of land in a two-tier area if the development or use is a county matter, or has or would have a significant impact on a county matter (Cullingworth, et al., 2015)

It is clear from the very nature of the duty to cooperate that coalition building between various parties is inherent in this form of environmental management. Not only are LPAs obligated to cooperate with each other with cross boundary issues, they are also required to cooperate with other public bodies, summarised in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 Relevant Public Bodies (adapted from Cullingworth et al, 2015)

Relevant Public Bodies (as listed by Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/767), Part 2)

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Environment Agency | Office of Rail Regulation |
| English Heritage | Transport for London |
| Natural England | Integrated transport authorities |
| Mayor of London | Highway authorities |
| Civil Aviation Authority | Marine Management Organisation |
| Homes and Communities Agency | Local Enterprise Partnerships ⁵ |
| Primary care trusts | |

Following the abolition of the RSSs by the Coalition government, the duty to cooperate has become the de facto way in which central government has sought its local equivalents to manage their areas. The idea behind this move is that by leading planning through their local plans, addressing economic, social and environmental issues that can only be effectively addressed in a holistic manner through working with neighbouring authorities. River catchment areas and travel to work areas that encompass land beyond the reach of just one

⁵ LEPs are not subject to the requirements of the duty, but LPAs and other public bodies that are subject to the duty must cooperate with the LEP and have regard to their activities when they are preparing their local plans.

authority's jurisdiction may hold the key to planning housing, transport, and infrastructure and flood risk management for a complete area. Such issues should create an environment whereby neighbouring LA's will want to work together to enhance the social, economic and physical landscape of their region in the face of competition from other counties.

The government expects the duty to produce effective policies on cross boundary issues, with such cooperation to be founded upon sustained working with tangible result, and it can be seen to be a clear step towards continued devolution. By removing RGOs, and removing the top-down targets of the regional plans that they produced, and assigning responsibility for local planning issues to LAs, it appears that the government is clearly committed to giving its local counterparts greater influence in how they can enhance their territory. Yet there is also potential for conflict, as local politics 'breeds different – sometimes conflicting – local visions for everything from employment to housing', as reported in cases of disagreement between several councils in Hertfordshire (Jeraj, 2013). These are issues that will clearly need to be tended to in the absence of any regional levels of central control to prescribe state-led guidance to LAs. Nevertheless, it is clear to see that the underlying approach is an assumption that the spread of local plans, in conjunction with the creation of neighbourhood development plans discussed earlier, and the accompanying issues that these policies will generate can be resolved through cooperative (and voluntarist) means (Colomb & Tomaney, 2015).

A major issue that has surfaced with the introduction of the Duty however, is the lack of guidance that has been given since its inception. Tomlinson et al (2013) comment that the draft guidance that was released with the Duty gave no indication of how local authorities and other public bodies should cooperate with each other, and how this cooperation should be envisaged going forwards. Such a dearth of guidance on the Duty can perhaps be explained by the lack of a clear vision that the government had at the time of its inception. Tensions were apparent within the governmental agenda; at one end, assurances were made to take decentralisation and localism further by giving more power to local councils and communities in order to manage urban development, yet at the same time top-down pressures for local authorities to accept new development and release land for development were imposed by central government (Wintour & Mason, 2015).

Subsequent research has shown that Duty has shown promise of being a useful tool in the emergence and consolidation of patterns of cooperation that has emerged through partnership working that local authorities have engaged in in recent years (Allmendinger, et

al., 2016). This has largely been through process through which the Planning Inspectorate has construed the Duty. As early as 2013, the Inspectorate had interrogated several proposed local plans on the grounds of uncertain cooperation and coordination between neighbouring parties. This has led to planning authorities recognising that the new Duty would have to be taken seriously, rather than being dismissed readily as a box ticking exercise (Allmendinger, et al., 2016).

However there are still reservations over whether the Duty can fully succeed in its current guise. Boddy & Hickman (2013) have found mixed reviews over the introduction of the Duty, and its feasibility in fostering cooperation between districts in the absence of Regional Spatial Strategies. Though it was not negatively received, interviews conducted indicate that local authorities were confident enough in their own ability to cooperate regardless of the Duty. The authors add that scrutiny of the Duty is limited, commenting that there have been calls for further guidance on its use and a possible second legislation to be passed (Boddy & Hickman, 2013, p. 759). Certainly, it is clear that the introduction of the Duty to cover holes created by the removal of regional level plans has not been universally met with acclaim, and that a lack of guidance on how the Duty is to be effected has compounded this situation.

3.14 Summary

As can be garnered from the accounts above, it is clear that the emergence of these three new forms of governance, and the way in which they are reliant on coalition building in order for them to carry out their functions, make them ideal for study in this investigation. More precisely, the lack of prior study on this new form of localised, self-organised governance under the rubric of behavioural economics and game theory has highlighted a gap in knowledge regarding certain preconditions in the coalition of actors within urban planning. The research questions asked earlier, revolving around how trust emerges and becomes established, and the extent to which leadership is required for such coalitions to exist, are central to addressing these gaps. Existing theories, as alluded to earlier, are not equipped to answer such important questions. It is the aim of this research to shed light on questions such as these, and game theory, through both experimental and qualitative means, will be the mechanism employed to uncover the answers. In order to delve into how these three levels of self-organised planning function, it will first be necessary to identify specific instances of where these mechanisms are happening. For this, case studies will be employed to analyse these groups in a real life context. Within these carefully chosen case study areas,

the mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2 will be implemented. Specifically, interviews inspired by behavioural sciences will be utilised at local authority level to ascertain a greater insight into how neighbouring districts cooperate with each other in the absence of a centralised, regional body to guide them. At the lower legislative level of neighbourhood planning, the Volunteer Function Inventory will be used to gather data from those who are actually involved at ground level in attempting to write a neighbourhood development plan for their specific locality.

Chapter 4 - Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will outline the methods that will be employed through this study. The research is aimed at two levels of the English planning system that have experienced contemporary reform that both demand self-organised cooperation: the devolution of powers from central government to neighbourhood planning level, and the invocation for local authorities to have a 'duty to cooperate'. Both of these approaches will be framed within a case study design. The methods that will be used at each level will be outlined and justified, the broader research design overviewed, the chosen case studies introduced and the procedure for data collection and analysis sketched out.

4.2 Research Questions

As this research is focussed on two separate levels of the planning eco-system, it is appropriate to split the research questions between these two levels. With this in mind, the questions that this research will look to answer are as follows:

- a. With respect to local authority planning practice, how does trust become established in coalitions of actors?
- b. To what extent is the 'Duty to Cooperate' a necessary condition for local authorities to coalesce into a coalition?
- c. What is the role of leadership in ensuring coalition stability?
- d. What are the behavioural dynamics that explain community participation in planning, and why do those who volunteer in neighbourhood planning choose to do so?
- e. To what extent does a sense of place attachment drive community participation at the neighbourhood level?
- f. To what extent does the composition of neighbourhood planning forums accord to the perception that they are skewed towards communities who are defending against unwanted development?

4.3 Overall Research Design

The research design for this study is to consider at two levels of governance – the neighbourhood scale and the geography of local planning authority coordination – how cooperation emerges and with what effect. At the lowest level, neighbourhood planning, the previous chapter made a case for the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) to provide insights into the personal motivations that lead individuals to become involved in what is a long road to creating a neighbourhood plan. The VFI was also supplemented by some contextual questions that allow the research to illustrate whether there are particular demographic groups who become involved in the process, and how their specific forum or council approach the task of creating a plan. This method also allows the research to gather some rich quantitative data, and this was analysed using a statistical package to explore the reliability of the data collected. Surveying was completed with groups of varying size, dependent upon the context of the neighbourhood body. 12 case study forums/town councils were been chosen around the core cities of England to be a part of the research, ensuring a wide geographical spread over England.

At the higher level, a more qualitative approach was implemented. Detailed interviews with members of differing local planning authorities were employed to uncover how each local authority has sought to adapt to the new planning landscape they find themselves in. The abolition of Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS's) has led to a previously guiding layer of the planning system being removed. In its place, the government has brought in the Duty to Cooperate (DtC) to mechanize a landscape where local authorities are legally bound to cooperate with each other and third party organisations. The interviews specifically look at how the DtC is used as a mechanism between local authorities, both within the context of a city region, and with those authorities that lie externally to this combined authority. The Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) was been chosen as the case study for this part of the research, for reasons that will be explained in this chapter.

In addition to this, both levels of research were carried out in an anonymised fashion. Individual participants were aware that their identity was to be anonymised, and that only the name of their respective neighbourhood body or local authority would be published in the research thesis. Both the VFI and surveys were self-administered in a setting of the participant's choice.

4.4 Case study approach

The case study approach is a useful research technique to be employed when investigating a specific theory and applying to a real life context (Yin, 2015)., and is considered to be an effective lens through which to explore questions that require an understanding of social and organizational procedures (Hartley, 2004). It is particularly useful as, rather than being a method in its own right, it can be used as a frame within which other research techniques, both quantitative and qualitative, can be implemented (Hartley, 2004, p. 324).

Yin (2015, p. 9) proposes that there are three conditions that influence the particular methods adopted by researchers at the commencement of any study:

1. The type of question being asked by the research;
2. The degree of control that the researcher has over events and behavioural traits, and;
3. The focus on present affairs over historical events.

Following the identification of these parameters, he proceeds to identify case study research as being an optimal method when:

- A “how” or “why” question is being asked about:
 - A contemporary set of events,
 - Over which the researcher has little or no control (Yin, 2015, p. 14)

It is the ability of the case study to stand as a frame within which other methods can be employed that justifies its inclusion within the research design of this investigation. This research is looking to uncover two major themes; firstly, why citizens are motivated to coalesce with each other to create a neighbourhood plan, and; secondly, how local authorities behave towards each other under the guise of a city region and with other neighbouring authorities, through the DtC. As the research is focused on these two particular types of this move towards devolved governance, it is intrinsically linked with the case study approach. Both of the aforementioned mechanisms are currently in use across the country, and to gain an insight and to uncover the answers to the questions that are being posed by this research required working with actors and communities that make up real-life coalitions in each of these contexts. Without being able to study these groups as cases would severely hinder the degree of insight that the investigation is able to garner.

4.5 Local Planning Authorities

4.5.1 Semi-structured interviews

At the other scale of analysis – the coordination and cooperation between local planning authorities – the qualitative nature of the data to be gathered suggested a research design where data would be primarily collected using semi-structured interviews. This method was deemed to be the most appropriate means of data collection, as this approach facilitates direct communication between two people, enabling the interviewer to draw information and opinions from the interviewee using questions and dialogue (Matthews & Ross, 2010). Interviewing can be carried out first hand through a face-to-face meeting, or from longer distances over the phone or internet. Interviewing is one of the most widely used data collection methods implemented in the social sciences. This is owing to the nature of the process, as it allows the researcher direct interaction with the research participant(s). Such direct interaction can be a rich source of data, as the interviewer can drill down deeply into a particular topic. This is a consequence of the power of language to tell a story through words and actions. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 126) comment:

“The expressive power of language provides the most important resource for accounts. A crucial feature of language is its capacity to present descriptions, explanations, and evaluations of almost infinite variety about any aspect of the world, including itself”

Qualitative semi structured interviews in this fashion, with their ability to gather a rich, detailed information set about the given topic, are a central method for researchers who are engaging in policy-related research (Wagenaar, 2011).

The decision was taken early on in the research that face-to-face interviewing in the chosen venue of each participant would be the employed method, rather than to conduct the research over the telephone or internet. The familiarity and natural essence of this method was a reason for this, as the researcher had previously carried out research in this vein, and as such was comfortable with the method and its ability to glean valuable information from the participant. Online interviewing would have been possible with all participants, yet as Hammond and Wellington comment (2013, p. 91), it was felt that by travelling to meet the participant face to face, a symbolic commitment was being made signifying the importance attached to their voice. Face to face interviewing also has the advantage of allowing the interviewer to pick up on physical signals from the participant, enriching the data collection further.

Interview requests were sent out via email to all 10 districts of Greater Manchester, with a further request sent to the planning team at the GMCA itself. In all, 10 participants were interviewed at this level of the investigation. Nine of the 10 districts of the GMCA were represented by a member of their respective planning departments, with only Oldham being unable to take part in this investigation owing to a lack of availability of staff at the time of data collection. Additionally, a member of the planning team within the GMCA itself was recruited for the investigation. This allowed the research to gather information on the combined authority and the cooperation between itself and its constituent districts from both the point of view of the local authorities and the GMCA itself. This added a richer layer of data to that that would have been gathered from interviewing participants solely from each local authority.

To maximise the potential for both involvement in the study and accurate descriptions of how the DtC policy is enforced at the respective LPAs, the research was conducted in locations chosen by each participant. In all cases, the venue turned out to be in a meeting room or private area of the participant's place of work. This aided the research further, as it maximised the chances of each participant feeling comfortable with the interview topic and layout. A decision was also needed from the outset as to whether the data collection at this level should be implemented using individual or group (focus group) settings. The benefits of focus group interviewing include the sense of security for participants that they are surrounded by their peers, and that they can help to jog one another's memories regarding particular actions or incidents that have taken place in the past (Hammond & Wellington, 2013, p. 93). They are also able to build upon points that other participants may make, adding further depth to answers that have already been collected. However, individual interviews were favoured over the focus group approach for several reasons. Firstly, due to the busy schedules of all of the participants involved, assembling all for a focus group session would be near impossible to achieve.

Secondly, and linking to the first point, is that to utilise the focus group method, all participants would have to travel to meet the researcher in a neutral venue. Not only would this have taken further time out of their schedules, with the potential for their withdrawal from the research, they would then potentially find themselves in an unfamiliar location. Such a move in the location of the research may have had negative effects on the data collected, as participants may not want to divulge information that they ordinarily would not envisage discussing away from their place of work. With regard to this issue, the individual

interview approach allowed the researcher to travel directly to the chosen location of the respective participant, ensuring that the research took place in as natural a setting as possible for what is, by definition, an “unnatural kind of conversation” (Hammond & Wellington, 2013, p. 91).

Thirdly, had all of the participants been gathered together for a focus group, this may have encouraged a less open approach to participation. Though the topics discussed in the interviews were the respective participant’s opinion, and none of the information spoken about classified (all of the topics discussed are available through public reporting), a group setting may have changed the dynamics of the data collection. Participants may have been reluctant to discuss their true opinions with regards to the dynamics of inter-authority relationships in the face of cross-boundary colleagues, particularly if other members of the focus group held higher grade positions in authorities elsewhere. Through the individual method, such pressure was removed, thus maximising the potential for true, honest opinions to be gleaned from the interviews.

Finally, the anonymous design of the research, at both LPA and NP level, channelled the direction of methodology towards individual interviewing. In order to be consistent at both levels of the study, anonymity was stressed for all participants, with only the name of their respective body of governance to be published. Such anonymity cannot be guaranteed using the focus group method, as participants may recognise one another from previous cross-boundary meetings or former employment positions. Individual interviewing assisted greatly in upholding the research integrity, and allowing for anonymised interviews.

Recruiting participants for the study was carried out through initial emails to the general email address of the planning department at each respective LPA. This yielded several replies from various members of staff at different departments, all of whom worked at varying levels within their LPA. After this, follow up phone calls were made to each authority that had not yet replied to the initial email to enquire as to whether there would be a member of planning staff able to consent to a short research interview. Following these calls, that were made to the general planning contact number for those particular authorities, further interviews were able to be arranged, ensuring a near-full coverage of the case study area was achieved. By using the general contact details of each respective planning department, the selection process was able to be as random as it could be. Planning departments at local authority level can be relatively small, in some cases staffed by a handful of individuals, owing to the cuts that austerity has forced over this time period. Though such small teams

of professionals can limit the degree of 'randomness' that is taken through the selection process, by contacting these departments through such general channels, the researcher was unable to know who would be the recipient of the message. The only assumption made was that the recipient would be a planning professional, thus an appropriate audience for the research request.

Though it would have been ideal to have all participants working at the same level within each LPA, in reality this would have been difficult, if not impossible to achieve. This is owing to the fact that each LPA may have a different operational design, as they are addressing different areas and have different needs. As such, one authority may have greater resources (regardless of being the planning department or not) than another in one particular area of its jurisdiction. This may lead to differences in staffing across authorities in departments that serve similar roles, in turn leading to a mismatch in equivalent roles across all authorities. Furthermore, the difference in positions of participants was taken as a positive aspect for the research. By interviewing personnel from different layers of administration across the authorities, the research was able to gather a greater depth of information as to how planning departments function across different authorities, and the role that they play in the functioning of the wider council in each area, in particular, the role of party politics across the case study area.

In a similar vein to the neighbourhood planning scale of investigation, all participants were briefed before the commencement of the research interview. A participant information sheet and consent form was read by all involved, and said forms signed by both interviewer and interviewee. This ensured that the interviewer had met all of the ethical standards set by the research institution, and that the interviewee was fully aware of what the research entailed, their rights regarding the use of any collected data, informed that a Dictaphone would be utilised for the collection of data, and the contact details of the interviewer should they have any further queries or wish to withdraw from the process at a later date.

4.5.2 Greater Manchester Combined Authority

With the research intending to uncover how LPA's communicate and work together with each other in the absence of any RSS's, the investigation sought to identify a region of England where local authorities are perceived as being able to work well together in a clear and transparent fashion. By analysing local authorities with a positive reputation for partnership working, the research would be best placed to uncover what exactly it is that

allows local authorities to work together successfully, communicate with each other clearly, and to find out the exact role that the Duty to Cooperate plays in such working relationships.

With this in mind, the conurbation of ten local authorities that make up Greater Manchester raise themselves as an obvious choice as the case study. The area “finds itself championed as a model of pragmatism and an exemplar for government’s devolution programme” (Osborne, 2014). These authorities are bounded together not only by geographical and legislative boundaries, but by centuries of history, with them all playing a key role in Manchester’s ascent to becoming the world’s first industrial city in the late 18th Century. More recently, the authorities have become further bounded together through various reorganisations at local government scale. The success of the cooperation and coordination managed in-house by the constituent local authorities of Greater Manchester has been recognised by previous research (Harding, et al., 2010; Haughton, et al., 2016), again indicative that this combined authority is an excellent choice through which to study self-organisation between local planning authorities.

Reorganisation for the local governance of Greater Manchester first took real hold in 1974 with the creation of the Greater Manchester County Council. This reorganisation was set against the background of a report that demonstrated how the then structure of government was unfit for the urban area as a whole (Green, 1959). Prior to the reorganisation, the area was divided across the four counties of Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire and West Riding (Yorkshire).

The Redcliffe-Maud Commission 1966-69 put in motion the reform process that would be achieved in 1974. The report called for three large conurbations, centred on Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, to be reorganised and placed under a two-tier structure of government. With regard to Manchester, the Commission encountered a fair degree of difficulty in formulating what areas should be contained within the conurbation due to the area’s complex urban structure, leading to considerable alterations being made to the area (Barlow, 1991). When the reorganisation did finally take place in 1974, a two-tier system was introduced to the area. Greater Manchester County (GMC) had a population of 2.7 million people, spread over 10 metropolitan districts covering 1300km² (Barlow, 1995). Whilst the county held responsibility for police, fire, highways and traffic, the districts were responsible for education, social services, housing and refuse collection. However, the early seeds of cooperation can be found in this county council arrangement, as both layers of

governance had responsibility for this task, with county level officers planning at a strategic level for the entire area, and districts responsible for their own local plans.

Further evidence of the willingness of the authorities of Greater Manchester to work together effectively could be seen following the 1986 local government reorganisation. At this point, the GMC was abolished and its functions transferred to the districts. The abolition was in line with changes at the national level, and a deterioration in the relationships between the metropolitan counties and Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government of the time. It was noted that the idea behind the reorganisation of local government was not to reform it but to abolish it (Flynn, et al., 1985), with the Conservative government attempting to stamp out Labour opponents who were in office at the local metropolitan level (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988). There was little internal appetite to remove the county layer of governance within Greater Manchester, and it has been argued that issues elsewhere in the country, particularly in London, where what accounted for the downfall of the GMC (Barlow, 1995).

Despite the removal of the GMC however, the partnership working that had occurred across the county in the decade previous did not halt. The ten authorities, who had become the only elected governments in the county, assumed the functions of the GMC. This occurred on both an individual and collective basis, with several inter district bodies being set up. Each authority took on a lead role with these inter-district bodies. An example of this is Oldham taking on the reins of lead authority for the Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority. The statutory nature of the functions that were taken on by the district councils made certain that they had to be covered. However, the councils came together to form the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) in the immediate aftermath of the GMCs abolition. This was a voluntary organisation that took responsibility for overseeing and funding joint activities between the districts of Greater Manchester, and to manage strategic public services that had been delegated to it by its member districts, such as public transport. However, it was set up to take responsibility for non-statutory objectives. It is this non-mandatory nature of the organisation, and the districts that came together to set it up, that make Greater Manchester such an intriguing case study through which to investigate the nuances of what make successful cross border working relationships possible.

AGMA still exists as a legal entity today, but has been superseded by the creation of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA). The GMCA consists of 11 indirectly elected members, each of whom is a directly elected councillor from each of the 10 boroughs

that make up the county, together with the Mayor of Greater Manchester. Though the first “metro-mayor” elections, won by Labour’s Andy Burnham, took place in May 2017, an interim mayor had been present on the GMCA board since May 2015. The combined authority that was first muted for pilot city region status in the 2009 Budget is a statutory authority in its own right. Whilst the mayor is able to make some decisions independently, other must be made in consultation with, and approval of, all eleven members of the GMCA, with some needing a majority of support, others unanimous. The powers afforded to the GMCA have been passed down through devolution, and the granting of pilot city-region status is indicative of the importance attached to Manchester in bolstering the national economy (Darling, 2009).

With regard to planning, the GMCA is responsible for creating and implementing the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework (GMSF), a Joint Development Plan Document that will coordinate land use across the entire city region. It is being produced by all 10 councils of the combined authority through partnership working to manage transport infrastructure and the built environment for the foreseeable future. Echoing the two tier nature of the GMC in the 1970s and 1980s, each local authority is responsible for writing their own local plan, whilst all simultaneously contributing to the GMSF as part of a wider strategic plan for the combined authority. This is indicative of tradition of partnership working in the city region, thus making it an excellent lens through which to study the ‘rules of the game’ with regard to apparent successful coalition working between various parties.

Furthermore, by selecting the authorities of the GMCA as the case study, this research will also assess how all of these authorities, and the GMCA itself as a combined authority, work and communicate with those authorities that lie outside of the city region. As can be seen from Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the GMCA is bordered by 10 local authorities across Merseyside, Cheshire, Derbyshire, West Yorkshire and Lancashire. As a key economic hub in the North of England, Greater Manchester and its districts have many cross boundary issues with their neighbouring authorities, such as transport infrastructure, employment opportunities and housing, among others. As such, it is necessary for all of these authorities to communicate with one another, a process that is now more important than ever in the absence of RSSs. It is this gap in legislation created through the Localism Act that the Duty to Cooperate is designed to fill, to ensure that local authorities are indeed communicating with each other in a clear and coherent way, and to verify that any cross border issues are resolved without hindering national economic growth objectives.



Figure 4-1 Map of Greater Manchester (Source: CIWM Online)



Figure 4-2 Map of Greater Manchester and neighbouring authorities (Source: ONS)

By using the GMCA as the chosen case study, this research will assess how effective the DtC is proving to be in its remit to ensure partnership working between authorities who are both within and outside of the combined authority. The research will look to ascertain whether the Duty plays a similar role in both internal and external partnerships, and whether the presence of a combined authority alters the role that it plays. Moreover, does the presence of the combined authority side-line the relevance of the duty, as the authorities of Greater Manchester are already voluntarily working together, and have been done through their own choice since the inception of AGMA in 1986.

4.6 Neighbourhood planning

4.6.1 Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI)

As outlined in Chapter 5, the VFI is based on the functional approach to volunteering. It is a psychological survey developed by Clary et al (1996) and further revised by Clary et al. (1998). The VFI is a 30 question survey that is designed to measure the motivation of volunteers according to six functional factors; career, enhancement, protective, social, understanding and values. Five Likert scale based questions are asked for each factor in order to ascertain how strong a role the respective factor plays in motivating an individual to volunteer their time for the chosen cause.

Table 4-1 Function Served By volunteering and their assessment through the VFI (Clary, 1999)

| Function | Conceptual definition | Sample VFI item |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Values | The individual volunteers in order to express or act on important values like humanitarianism. | I feel it is important to help others. |
| Understanding | The volunteer is seeking to learn more about the world or exercise skills that are often unused. | Volunteering lets me learn through direct, hands on experience. |
| Enhancement | One can grow and develop psychologically through volunteer activities. | Volunteering makes me feel better about myself. |
| Career | The volunteer has the goal of gaining career-related experience through volunteering. | Volunteering can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work. |
| Social | Volunteering allows an individual to strengthen his or her social relationships. | People I know share an interest in community service. |
| Protective | The individual uses volunteering to reduce negative feelings, such as guilt, or to address personal problems. | Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles. |

That the inventory's main objective is to assess the main motivational factors behind individuals volunteering for a chosen cause is the primary reason that it was chosen as the main mechanism through which to study voluntarism within neighbourhood plans. Voluntarism is one of the key facets of this still relatively young piece of legislation in English planning, and it is important to understand what drive individuals to become involved in this

activity. Such importance is twofold: firstly, in order for neighbourhood plans to be created in the first place, individuals must volunteer their time and resources, and carry out duties that ordinarily would not be fulfilled e.g. canvassing local opinion through delivery of questionnaires to residences in the area. Secondly, at the national level, if neighbourhood planning is to sustain itself in the long term, it is essential that there is a long-term supply of people who will be willing to volunteer. With this in mind, it is important to understand what it is that motivates people to become involved in the process. Uncovering these motivations will allow the research to understand why people choose to give up their time to create a plan, and in doing so can inform any potential amendments to policy.

As outlined earlier, the VFI has been used across a variety of different disciplines to measure volunteer motivation. Its use has been applied in the field of social services (Agostinho & Paco, 2012; Allison, et al., 2002; McCabe, et al., 2007), sports clubs (Bang, et al., 2012; Kim, et al., 2010), education (Caldarella, et al., 2010; Eppler, et al., 2011) and civil services (Francis & Jones, 2012), among others (for an in depth list of studies that have used the VFI, please see Maley, et al, (2015) or Chacón, et al. (2017)). In their seminal work with the inventory, Clary, et al. (1996) discovered that values and understanding were the factors with the greatest motivational force for volunteers in the arts field. Since this initial research, the VFI has been used in a multitude of studies, outlined above. Yet it has not been used in the field of planning, and more specifically, neighbourhood planning. This is unsurprising, as the policy is still in its relatively nascent stage. Indeed, wider literature has not emerged on the subject of neighbourhood planning until recent years, with notable work by Bradley (2015), Gallent & Robinson (2012), Parker (2012; 2016; 2017), Parker, et al. (2014; 2015), Stanton (2014). Sturzaker & Shaw (2015) and Wills (2016). Yet such research has focussed on aspects other than motivations, such as capacity of particular groups to form a plan and their legitimacy (Sturzaker & Shaw, 2015; Wills, 2016), the ability of the Localism Act to successfully decentralise power to the local level (Stanton, 2014) or the experience of independent examiners in the process so far (Parker, et al., 2017).

Yet the VFI has not been applied in the discipline of planning. Neighbourhood planning, and the opportunity that it gives residents and communities to come together to create a piece of legislation for their area, is an obvious opportunity to utilise this instrument to uncover why people are motivated to take part in such an activity. It is this opening that has been created by the changing planning landscape in England that has led the VFI to be chosen as the main basis of this level of the investigation. Its widespread use across various disciplines

is indicative of its popularity as a mechanism through which to measure this phenomenon. This is owing to the inventory's relevance to both initial uptake of volunteering and the continued commitment to volunteer (Clary, et al., 1998; Clary & Snyder, 1999). The sturdiness of the VFI also makes the its application here appealing, as it has been proven to be both reliable and valid in previous studies (Barron & Rihova, 2011; Chacón, et al., 2017; Clary, et al., 1998; Petriwskyj & Warburton, 2007).

The VFI in its standard form is a 30 question survey that assesses 6 psychological functions of an individual's willingness to volunteer. The format of the survey is sufficiently broad to make the VFI applicable to a wide range of disciplines. For this research however, the decision was taken to extend the VFI framework to capture some specific insights into the nature of volunteering to be a citizen-planner, and to include some language that spoke directly to the subject of neighbourhood planning. As this method of investigating motivation to volunteer has not yet been applied to planning, this slight change in the language of questioning helped to embed the VFI more firmly within the context of the investigation. Neighbourhood planning aims to serve as another layer of public governance, and is subject to all of the legislative powers and boundaries that other levels of the planning system are subject to and bound by. As such, this creates a very formal environment within which the volunteer finds themselves operating in. Typically, neighbourhood planning groups will liaise with their local planning authority, residents, businesses and potentially developers who may be interested in a site within the designated neighbourhood area. They may also find themselves working closely with planning professionals in order to guide them with the writing and policies of their plan. In addition to this will be the inspector's report that judges whether or not the plan is sound or not. These different layers of communication, along with the various stages of plan creation and publicity periods, ensure that the process of the creating a neighbourhood plan is lengthy, potentially taking several years (DCLG, 2016). That neighbourhood forums are designated for periods of 5 years at a time is testament to this.

All of these activities and relations ensure that neighbourhood planning is embedded into the planning system. As such, volunteering in this context can be seen as a particularly formal activity, arguably more so than when it comes to volunteering in other domains. It is this formal nature of the volunteering for neighbourhood planning that has justified the addition to the existing VFI framework to speak more to the specific question of whether volunteering for neighbourhood planning entailed some demographic or spatial aspects. For example, the

question of whether place-based affiliation plays a part in why people volunteer for neighbourhood planning is an important question on which we can gain data by refining the VFI slightly, and including further questions that can complement this issue. The version of the VFI used in this research is still able to garner data on the six behavioural factors that were envisaged by the VFI's designers.

As can be seen from Table 4.2, though some of the language has been altered, the essence of the line of questioning in this VFI remains in line with that of the original work. For example, for the Understanding factor, the question "Volunteering lets me learn through direct, hands-on experience" is altered to read "Volunteering in the forum lets me learn through direct, hands-on experience". This very modest alteration allows the VFI to retain its analytical origins, but also addresses the participant in a way that is much less abstract to the planning process. It also ensures that the participant is aware that the volunteering behaviour that is being measured by the study is concerned with the neighbourhood plan, and not any other causes to which the respective participant may be involved with.

Table 4-2 Modified examples of VFI questions for planning research

| Functions | Original VFI question | Planning VFI question (altered) |
|------------------|--|--|
| Values | I feel it is important to help others. | I feel it is important to help others in our area. |
| Understanding | Volunteering lets me learn through direct, hands on experience. | Volunteering in the forum lets me learn through direct, hands-on experience. |
| Enhancement | Volunteering makes me feel better about myself. | Volunteering in the forum makes me feel better about myself |
| Career | Volunteering can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work. | Volunteering within the forum can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work |
| Social | People I know share an interest in community service. | People I know share an interest in community service (<i>no change necessary</i>) |
| Protective | Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles. | Volunteering in the forum is a good escape from my own troubles |

With the inclusion of these alterations on the stock VFI, this method was confirmed as being the most appropriate for data collection in this context. Before the choice of the VFI was made, other surveys had been considered. The Attitudes towards Helping Others (AHO) scale (Webb, et al., 2000), Helping Attitudes Scale (HAS) (Nickell, 1998) and the Attitudes toward Charitable Giving (ACG) scale (Furnham, 1995) were all deliberated over as potential methods through which to measure individual's propensity to volunteer their time for particular courses. However, whilst they have their own particular merits, they lacked the robustness required for this research, something that the VFI gives. In particular, the AHO and HAS merely measure individuals beliefs around helping others, and do not look to factorise these results in the way that the VFI classifies particular questions under particular groupings e.g. Career, Social, Values etc. The ACG meanwhile, whilst splitting its 20-item measure into 5 groupings in a fashion very similar to that of the VFI, is embedded deeply within the realm of traditional charity giving through donations to charitable organisations. The VFI emerges as the strongest candidate here, as it speaks directly to the language of voluntarism as opposed to charitable giving, and its flexibility and robustness has been proven through its widespread use in the literature (Maley, et al., 2015; Chacón, et al., 2017).

The survey was carried out at neighbourhood/town council forum meetings for the respective case study. Each case study was attended once by the researcher in order to carry out the survey. All participants took part in the survey simultaneously. For each of the cases, the research was included on the respective meeting's agenda as a separate item away from the normal business of the group. This allowed the researcher to introduce the survey to the participants, fully brief them as to the participant information sheet and consent form, and to dispense the survey. Each participant completed their survey in their own time, and the results were anonymised so that nobody in the group could ascertain the results of other participants' responses.

The VFI used in this investigation was supplemented by some additional contextual questions, embedding the survey as a planning context. Three introductory questions were used to open the survey, asking participants to state their gender, age group and employment status. These questions were implemented for two major purposes. Firstly, this allows the research to point towards which demographic groups' individuals belong to when becoming involved in the process. This can help to identify if there are groups who appear more likely to become involved in neighbourhood planning than others. Secondly, these relatively simple and closed questions served as test questions for individuals to get to grips

with the survey response software that was initially planned to be used for data collection. Several polling software packages were considered as a way of data collecting. Such software runs through Microsoft PowerPoint and would allow the users to enter their survey responses through mobile response hardware directly into the system. The result would then be available for statistical manipulation readily, without the need for the researcher to manually input the data into a spreadsheet before analysis. However, after setting up meetings with the first neighbourhood planning groups and pilot group, the researcher was informed that there would be no AV equipment available in order to project the survey to the entire group. Despite some groups in the later meetings informing the research that AV equipment would be available, the decision was taken to continue with the paper based approach that had served the investigation well previously. This fostered continuity and consistency between the various meetings and ensured that all participants experienced the survey in the same way.

In addition to the survey and opening questions, nine further questions were included to close the survey and to add further planning context. The opening question asked participants to indicate how often they attend meetings of their neighbourhood planning group. The following seven questions were answered through a Likert scale (1-5), and made exploratory inquiries directly related to neighbourhood planning, questions that are not under the remit of the VFI. These questions were again informed by the literature of behavioural insights, and sought to identify particular beliefs that people may hold about the planning forum. For example, participants were asked whether or not they believe that the formation of the neighbourhood forum or council helped to foster trust between members of the coalition. Other questions also centred on whether participants would be open to assisting neighbourhood forums in other geographical locations (establishing whether or not participants feel an association with place), levels of input from various groups outside of the forum, and whether or not levels of development had played a part in the decision to join the neighbourhood plan team. The final question used was a closed question which sought to identify a core reason for becoming involved with this activity, asking participants to choose one response from five pre-prepared options. This final question serves a purpose in that it is derived from the background of neighbourhood planning, so is more directly contextual to the subject than the VFI.

As the survey was administered in paper-based format, this allowed the researcher to discuss the purpose of the investigation to the participants whilst they had a paper version

of the information sheet, consent form and the survey in front of them. This allowed for the highest level of understanding of data gathered. Furthermore, the anonymous nature of the survey was emphasised to all participants, maximising the potential for honest responses.

4.6.2 Case study selection: Choosing Neighbourhood forums/Town councils

Since its inception, neighbourhood planning has proved to be a relatively popular mechanism that citizens have participated in. Indeed, by February 2016, at which point in time the case studies for this research were being sifted through and refined, there were 1625 designated areas (Parker, 2016). Since then, the numbers of designated neighbourhood plan areas has only increased further. This posed an obvious question: with so many areas now designated, how could this be reduced to a manageable, but valid sample of case study areas?

Neighbourhood planning is not limited to particular types of area, and they can be set up in any area of the country should they meet the set criteria for membership of the forum/town council. The result of this is that there is no “typical” neighbourhood development plan. There can be vast differences between those plans that are urban and those that are rural. Urban plans are more likely to be organised by neighbourhood forums that have been assembled with the sole purpose of developing the plan, and therefore have limited knowledge of planning matters from the outset. Yet rural plans are more likely than their urban counterparts to be organised by town or parish councils (though it should be noted that even rural plans may be instigated by a neighbourhood forum established for this sole purpose). An obvious benefit of a plan being organised by a council is that those who are on this committee will have experience of managing projects of this nature, being as they are elected officials for their respective areas. They are also more likely to have experience of liaising with external shareholders and their city or borough authorities, and have the familiarity of working with each other on a regular basis at general council meetings.

The ‘North-South’ divide of England may also be seen to influence the makeup of neighbourhood plans across the country. The widely reported differences in average income, house prices and government spending (Massey, 1985; Martin, 1988; Rowthorn, 2010; Martin, et al., 2016) may influence the take up and make up of neighbourhood development plans across the country. Indeed, two local authorities with the highest number of neighbourhood planning applications hail from the south of England, Cornwall and Wiltshire respectively. There is also the potential for differences between areas that are

under differing local political control, and also between those areas being subject to local planning departments varying attitudes to neighbourhood planning. Whilst some departments may be happy to embrace neighbourhood planning and offer advice and guidance to citizens on how to start up and develop a sound plan, others may not be able to assist in such a way, perhaps owing to scarce resources or a different attitude towards this form of citizen participation. Again, this can be linked back to variations in political control at the local level.

With this myriad of determining factors, the route chosen to vastly scale down the number of potential case studies was to use the 8 core cities of England (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham & Sheffield) and London as the frame within which this side of the research would be conducted within. The core cities are the 8 largest cities in England outside of London, and as such represent the biggest geographical urban areas nationally. By focusing on these nine areas, the research has the opportunity to sample neighbourhood development plans that are truly urban in nature. Furthermore, rural plans that lie in the hinterlands of these large urban settlements will be assessed in order to ascertain how the process varies across urban and rural geographies. This allows the research to compare the plans and their constituent groups in several ways. Firstly, comparisons can be made locally between the urban and rural plans created in each respective city region, where possible. Secondly, comparisons can be made nationally between plans created in similar arenas i.e. all of those in the urban areas can be compared against each other, and similarly for those created in rural areas. Finally, the differences if any, between plans created by a designated neighbourhood forum and those forged by exiting town and parish councils can be compared.

After this approach had been determined, various local authority websites were used in order to build up a database of neighbourhood planning activity in each respective city region. Following this, contact details for each of these neighbourhood areas were compiled, and contact was made with each of these groups, of which there were 120 at the time of data collection. This figure was slightly reduced after early replies were received from forums who had successfully had a plan adopted. Following the adoption of a plan, it was discovered that the neighbourhood forums that had created these pieces of legislation had then been dissolved or put into an indefinite period of hibernation, as their objectives of creating a plan had been achieved, and thus there was no need for regular planning

meetings. This resulted in the research being refined further to focus on groups that were in the pre-examination stage of neighbourhood planning.

After this, contact was originally made via email to the respective groups, inviting them to be a part of the study, and laying out all of the details of the research, and the ethical guideline that it was to adhere to (Appendix 1). Follow up phone calls were then used with those groups that replied to the email to discuss further the nature of the investigation, and to organise a time to run the survey with members of the respective forum/council. Profiles of those groups who chose to participate in the study can be found in Table 6.3.

As evidenced by Table 4.3, there were difficulties in attaining both a rural and an urban neighbourhood plan group for each respective city. A major factor in this is the relatively low take up of neighbourhood planning in practice in some of these areas. For example, at the time of data collection, there were only three neighbourhood planning areas in Newcastle, with only one of these three being located in urban Newcastle. Furthermore, this particular urban group were unable to be contacted to participate in the study, despite the researcher exploring every available avenue to contact them – although existing in name, the group were not functioning as an active forum. This resulted in only one neighbourhood forum, Whitburn, participating in the study from the peri-urban area surrounding Newcastle. Similar issues affected participation take up in Bristol, Leeds and Sheffield.

Table 4-3 Key statistics from case study neighbourhood areas

| NPF | City Region | Parliamentary Constituency | Constituency (2017)* | Control | Usual residents** | Population Density** | Rural or Urban | Forum or Council |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Beeches, Booths & Barr | Birmingham | Labour | Perry Barr | | 23,652*** | 29.7*** | Urban | Forum |
| Birkenhead & Tranmere | Liverpool | Labour | Birkenhead | | 9,284*** | 50.8*** | Urban | Forum |
| Birkenhead North | Liverpool | Labour | Birkenhead | | 7,510*** | 21.0*** | Urban | Forum |
| Blackrod | Manchester | Conservative | Bolton West | | 5,001 | 5.8 | Rural | Council |
| Denton South | Manchester | Labour | Denton & Reddish | | 11,074 | 38.2 | Urban | Forum |
| Kippax | Leeds | Conservative | Elmet & Rothwell | | 9,785 | 14.3 | Rural | Council |
| Linby | Nottingham | Conservative | Sherwood | | 232 | 0.6 | Rural | Forum |
| Mill Hill | London | Conservative | Hendon | | 18,451 | 19.7 | Urban | Forum |
| Oxspring | Sheffield | Labour | Penistone & Stocksbridge | | 1,225 | 2.5 | Rural | Council |
| Stanton Drew | Bristol | Conservative | Somerset North East | | 787 | 1.1 | Rural | Council |
| Stapleford | Nottingham | Conservative | Broxtowe | | 15,241 | 35.6 | Urban | Council |
| Whitburn | Newcastle | Labour | South Shields | | 7,448 | 11.4 | Rural | Forum |

*Based on results of 2017 General Election

**Based on results of 2011 Census (KS101EW – Usual resident population)

***Figures based on overall ward data. BBB, Birkenhead & Tranmere and Birkenhead North are not based on traditional borders of jurisdiction

A lack of neighbourhood planning activity in urban Sheffield and Bristol meant that it was difficult to recruit participants from an already small pool of potential groups. There was more contact with urban groups in Leeds, yet this ultimately yielded no city participants, as two of those forums had stalled on their plan and were no longer meeting – again, the forums existing in name only.

The variability of practice, particularly the way in which a number of ‘urban’ NP fora had stalled is perhaps the first finding of this research. However, as the specific focus of this research is to explore volunteering in functioning NP forums, it is important to note that 12 neighbourhood development planning groups were found to participate in the study. These groups cover the full English national geography covered by the Core Cities and offer a great deal of insight into how the process works across different areas, and most crucially to this specific work, shine a light on the motivations of those who volunteer to take part in this process. The twelve case studies involved give a great deal of scope to consider variations between different regions of England, with at least one group included from each of the 9 city areas. This allows for comparisons to be made between rural and urban areas, and also how the difference in the nature of the group (forum or council) impact upon motivations to volunteer in the process. Furthermore, small local contrasts can be investigated in both Nottingham and Manchester, as both of these city regions are represented by both an urban and rural group each.

In total, across the 12 neighbourhood development plan areas surveyed in this investigation, 112 participants took part in the full survey. These 12 surveys followed a pilot study that was conducted with a local residents group who had expressed plans of eventually forming a neighbourhood forum. As this group was not yet a recognised forum, yet had keen understanding for planning and an interest in their area, this represented an appropriate choice for a pilot study. This study was conducted to assess the feasibility of the survey in its final guise. As highlighted earlier, some of the wording of the stock VFI had been amended in order to embed the method further into the context of the research. This pilot allowed the investigation to test whether the language used in the altered VFI was appropriate for the audience, as well as to address any editorial issues. This process was conducted in the paper based format that would soon become the single method used for data collection, as opposed to the presentation style that had been initially pitched. This further reinforced the method as being the most suitable for data collection.

The variety within the case study areas is invaluable to this research, allowing the investigation to gain a deeper understanding into the differing motives that drive citizens to participate in this level of planning. The wide geographic spread of the cases allows for as wide a scope as possible to be taken on this subject. It is difficult, if not impossible, to define what would be the 'archetypal' neighbourhood plan, as each individual area and its inhabitants will have different agendas and priorities that drive the plan forward. By taking such an all-encompassing approach to data collection, a more holistic understanding of volunteer motivation in neighbourhood planning is achieved.

4.7 Summary

This chapter has analysed the methods that will be used in the research along both streams of investigation. This case study led approach using two levels of the planning system provides the ideal lens through which to analyse the new mechanisms through which the government has looked to foster voluntarist action at the grass roots level. At the neighbourhood level, the VFI will be used as the instrument through which to measure individuals' motivations to become involved with, and continue to give their time towards creating a neighbourhood development plan. The quantitative nature of this method allows this research to collect a large number of sample data from various different neighbourhood groups. This in turn allows for both a general picture of motivation in this particular sphere to be illustrated, but also for comparisons to be made between differing types of neighbourhood plan, be it rural or urban, forum-led or council-led, and so on. At the other end of the scale, the VFI is impractical as a data gathering method. The VFI is useful for gathering motivations of individual to volunteer. Yet, at the neighbourhood level it is not individuals choosing to cooperate with each other to create local plans, but councils themselves. Attempting to measure voluntarism levels of an organisation through the views of one individual employee would be flawed. With this, the interview method will be implemented to collect data on how partnership working between local authorities within the GMCA occurs, both with internal districts of the combined authority, and also outside of its jurisdiction.

This chapter then has sought to validate the methods that have been chosen, and these approaches will be broken down in the next chapter. The results of the interview data will be introduced first in Chapter 5, and from this key themes will emerge around the use of the Duty to Cooperate and the strength of the coalition that binds the GMCA together. This

particular combined authority is seen as the flagbearer of this particular type of governmental vehicle presently being used in England and Wales, and an understanding of its internal (and external) cooperative dynamics are essential in order to learn how the model has flourished in the absence of any existing example to take lead from in the country. Following this, the data from the VFI survey will be analysed, initially focussing on the six behavioural factors that the survey measures. The contextual planning questions will also be assessed here, further embedding the data of the main VFI within the language of planning practice. Following initial analysis of the dataset, the VFI will then be broken down further into different sub-divisions based on geographical and political spread, with reliability and correlational test also carried out.

Chapter 5 - Analysis of interview data

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, analysis will be carried out on the data that has been gathered at the local authority level. In particular, a qualitative breakdown of the interview data collected from participants at the GMCA and 9 of its constituent districts will be conducted. This will be implemented to ascertain the drivers of cooperation that have allowed the districts of Greater Manchester to successfully work in collaboration with each other over the past decades. The role of the Duty to Cooperate will be investigated to determine its use and whether or not it is fit for purpose in a combined authority as exhibited in Greater Manchester. Other factors of coalition building will also be probed, including the importance of trust between the individual authorities, and the emergence of any dominant parties in the group.

Of course, it is essential that planning practice is not viewed as existing in a vacuum. Indeed, by its very nature planning is a highly politicised; *planning is in politics, and cannot escape politics, but it is not politics* (Albrechts, 2003, p. 251). As such, it would be impossible to disregard the importance of party politics in shaping how the GMCA's councils interact and cooperate with each other. As such, this subject is analysed within the contents of this chapter. Important too is the tradition of cooperation that has existed in Greater Manchester long before the dawn of the GMCA, a tradition that really took hold during the era of the Greater Manchester Council. Indeed, this history was mentioned by all of the ten subjects who participated in this research, and thus is discussed at greater length in this chapter. This tradition, which can be likened to the notion of 'repeated interaction' in the language of behavioural sciences, also surfaces as being a central reason for the level of trust that has emerged in Greater Manchester. However, it is the topic of the Duty to Cooperate, the key component passed on from central government to aide communication and cooperation between local authorities (and other public bodies) in the absence of regional offices, is where this analysis commences.

5.2 The Duty to Cooperate

The Duty (hereafter, DtC), introduced to ensure that local authorities continue to work together in the absence of regional assemblies, was discussed in all of the interviews. It was here that its role was able to be further explored and understood and its applied use in contemporary planning practice investigated.

It was outlined by several interviewees that the communication that they and their respective planning departments have with their counterpart in non-GM districts was primarily through the DtC and the cooperation that it is there to ensure occurs at the local level:

“The work that members of the GM have with those authorities outside of the combined authority is the more Duty to Cooperate kind of role between one planning authority and another” (Participant 3).

“We have Duty to Cooperate meetings with _____, they’ve been out for consultation with their own local plan, so we’ve been involved in that ...” (Participant 4)

In this sense, it can be seen that the DtC is serving a purpose in bringing neighbouring authorities together to engage in formal communication and cooperation with each other. This is vital across all of England, as plans in one local authority will not just have an impact within its own jurisdiction. Developments in one authority may have direct impacts on others, particularly near neighbours. Districts may also have cross-boundary targets, for example on regional housing figures, hanging over from previous administrative bodies that cannot be readily dismissed. Transport infrastructure also stands out as a major national property that needs to be managed effectively by neighbouring bodies, as they are intrinsically a shared resource.

Transport and housing, though not the exclusive topics of communication between authorities cited by the interviewees, did rise up to be the two most common themes when discussing the DtC. Particularly with regard to housing, the formal need for the DtC became apparent. All of the districts have collaborated with others in order for them to attempt to meet housing targets that they have been set, judged by what their Objectively Assessed Need (OAN) for housing is. Whilst some of these authorities may be able to meet their own OAN within their own boundaries, others may need to cooperate with their neighbours in order for OAN’s in the region to be met. This was mentioned by some participants:

“We haven’t been able to meet our own OAN, because this has been redistributed across the GM, other districts have ended up taking more ...” (Participant 4).

“We’ve always agreed with (external neighbouring district) that neither authority can take any of the OAN of the other, and that’s purely down to the fact that both districts are constrained, and any additional housing uptake from the other would involve green belt release ... we just can’t afford to take any others on top of our own” (Participant 9).

However this in itself doesn’t necessarily call for the need of a DtC. Cross border communications have always needed to occur between local authorities in order for national objectives to be achieved, and such working relations predate the DtC tremendously:

It’s a legal requirement. But it would happen anyway in Greater Manchester, because it always has with the joint districts. POG has been around forever, and issues get discussed at these meetings. This has been done without the Duty to Cooperate” (Participant 2).

Indeed, the notion that there was a need for a governmental mechanism to ensure that authorities communicated was questioned:

“It’s an old thing in many ways. The Duty to Cooperate was created out of the abolition of Regional Spatial Strategies. I’ve always thought of it as a tick box exercise in a way, because the authorities are communicating with each other, or should be communicating with each other in any event anyway” (Participant 3)

“I don’t think it’s really changed things since it’s come in. We’ve always done a lot of joint strategic work. Joint minerals plans, joint waste plans, housing, transport ...” (Participant 10).

This questioning of the need for the DtC, certainly within the confines of the GMCA, is understandable. The GMSF, being prepared by all ten of the districts is a Development Plan Document (DPD), sets out the approach to housing and employment land development that the combined authority will take over the coming years. The birth of this document appears to be rooted in issues that the constant flux of governmental scales have caused over the last decade:

“The GMSF in part came out of the problems with Duty to Cooperate and housing figures. Various districts were trying to get local plans and core strategies passed through, it was more so core strategies at that time actually. A few of them got them through initially based on the old RSS targets. Then the NPPF came out, and RSS went, and it got quite difficult, some districts got caught out by that, as some of the work was based on old targets ... the view became that it would be better to do a joint DPD, due to the likely challenges on how we’d meet targets, but only at a higher level. You’d still need local plans for the more in depth stuff, the DPD is more for the higher level growth needs, things like housing, employment across the entire area ... essentially, GMSF came about because it was getting harder for individual authorities to demonstrate their housing need and capacity, and the decision was taken that it would be better to manage all of this together ...” (Participant 10)

It appears that the changing scales at which planning governance occurs over the last decade or so has played a role in the birth of the GMSF. With RSS’s being ditched for the NPPF, and the knock on effects that this has had on targets and core strategies/local plans, it is perhaps unsurprising that the GMCA has chosen to undertake its own DPD at a strategic level to manage its own targets for housing and other development matters. This has also created somewhat of a grey area for the use of the DtC within GM; as one participant put it:

“If you look at the GMSF, that is essentially our Duty to Cooperate ... we weren’t able to meet our OAN, but other districts took more than their OAN, so that’s how we’ve been able to deal with our Duty to Cooperate ... the GMSF will be a joint DPD, and that’s where ... the Duty to Cooperate doesn’t really anticipate a joint DPD as such, it kind of anticipates that each LPA will develop its own local plan. So the DPD does some of it, but not all of it. We still do need to do the Duty, but in a different way to externally” (Participant 4).

Such a landscape creates a different role for the DtC compared to other parts of the country. Whilst development of a joint DPD allows the combined authority to have more control over the strategic issues that the entire area faces, it is clear that there is still a requirement for local plans to deal with smaller scale issues such as green infrastructure, pollution, services and facilities that are unique to each particular district.

Though communication between neighbouring local authorities has a long tradition predating the DtC, it was conceded by most of the participants that it does serve a purpose, even though it can sometimes be difficult to define what exactly the “cooperation” it asks for should look like. The formal procedure of recording meetings of the DtC is what is recognised as its most valuable use. As one participant put it:

*“It’s an audit trail, because when it comes to local plan preparation, the inspector will look at how you have cooperated with other LPAs”
(Participant 1).*

This purpose as an evidence base to present to planning inspectors was further discussed by others, particularly in regard to work with outside authorities:

“The benefit is that it formally sets up the documentation process, it makes you be aware that you need to document things better ... I think what Duty to Cooperate was brought in for was to deal with the question of ‘what are we going to with regional planning in a wider context’. And in our case if you like, the North West picture of where is growth going to go? Does it go to the Liverpool City Region, Manchester City Region, Lancashire, Cheshire ... you know, those big issues, how do you resolve those? The RSS covered a lot of authorities. By getting rid of those, you’re back to each authority choosing who it will and won’t cooperate with. So it didn’t make a fundamental difference to those within GM ... but it’s better with those outside GM. Those conversations would probably happened anyway, but it just logs it all, records it better” (Participant 2).

Such thoughts were echoed again:

*“We don’t really need it (the DtC) too much within the 10, but it’s more for any dialogue we have with those outside GMCA. Meetings have taken place on a fairly regular basis, and it’s all formally recorded. The tick boxing has been done. Look at some of the work that’s done with other authorities regards the motorways, that involves working with other districts”
(Participant 7).*

It’s clear then that the DtC has a use in documenting communication between the authorities of GMCA and those outside of this designated area. Evidencing that negotiations

are occurring between various LPAs (and other agencies) in order to contribute to national growth can only be of use, allowing policymakers at higher levels transparency when assessing the distribution of growth nationally.

It is clear from the interview testimony presented above that the Duty to Cooperate has had an impact on some aspects of coordination across Greater Manchester. However, for most interviewees, the DtC was not understood as being pivotal in encouraging cooperation between the constituent authorities of Greater Manchester. Instead, the weight of the evidence gathered attributes that high levels of cooperation and coordination to other factors.

5.3 Importance of historical links and tradition: Does cooperation emerge?

An undercurrent through all of the interviews was the notion of tradition in links between all of the councils of the GMCA. Every participant commented upon how the strong traditions of cross border working between the councils is a key component of the current working relationship that they all have with each other and the GMCA itself:

"I think a lot of it's got to do with history. I mean, since 1986, there's been a lot of close working with the GM authorities ..." (Participant 3).

"Obviously, we used to have Greater Manchester (County) Council, that was dissolved in the 80s, and then after that came AGMA ... so there's always been that collaborative approach that's carried on ..." (Participant 3).

"We've been all working together for such a long time, you know, over the past 20 years or so. There's always been groups who meet from across Greater Manchester ..." (Participant 8).

The importance of this history between the different boroughs of the GMCA emerged as a vital driver of cooperation between the authorities. It was recognised by all representatives as the basis on which this collaboration is founded upon. Following the Local Government Act 1985, through which the metropolitan county councils of England (including the Greater Manchester County Council) were abolished in 1986, there was consensus within Greater Manchester at that time to not break up some of the cross border working arrangements that had been place. Projects and working groups that had existed for a prolonged period of

time under the remit of the county council were viewed as being crucial to the long term future of Greater Manchester as a whole:

“Ever since 1986, we’ve always had joint meetings, and joint working. So, it’s ... I do think it’s the fact that when GMC disbanded in 1986, and the ten districts became unitary authorities, the decisions was taken that, actually, we didn’t want to break up that overarching ... kind of network that GMC had created” (Participant 4).

This process of staying together was emphasised as being a voluntary process, with no legal stipulation requiring the authorities to replace the structure that the GMC had previously given to them:

“AGMA was a voluntary thing, because after the county council was done away with in ’86, then there was no requirement to have a, you know, county body. It was that the districts thought that it would be easier to work together, having various joint activities, rather than just doing their own thing ...” (Participant 5).

Interview testimony such as this points to the importance of cooperation between local authorities being the result of the time period over which cooperation could become established on a voluntary basis, rather than being impelled through a centrally orchestrated ‘duty to cooperate’ much of this cooperative behaviour goes back to the establishment of AGMA - Association of Greater Manchester Authorities - the local government association for Greater Manchester, established in 1986 after the abolition of the GMC. It was founded as a voluntary organisation with the aim of representing the districts of Greater Manchester. It has operated as a joint committee of the ten authorities, and has been responsible for developing policy for the region. In the late 2000s, AGMA began to lobby central government, seeking to arrange a formal governance structure for Greater Manchester in a similar vein to that of the Greater London Authority (GLA). It is through this process that the GMCA came to fruition in its current guise. The GMCA has now taken on many of the roles that AGMA was responsible for, though the latter has not been abolished due to various legalities that the committee serves. Such moves, beginning with AMGAs formation in 1986, illustrate that there has been a real desire for collaborative working in GM since the abolition of legislative frameworks for joint working.

The creation of AGMA itself can be seen itself as a borne of a desire to keep existing close working relationships between the authorities that made up the GMC, and a view from within that staying together as a greater coalition would be best for the region in the face of challenges that may arise. Several participants alluded to this willingness to continue cross working with other boroughs:

“I think it goes back to the fact that Even after the abolition of the county council, out of that came AGMA, so we’ve always looked for that collaborative approach. Even though the formal structure of the GMC got dissolved, AGMA carried it all on ...” (Participant 9)

“When the county was abolished in ’86, it was replaced with a kind of, federation of districts who were still wanting to work together, to discuss issues. So it’s been a 30 year period, and gradually they do more and more things together ...” (Participant 6).

Such comments appear to emphasise the view that cooperation and trust emerges over time. Previous research has emphasised how individuals in groups interacting with each other over long periods of time can foster situations whereby direct reciprocation of altruistic acts lead to long term stable collaboration (Axelrod, 1984). Other research has shown how actors with longer memories of fellow group member actions were more likely to develop cooperative strategies (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016).

But what has created this history? Though having such long term relationships have appeared to smooth the way for contemporary collaboration between the authorities in their current guises, there must be a driving force that has helped to sustain these enduring working practices. In other words, a working culture has been cultivated that fosters this coalescence.

5.4 A strong starting position

Drawing from the interviews, a key facet in developing this culture is the base that the former GMC gave to the coalition. AGMA, and later on the GMCA, were not borne of a new desire to see the ten districts work together. These arrangements had already been in place before this though the county council. The relationships that had been formed in the county council, that had governed Greater Manchester from 1974 to 1986, had experienced 12

years of formal ties through which each authority worked with each other. Cross boundary issues such as waste disposal, emergency service provision, public transport and planning had been strategically managed by the GMC during this period, with the council itself composed of members from the ten metropolitan boroughs of the county. Though the individual districts orchestrated local matters, strategic projects covering the county were headed up by the GMC. This opened up a wide array of avenues for individual councils to work with each other towards higher strategic objectives. Such networks have continued to be built upon in the decades following the GMCs abolition:

“I think its origins are that it had a county council in the first place, and those working relationships became so entrenched as a part of the Greater Manchester County council, albeit it’s been gone since ’86 now, but the legacy of that has remained, and was prepared for, I believe, pretty well ...”
(Participant 2).

This echoes the comments of participant 4, who as previously mentioned, commented that there was a reluctance from the districts at the time of the abolition of GMC to “break up that overarching ... kind of network that GMC had created”. The foundations had been previously laid for joint working between the authorities, and a recognition from all that this had been a positive mechanism for the county in that they voluntary wanted to carry on some of the functions of this going forward, leading to the creation of AGMA. Certainly, the shadow of GMC can be seen not just in the nature of the partnerships that it helped to foster, again indicative of the viewpoint that long term relationships can assist in engendering cooperation between actors (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016).

5.5 Common ground

Another topic that emerged under the theme of historical links between the authorities was that of a shared vision of Greater Manchester. It was admitted that the districts, though they have their own unique opportunities and challenges, there remains a common ground between all parties, based on their historical ties, but also for their future prosperity. An undercurrent running through this shared vision is the political landscape that exists in Greater Manchester, being governed by the Labour party in 8 of the 10 boroughs, and the political connotations that this carries. These issues are discussed here.

The districts of Greater Manchester have long been recognised as sharing a common past, dating back to the period of the Industrial Revolution, and particularly the transformation of the regions trade in textiles towards the end of the 18th century. Such a transformation brought with it the development of built infrastructure, houses, factories and roads created for the workforce not only in Manchester, but for all of the neighbouring town and boroughs that make up contemporary Greater Manchester (Natural England, 2013). Prior to the reforms of the Local Government Act 1972, local government structures had been the focus of the Redcliffe-Maud report. The report concentrated on local government between 1966 and 1969, and broadly recommended the abolition of county, borough and district councils that existed in this period. Unitary authorities, based on large local towns that were to be regional centres, were to be the replacement for the existing structures that were judged as being obsolete, created as they were at the end of the 19th century.

Though the general plan of the Report was not followed up in the 1972 Act, several components were enacted, such as the creation of Greater Manchester. This was based on the findings of the Report that called for a proposed metropolitan area to be called Selnecc (South East Lancashire – North East Cheshire). That the ten authorities came to be grouped together in the metropolitan county that we now recognise as Greater Manchester can be seen as a recognition of the shared similarities between each of the districts. Indeed, one of the principles of the original Report was that towns and their surrounding rural hinterlands were interdependent, and therefore the individualistic method of government that had existed should cease. The ten authorities being brought together under the umbrella of the GMC was viewed then, as a unification of a region that had been bonded together over centuries through a shared history (Frangopolou, 1977).

This recognition of having a shared past, a culture that has helped to bind the region together, was readily recognised in the interviews. Discussing the nature of cooperation in Greater Manchester, it was noted by one participant that “there has been that connection between the districts and Manchester, in terms of historic industries” (Participant 6). Such commonalities were built upon through the lifetime of the GMC. Whilst some services such as police and fire were provided by the newly formed county, and others, such as education and social services, were provided by the districts, planning was delivered at both levels (Barlow, 1995). The county was responsible for strategic planning across the entire area, whilst districts were accountable for their own localised plans. Such arrangements can be viewed as an early precursor to the current governance mechanisms that we see in Greater

Manchester today, with the GMCA taking lead with the GMSF for the entire area, and districts responsible for their own local plans.

However, it was alluded to in the interviews that some of the working practices that existed through the GMC to serve all of the county are still in use within the present working structures:

“... we didn’t want to break up that overarching, kind of, network that GMC had created. So there was a lot of information gathering ... we have things like a GM Ecological Unit, we have a GM Archaeological Unit. So these are all services that the GM districts fund and get a service, a core service back And I think the fact that we’ve had those right from 1986 and we’ve carried them on ... we do have a good working relationship” (Participant 4).

Though not necessarily related to planning, the retention of units that have their roots within the GMC and the early days of AGMA can be viewed as recognition of the need for the authority to keep these services, as they play a pivotal role in their respective fields for the area. That they have survived the cuts that austerity has ushered in is testament to the value that the combined authority assigns to them. This illustrates a key point of Schelling (1960) who postulates that cooperation can be ‘habit-forming’ in that a history of cooperation can shape beliefs among actors and determines ‘focal points’. Tangible assets have also allowed this cooperation to continue. As with any level of politics, disagreements will occur, and GM is no different. Yet the management of key infrastructure, such as the joint owned Manchester Airport and the development of Metrolink during the 1990s has encouraged sustainable joint working between authorities (Haughton, et al., 2016). Such points have allowed the GM model to prosper, through a blend of interconnected, intergovernmental relations and augmented institution building (Harding, et al., 2010).

In game theoretical terms, this management of shared resources resembles that of the ‘stag hunt’ game (Rousseau, 1755). This parlour game, put simply, emphasises coordination between players to achieve the best solution for themselves, and that of all parties. All players in the game are required to cooperate with each other in order to capture the best solution, the stag. However, if they choose to hunt alone, they can only capture a smaller prize individually, in this case a hare. Though capturing a hare will give them a positive payoff, it will not be the maximum that they could have achieved by working together to capture the larger animal. This rather abstract game can be applied to that of resource

management. Authorities who choose to go it alone would have to manage their own resources, and rely on other authorities to assist them with services that may be specialised elsewhere e.g. waste management. By existing within the greater coalition, individual authorities have access to these shared services without potentially incurring any inflated external costs.

5.6 A common present – and forming the model for the Northern Powerhouse

Shared issues have continued to the present day, with relationships appearing to be sustained not only by the presence of these older working groups, but also through groups that have been created more recently. A prime example of an area that is shared by all of the districts is that of transport. This body can be traced back as far as the 1968 Transport Act, with the establishment of the SELNEC Passenger Transport Executive, with the contemporary group now called Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM). The policies of this group are set by the GMCA and the TfGM committee, but its presence is acknowledged as one of the driving forces behind the partnership working that is seen in Manchester now:

“The first area, really, was transport. So we’ve worked on a Greater Manchester Transport Strategy, and planned, together, on the local plans for a lot of years now. So it’s, sort of, built up from that ...” (Participant 8).

Transport and its infrastructure is a critical issue for any areas economic vitality and growth. That transport was one of the first issues that brought the authorities together in a working group may suggest that to bring authorities closer together in their working practices, it is the major subjects that can act as a driver to this cooperation, rather than lower profile issues. Again, as alluded to above in the stag hunt game, an issue of infrastructure management between all ten authorities like this can serve as a mechanism that keeps the coalition bounded together.

Another matter alluded to by participants was the shared recognition by the authorities of the need for regeneration efforts across the county. One of the world’s first industrial cities, Manchester (and its surrounding boroughs) underwent a shattering process of deindustrialisation following the Second World War. Between 1961 and 1985, Manchester’s population fell sharply from 661,000 to 450,000, a fall of over 30% (Seo, 2002), with large swathes of the district characterised by social exclusion, crime and worsening living

conditions. Measures then, were needed in order to turn around the fortunes of the county, and this is something that was recognised as a binding feature by those interviewed:

“There was such a recognition, particularly in the 80s and 90s, and still enduring today to be honest, about the regeneration thrust of what we need to achieve for Greater Manchester as a whole ...” (Participant 2).

These regeneration efforts have not been confined to just gradual urban renewal however, with major urban schemes credited as bringing the districts together. An apparent driver of regeneration across the county was suggested as the need to prepare for, or in some cases recover from, major events within Greater Manchester:

“I think that ... things that have happened over time have helped that joint working between us all. So you’ve got the successful Commonwealth Games for example. Also, all of the authorities really pulled together after the IRA bombing, years ago...” (Participant 3).

The 2002 Commonwealth Games, based primarily in Manchester, Salford and Bolton, but with competitor bases all over Greater Manchester, are recognised as a turning point in the county’s history, helping the city in particular to recover from the IRA bombing of 1996. It led to the redevelopment of vast swathes of the city, with a lasting legacy that has seen all the main facilities have continued use in the time since. It is noted that the bid for the Commonwealth Games, and earlier bids for the Olympic Games to be hosted in the city, were central to the cementing of the strong collaborative partnerships that are still in evidence in GM to this day. Though Manchester and the North West of England has been the site of numerous partnership formations, particularly in the 1990s (Burch & Holliday, 1993; Peck & Tickell, 1994; Tickell, et al., 1995), the Olympic bids are recognised as the central forces behind collaboration in GM (Cochrane, et al., 1996). Building upon these shared opportunities and objectives of the past, Greater Manchester’s districts continue to work together on opportunities for the future.

An essential catalyst that was mentioned several times was that of the Northern Powerhouse:

“And then there’s the Northern Powerhouse, and you know, the main idea that we should be aiming for even more growth ... so, you know, a managing something of that complexity starts to get quite challenging, and so it’s

obviously beneficial to have everyone getting involved together with that ..."
(Participant 10).

The Northern Powerhouse is a government led proposal to increase economic growth in the north of England. The proposal includes improvements to transport infrastructure, investment in science and innovation, and devolution of powers to regions, such as the deal that has been witnessed in Greater Manchester. These devolved powers appear to have further galvanised the individual authorities of the GMCA, as was alluded to by participants:

Devolution was a driver in bringing us all together within the GMCA, but at the same time that only really came about because we've been seen to be successful in working with each other over the years, a bit of a virtuous cycle ..." (Participant 7)

As revealed by the interviews, that Greater Manchester was chosen to be the countries first combined authority can be attributed to the traditional working relationships that were already in place across the districts. Through the setting up of AGMA after the abolition of the GMC, the districts had shown a commitment to working together to boost the local economy of the entire county, and this point was noted by those from within central government (HM Treasury, 2009). Yet, the Northern Powerhouse is also a homage of sorts to the success that the counties of GM have exhibited. The model on which central government have based the Northern Powerhouse on is that of the GMCA, given its relative success in its nascent years (Haughton, et al., 2016).

It is clear from this then, that the traditional model of joint working in Manchester, together with major events for all of the individual districts to rally around, have allowed Greater Manchester to put themselves in a strong position to successfully negotiate for city region status. But what of the structures that have allowed for such practices to flourish within the GMCA, and before this?

5.7 Structures for cooperation

One of the key themes gleaned from the interviews was the importance that the various types of structure that were in place in order for the GMCA to be successfully managed. Each interviewee in the sample alluded to the impact that having such mechanisms in place had on the relationship each individual council had with each other and the GMCA as a whole,

and how these structures facilitate decisions being made in the best interests of all of those involved. Such structures include the type of voting systems that are implemented in the GMCA, unanimous systems in the case of spatial planning, and the recognition of a 'leader' amongst all of the constituent local authorities.

Whilst the Localism Act has brought to Greater Manchester similar powers to the Greater London Authority, the model adopted has not entirely replicated the structure that exists in the capital. Whilst the Mayoral system that has been introduced allows the leader to make some decisions independently, other decisions require consultation and approval of the ten districts. Though some of these judgements need only a majority vote from the total of eleven cabinet members (the ten individual district leaders plus the Mayor), others need a unanimous decision to be made, a route that is taken by the combined authority with regard to planning decisions. This arrangement was reached through the first devolution agreement in November 2014, an accord that paved the way for an elected Mayor to create a spatial strategy with an all or nothing approach to support from their cabinet.

It became apparent that this sort of model was agreed between all of the parties from the outset:

"The model that has developed in Greater Manchester is very much a collaborative model. It's not about one district being more important than the other, it's about true collaboration. So when the devolution agreement was signed, that's something which, you know, the ten leaders very much wanted to retain ... in planning, for example, any agreement on strategic planning matters has to be unanimous. And if one district, you know, disagrees, effectively then it's got a veto" (Participant 3).

This type of consensus building through unanimous voting is viewed as beneficial by the greater coalition, as decisions must be reached that are acceptable to all stakeholders. This was an opinion echoed by others in the sample:

"It's not always very easily, politically, but it does mean that there's very much movement towards consensus. It's not just joint working, there needs to be a resolution of some of these things. So the GMSF needs a unanimous decision, or the whole plan falls. So there's a positive to that ..." (Participant 2).

Participant 3 gave a clear example of how this understanding has manifested itself in the past, even in the era preceding the GMCA: the expansion of Metrolink, the tram system that stretches across 7 of the 10 districts of the combined authority:

“So for example, Metrolink ... lines have developed on that basis. So the first Metrolink line was to Altrincham (from Manchester Piccadilly), and then to Bury, then onto Eccles and Salford Quays. So gradually, over time, it’s connected more and more places. So there’s that understanding that things will move over time” (Participant 3).

This appears to show not just a respect for the structure that is in place, in that parties understand that it will take time for decisions to be made, particularly when a unanimous vote is needed, but also that the structure of the working practices between the districts is conducive to the coalition efforts that we see in GM. With regard to planning, the unanimous style of voting between authorities reflects the ‘rules of the game’ in game theory. This is in that all members of a coalition will look to maximise their ‘payoff’ i.e. they will look to secure the best possible outcome for themselves. A unanimous structure of voting in GM then for example, helps to ensure that all ‘players’ in the coalition (the individual LPA’S) can vote in a way that ensures they will maximise their desired outcome. This may be in the form of funding or resources e.g. an expansion of the Metrolink into their area of jurisdiction (TfGT, 2018).

However, this is not to say that there is not confrontation at times within the combined authority. Working relationships in any sphere, be it public or private, professional or academic, governmental or non-governmental, are seldom perfect, and there will be times when conflict occurs. The GMCA and its individual districts are not immune from these perils. Planning is an inherently political subject, required as such to take in and cater for the needs of a multitude of different demographic groupings and places. Planning decisions made in one area may not be transferable over to another area, or decisions made in one district may impinge on the fortunes of another. It could rationally be assumed then, for example, that decisions made to benefit a Manchester or a Salford (the two main cities of the GMCA) may cause a storm for a Bolton or a Rochdale, districts with a differing environmental and demographic makeup. There may be disagreements between neighbouring authorities regard cross-boundary development or housing figures, or between districts that are under the control of opposing political parties, each of which following a separate doctrine.

There are then an array of factors and reasons why disagreement can occur across the combined authority, particularly with regards to planning. A major issue that has reared its head is that of green belt development, and whether or not the boundaries of protected sites should be redrawn to accommodate for further house building that is required across Greater Manchester. This was widely reported in the local press at the time, with the views of local councillors showing a very mixed response to this proposal (Manchester Evening News, 2016). Such an issue was picked up on in the interviews:

"I mean, the green belt was a very, very political ... you know, it has, it's certainly put strategic planning on the agenda, on the map if you like, in the eyes of politicians" (Participant 4).

The subject of the green belt illustrates that planning in its entirety can be the basis of disagreement, being such a politically charged subject. Managing a wide assortment of agendas is central to the tasks of a local authority, ensuring that decisions that are undertaken by those in charge will almost always be contentious, cutting across a range of disciplines, including planning. It is the political angle of such decisions that were highlighted by several in the sample as being the core reason as to why disruptions can be experienced between the members of the combined authority:

"Greater Manchester authorities do argue, it would be wrong to think that they don't! It does take time for all of the ten districts to come to some decisions because political stuff comes into play ... in Greater Manchester there were eight Labour councils, one Lib Dem and one Conservative ... so they're never going to agree on a lot of things ... there will always be disagreement, it's the nature of democracy, and the nature of ten districts trying to pull together" (Participant 1).

A prime reason given for potential political disagreement is a perceived view that perhaps some districts may have more influence on decisions than others. Manchester and Salford, the two main cities of the combined authority, were identified by some in the sample as having more political sway than other districts. This is perhaps to be expected, as they are home to nearly a third of the entire population of GM and are located centrally to the combined authority. Added to this, they are the main economic drivers in the county, with finance and professional services, tourism, culture and internet based organisations based in the two cities. This is reinforced by the Media City development at Salford Quays, the

sporting success of Manchester's two main football teams and the Universities that are located in the two cities, making these two boroughs in particular a major pull for students, tourists and business alike. Politically, this can be seen to elevate power of these two districts to perhaps a higher level than its neighbours, as was alluded to in the interviews:

"We do work well together, but the view is occasionally amplified ... some friction came up last year with the view that everything is centred on the centre, Salford and Manchester. That's where obviously, most of the jobs and economic growth and all that is ... It happens at every level doesn't it, that they seem to get a better piece of the pie. So maybe there's a bit of a view that they're seen as more important to a degree ..." (Participant 10)

However, even though there appeared to be concerns that Salford and, in particular, Manchester may have more of a political clout than others, this did not shatter the image of GM being a county where cooperation is key. Indeed, participants stressed how the structure of collaboration, particularly with regards to planning, ensures that not only do all individual areas look to work together, but that it is embraced too:

"There's a recognition though I think, at many levels, that what is good for Manchester in particular, the increased footfall and business in the centre, can only be good for the rest of the [combined] authority. Growth at the centre will branch out to the outer districts" (Participant 5).

"I do think that it helps though in GM that the districts are a little more even, in terms of size and that they all have their own unique opportunities [compared to other parts of the country]. In GM you've got Trafford Park in Trafford ...there's opportunities elsewhere. Issues pop up from time to time, but you'd expect that anywhere. We're never going to stop trying to attract development though. We appreciate that, you know, that a thriving Manchester is always going to be better for us. It helps to attract people in. It's a draw isn't it?" (Participant 10).

Evidently, the structure within which the districts operate appears to be conducive to partnership working between all parties. Despite the presence of a Mayor, all local authorities are afforded an equal vote on decisions that occur in the GMCA, with the Mayor unable to make decisions based on their own personal agenda.

With particular regard to planning, there was appreciation for the entire approach that the combined authority takes to managing the built environment and development across the area. It was commented that though Manchester does take a lead role, as it is the major economic pull of the greater area, the structure of decision making allows for equal standpoints to be taken account. This is coupled with a shared view amongst all of the districts that regeneration of the entire landmass in the combined authority is in the best interests of all authorities:

“Well there’s geographical differences and scale differences. Manchester is by far the biggest district. And it has in many ways ... yes, held the strongest sway, if you like, as the regional centre. It’s often taken the lead, you know ... but in terms of how planning works, there’s certainly a lot more parity than just saying that “Manchester takes the lead on things” ... historically planning in Greater Manchester subdued growth in the outer districts to direct resources and opportunities to Manchester and Salford, because they were the driver of the GM economy if you like. But now, there’s things like the airport, there’s a wider range of opportunities elsewhere for investment ...” (Participant 2).

The interview testimonies appear to suggest then that the structure of decision-making is key to cooperation in the GMCA, both within planning and in other departments external to it. With regard to planning, the system of unanimous voting for major decisions appears to help in binding the districts together, and to keep the coalition stable. This also appears to have been one of the motives for encouraging districts to form the GMCA as part of the devolution deal, best surmised in the comment that “the structure is vital, there has to be something that benefits all of Greater Manchester” (Participant 3), with this approach “having the initial buy in from all ten districts that this was in the best interests of Greater Manchester as a whole” (Participant 7).

The political nature of planning can lead to confrontation, yet in GM the greater coalition continues to exist. Though issues that can cause disagreement and ‘strife’ (Pløger, 2004) exist, collaboration continues to occur. The model that exists in GM appears to fit the game theoretical concept of the ‘core’. The idea behind the core of a cooperative game is that there exists no feasible set of payoffs that would detract than that of the grand coalition (Binmore, 2007; McCain, 2015). That is to say, the core forms the best set of payoffs for all involved whereby all players would be served no better by leaving the grand coalition, or by

setting up a smaller coalition. Such a concept can be pictured within the GMCA, particularly in the face of their being a member of the combined authority that is seen as a ‘first among equals’, namely Manchester. The coalition that exists within the GMCA at present can be seen to be the core coalition, in that none of the individual partners appear to be motivated to remove themselves from the coalition. Though Manchester may be seen to enjoy an elevated role in the region, owing to its status, the other authorities seem to recognise that association with Manchester can bring benefits to themselves, such as grants to be managed locally handed to the GMCA by central government (DCLG, 2018). Conversely, Manchester’s ‘payoff’ from remaining in a coalition with its neighbouring authorities can be seen as the support these areas give in allowing the city to expand (and with this, the GMCA itself and the investment opportunities that this can bring to the area), and the residential space they provide for citizens who work in the city.

5.8 Party Politics

It is not only the structure of the GMCA that appears to make the coalition strong however. The importance of party politics cannot be discounted, with the authorities of Greater Manchester seemingly sharing similar ideologies. Of the ten constituent districts, 8 are currently governed by a Labour council, whilst the other two (Stockport and Trafford) currently have Labour leaders, though there is no overall control following the 2018 local elections. It was commented that even the slight differences in political control can have impacts upon decision making, and how “councils will never agree on everything, it’s the nature of democracy” (Participant 1). However, there was recognition that the combined authority operating under the predominant governance of a single party was beneficial in reaching agreement over issues covered in the GMSF:

“That the bulk of authorities are Labour ran, in one sense there’s a strong one party political direction across the GM, and that helps moves things along in a way ... votes have to be unanimous, which I think means that, even if it’s not all the time politically easy, it leads to consensus. Everyone needs to see the benefit” (Participant 2)

“If you look at the political map of Greater Manchester, the bulk of authorities are Labour, so ... you know ... in one sense there’s a strong one party political direction across GM” (Participant 2).

“The GMCA is headed up by an elected Labour Mayor, and the districts tend to be strongly orientated to Labour too ...” (Participant 9).

As would be expected, a one party majority in the combined authority would appear to signal that partnership working between the individual districts would be made easier. Yet in reality this is not always the case. An example from nearby, the Liverpool City Region, is entirely governed by Labour, who hold the lead councillor role in the six constituent boroughs of Liverpool, Wirral, St Helens, Knowsley, Sefton and Halton, and a democratically elected Labour Mayor. However, despite this apparent one-party direction, cooperation between the districts has been difficult to initiate. Liverpool already had a city mayor at the time of the devolution moves to create a city region, leading to public confusion as to what the difference between the two roles would entail. This followed confrontation at council level regarding what the name of the combined authority would be (BBC, 2017) whilst tensions between Metro Mayor Steve Rotherham and Liverpool City Mayor Joe Anderson escalated, leading to Anderson refusing to attend cabinet meetings of the combined authority (Liverpool Echo, 2017).

Yet such issues do not appear to publically impinge on the GM regime. The Mayor of the GMCA, Andy Burnham, does not have other mayoral figures to cloud the waters of who is responsible for the strategic vision of the combined authority. Further to this, interviewees were adamant that, although all individual boroughs work together for the greater development of GMCA, they still have a duty to look after their own constituents first:

“I think it’s fair to say though, that here in _____ the politics here is very much about the good of the borough, and it’s less party politics ...” (Participant 2).

This was echoed further by another participant, who commented that their borough, in line with several others within the GMCA, were initially pressing ahead with their own local plans in the face of the GMSF. This was to ensure that the respective boroughs put the needs of their own constituents first:

“Some districts were considering “well what is the option of, you know, us doing our own local plan ahead of the GMSF?” and what problems that would cause. And, certainly from a _____ perspective we just thought that it would be really difficult to do that. Basically, if we said that we’re going to press ahead and unilaterally do our own plan ahead of the GMSF,

in terms of the evidence base we'd have to produce, it just makes it really difficult as you could have conflicts in your own evidence base and that of the GMSF, particularly around housing numbers. So we took the decision to stick to the GMSF, and not to produce a local plan before that document"
(Participant 9)

This appears to illustrate that the politics of planning can swing both ways between planners and councillors. Though policymakers have a duty to their constituents and need to be seen to be acting in the best interests of those in their district who voted them into office, it appears that the misgivings of planners in some boroughs as to the difficulty of independently producing a local plan in the face of the GMSF has persuaded councillors to stay a part of the GMSF and focus on the preparation of the strategic overview primarily.

Yet, eventually it was conceded that the very makeup of the structure of decision making with regard to spatial planning influences the politics surrounding it. With the GMSF being such an influential document in the process of land management across the county landmass, there is a pressure on all leaders to come together and agree on decisions that will be beneficial for all. The unanimous voting was seen as pivotal to agreement being reached, and in keeping all parties happy to be a part of the coalition:

"It's positive with the structure being in place, there's all of these officer bodies that feed into that, and you have that political imperative to stitch up a deal, if you like. So I think the structure is vital ..." (Participant 2).

Again, the importance of traditional working relationships is vital to the formation of this structure. The long standing associations between the ten districts of GM were described as allowing the structures of the devolution deal to be implemented by the authorities:

"There's a long term stable governance structure of working together in place, you know, and there's a real interest in working with all ten of them. That's been borne out over time, GMC, and then AGMA and so on ..."
(Participant 6).

So a structure is clearly in place then for cooperation in GM. With reference to game theoretical literature, the formal structures that are in place, namely the legislative body that is the GMCA and the services and resources that it is accountable for, can be seen to form more 'rules of the game' to which the individual players (authorities) must adhere to.

By staying together, authorities are ensuring their access to a pool of resources managed by the GMCA. Furthermore, leaving the coalition would be a step into the unknown, and loss of a voice in cross-county issues, such as transportation, can be seen to serve as a penalty to defecting from the group, as will be discussed here.

5.9 Strength in numbers – the grand coalition

Of course, all of the partnership working that is evident in Manchester, based on the factors of history, tradition, stability, trust and structures which frame these dialogues, are essential to keeping the coalition together, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter. However, relationships are very rarely perfect, and as has been conceded, there are times when even the districts of GMCA, so often regarded as a shining example of cooperation, can reach confrontation. Such issues can be exacerbated by other factors, particularly those of a political nature. The 2018 local elections saw all districts of Greater Manchester come under the control of the Labour party, though it should be pointed out that in Stockport and Trafford the leaders of each respective council hold no overall control. Prior to this however, the political landscape of the wider region has fluctuated gently, with only 4 of the 10 districts (Manchester, Salford, Trafford and Wigan) having had no change in political control over the previous 20 years. The other 6 authorities have seen changes in their leadership over that period of time, and such modifications in ideologies can impact on many of the various functions that a council provides for its area, including that of planning.

There were certainly a couple of contentious points raised in the interviews that echoed the view that there isn't always perfect relations in the GMCA, albeit at a political level rather than from a purely planning perspective. As mentioned earlier, there were issues raised over whether the two most central districts of GM, namely Manchester and Salford, receive more attention than the other outlying authorities. Yet there was also recognition that whilst these two districts may at times receive more investment and development than others, the effect of increased activity in these areas is beneficial for the other 8 authorities. Furthermore, councils do not exist just to manage planning matters in their area. Environmental, educational, recreational and economic factors are also of central importance to these authorities. This of course results in thousands of officials and employees working at different levels across different councils pushing different agendas. Occasional disputes are bound to occur at times across separate disciplines.

In this regard, it is reasonable to ask the following question: what would happen if an authority decided to go it alone? If a district took the decision to remove itself from the combined authority, in a similar way that the UK is negotiating its 'Brexit' from the European Union, how would this be achieved? And are there any incentives for staying in the coalition, or perhaps penalties for leaving? The response from the interviews appeared to suggest that though partial separation from GMCA-centric activities would be a possibility, there were many aspects of such a move that would make it unappealing to any potential breakaway district. A district could choose to leave the GMCA as a whole, or to withdraw on various aspects of it. From a planning perspective, the most obvious project that a district could choose to walk away from is the GMSF. Again however, the response emerging from the interviews suggest that this would be not only a problematic but also undesirable for all involved.

When asked on whether the potential exists for an authority to leave the combined authority outright, one participant with a thorough knowledge of the GMCA conceded that such a split would be possible, yet it could prove to be problematic for all:

"The combined authority is a local authority in its own right. So with that, theoretically, any authority could choose to leave. But then other things would start to unravel. So for example, transport. What are you going to do about transport? The Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) committee are accountable to the combined authority, so there's issues with that ..."
(Participant 6).

This opinion on the difficulties of opting out of the GMSF was echoed by other participants from various districts, and appeared to serve as something of a disincentive to leaving the greater coalition:

"Anyone could leave if they wanted to, there's nothing stopping them from doing it. But then of course, they'd have to consider the consequences of leaving. Would they still be a part of the strategic transport plan? Would it still be involved in things like policing? I mean, you're looking at real far reaching consequences ... the redistribution of housing as part of the GMSF wouldn't be relevant to that authority, so you'd have to meet your own objectively assessed need. I can't really foresee anything like that happening ..." (Participant 3).

It seems clear then that the obvious position of strength that the GMCA operates from, particularly in the context of devolution of power to the local scale, is a key factor in keeping the coalition together. More importantly, it would suggest that all of the authorities see it not only as a potentially negative decision to choose to leave the GMCA, but as a positive to stay within it, in light of the additional powers that it affords those authorities in the region.

Yet that is not to say that disagreements can flare up, particularly when differing political ideologies come to the fore. On two separate occasions, in late 2016 and early 2017, several Liberal Democrat councillors in Stockport proposed that the authority should be taken out of the GMSF. This was in response to developments that the framework had earmarked for green belt land, with some of the proposed developments affecting land within the borders of Stockport. The air of uncertainty around this district was echoed further by one of the participants, based in a different district:

“In terms of the GMSF, Stockport is the most controversial area. It tends to put in the most concerns about projects, there was the issue with the Green Belt ... and you see that’s where the political part of it comes in ...”
(Participant 9).

Such issues appear to illustrate that even in areas such as Greater Manchester, where cooperation between authorities has a long standing history of success, particular issues can arise that can upset the equilibrium. It is clear that if a particular authority expressed a desire to leave the combined authority, then it would certainly have the power to do so. Yet the structure of the GMCA appears to make such a scenario unlikely to happen, as highlighted above by participants. Each authority would have to contend with how they would operate as a planning authority, with the change in legislative status requiring them to cooperate with its former “colleagues” of the GMCA in a similar vein as to how they currently work with colleagues from neighbouring exterior authorities. Such a change in dynamic is unprecedented in England, with nine authorities currently in existence, and plans ongoing for several more to be created. Yet none have, as yet, seen any of their constituent local authorities leave each respective coalition.

Planning functions would not be alone in being affected by such a decision. The GMCA itself has one of the largest remits of all combined authorities, responsible as it is for issues such as health and social care, children’s services and social care (Local Government Association, 2016). Other vital functions, such as policing, fire and rescue, waste and recycling are at least

part run by the combined authority, showing the breadth of functions that any district seeking to go it alone would have to take on for themselves. As such, any decision to leave the GMCA would be a bold move with no sure vision as to how this would impact the day to day business. Additionally, as can be seen from various examples around England, devolution is being sought after more by those areas that currently do not have a combined authority. Proposed arrangements are awaiting approval in Dorset, Cheshire, Leicestershire and the South West, whilst there has been devolution activity in areas such as Cumbria that have previously voted against it. To remove itself from the GMCA, an authority would be seen to making a move that is particularly against the grain in English politics.

It is also evident that in situations where there have been potential disagreements, the political makeup of the GMCA has fostered resolutions aimed at keeping the coalition together. Commenting on the angst towards the GMSF in Stockport, one participant noted:

“Well Stockport has just become Labour⁶ after being Liberal Democrat for a few years. A strong contingent of the previous regime didn’t want the GMSF, they didn’t agree with it. Then they suggested that they would withdraw from the spatial framework, but they were advised against it, that it would be better for all for them to remain in the GMCA. Then, you have the election, the change in administration, it went back to a stage of discussion and the situation was diffused ... that’s the thing, if a district leaves, it could potentially put them in a difficult position. They’d have no real say in what is going on in Greater Manchester, and would end up negotiating as an outsider ...” (Participant 1).

Ultimately it appears that the safest option for all concerned in the current political climate is to stay as part of the greater coalition. With the uncertainty at national level over negotiations with the European Union regarding Brexit will be handled, what “deal” the UK will be able to secure for itself and the ramification that this will lead to at the local level, a “safety in numbers” approach seems to be the favoured method. This appears to be backed up by the increasing numbers of authorities who are exploring the possibility of building combined authorities in their respective areas.

⁶ After 2016 local elections, the Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council elections ended with no party in overall control, but with the Leader of the council changing from Liberal Democrat candidate Sue Derbyshire to Labour candidate Alex Ganotis

5.10 Summary: Continued cooperation: a multi-layered relationship

From the evidence above then, it is clear that the interactions between the individual authorities and the GMCA itself are based upon, and shaped by, a myriad of mechanisms and ideologies. From the interviews carried out, three broad topics identified themselves as running through a lot of the decisions that have brought Greater Manchester to the point that it stands at today. Firstly, the importance of the history and tradition of cooperation between the individual districts, even prior to the formation of AGMA, cannot be emphasised enough. All interviewees stated this as a reason as to why the GMCA has been successful in becoming the country's first combined authority to at least some degree. As institutions, the authorities are long regarded as being cooperative on a plethora of cross boundary issues. Being grounded in a shared industrial tradition has fostered an identity which has been built upon through a series of legislative moves to group the districts together. Whether such moves have been directed by central government policy, such as the formation of the GMC, or enacted wilfully at the local level (the voluntary formation of AGMA), cooperation between authorities is engrained in the Greater Manchester psyche. With regard to game theoretical, the experience of Manchester appears to indicate that 'cooperation emerges' over time through repeated interactions with each other (Axelrod, 1984; Stewart & Plotkin, 2016).

The second theme that ran through all of the interviews was that of the power and resources that devolution from central government has given to the combined authority, and how this acts as an incentive to remain in the coalition. Devolution has become the *de rigueur* movement in contemporary British politics, with the English planning system directly affected by this shift in ideology. With this, the GMCA has gained more control over transport, skills, housing, regeneration and waste management, among others. Such a model is being seen as more attractive to other local authorities, with the added financial clout and control over where these funds are spent being key drivers in this. Several combined authorities have followed the move of Greater Manchester in the hope that they can gain more control of matters at the local level, without relying on the direction of central government. It is this level of control that appears to hold the authorities of the GMCA together, particularly in the tumultuous political times we are currently experiencing. The extra power that has been afforded to the GMCA has allowed it to take a much more proactive approach in the management of its areas of jurisdiction. A move to leave the

coalition would, by and large, reduce the power for an individual district to influence change and development in Greater Manchester. This is not just limited to urban planning, but also to policing, healthcare, education and other vital services. A lone authority has yet to leave a combined authority, so it is difficult to predict how such services would be managed. For example, would a council departing from the GMCA still be involved with TfGM and the transport infrastructure that it is responsible for? Issues such as this appear to make the prospect of leaving the GMCA intimidating and therefore unlikely. Such uncertainty can be seen as serving as a penalty to leaving the coalition.

Thirdly, the structure of the GMCA ensures that all districts involved receive a fair share of the resources that the combined authority is responsible for. Though it was conceded that at times there is perhaps a Manchester and Salford-centric approach to economic development, there was recognition that, ultimately, this is still beneficial for the greater area. The worldwide status that the city of Manchester has garnered, through its cultural, musical and sporting achievements, means that it stands as a flag bearer for the greater conurbation in attracting tourism, development and investment. Being the central authority of the GMCA, it is to be expected that a considerable share of any resources or investment may be directed its way. Yet it was recognised by members of the other districts that, despite Manchester being the powerhouse of the combined authority, the attention that it attracts is favourable for all of the authorities. There was an acknowledgement from interviewees that as a standalone district, Manchester cannot possibly achieve all of its development aims. Such a stance has created an environment whereby districts work together in order to meet not only their own individual needs, but also the needs of the combined authority itself. The structure of the GMCA and the decision-making process creates a framework whereby outcomes that are acceptable for all are attainable. Each council is represented on the GMCA board by their individual cabinet's leader, in addition the metro mayor of Greater Manchester. Not only does provide a platform for them to voice their opinions and concerns on decisions across the combined authority, but each member also takes a leading role on various aspects of development. Examples of this are Stockport leading on Green City initiatives, Bolton leading on Culture, Arts and Leisure and, more pertinently to this research, Salford leading on Housing, Planning and Homelessness. By dividing these responsibilities between the constituent authorities, rather than keeping them in-house within the GMCA, each council holds a duty to the wider region and allows it to take a leading role in crucial developments. More germane to planning, the decision making process for affairs related to the GMSF is based upon a unanimous voting system, as opposed to the majority system

that is utilised in other policy areas. As was noted by several participants, this can lead to slower outcomes, as it is extremely unlikely that all councils, in any part of the country and on any policy, will agree on proposals at the first time of asking. Yet by utilising such a voting system, the GMCA is ensuring that proposals put forward for the final draft of the GMSF will have been agreed by all members, in addition to being agreed by the planning committees of each of the 10 individual local planning authorities.

Evidently then, the continued collaboration between the individual districts of the GMCA is attributable to several factors. But it also illuminates the policy arena within which the DtC is currently functioning. More specifically, it illustrates how its function differs between LPA's who are part of a combined authority and those who are outside of this system of governance. Within the GMCA, the presence of the joint DPD spatial framework (GMSF) negates the effectiveness of the DtC, to a degree. Instead, the GMSF plays the role of the DtC, being the framework that guides development over the combined authority. As the GMCA are responsible for the management and location of their housing need, the spatial framework effectively replaces the need for the DtC in evidencing the cooperation between districts. Instead, it performs the role of documenting interactions between the authorities and other public bodies. However, the Duty has a more central role when dealing with matters outside of the GMCA. It became evident through the interviews that its use was more important when cross boundary issues were to be resolved, with housing issues noted as needing to be evidenced officially, and reflected in any policy outcomes. The current guise of the Duty however was questioned. The lack of guidance on what 'cooperation' actually constitutes was mentioned by several participants as a hindrance to the policies inception. Many participants perceived their departments as already having strong relationships to their non-GMCA neighbours, and that negotiations with these districts had always been clear and transparent. The view that was echoed by each participant was that, though they understood the political need for the DtC, it is perhaps an empty tool as negotiation with external partners had previously been ongoing. The Duty then appears to be seen as merely a paper trail to evidence that official communication between LPAs has occurred, without necessarily ensuring that each authority will reach an effective outcome through it.

It can be argued that, within the context of the intra-GMCA negotiations, the Duty has added very little value. The adoption of a joint DPD ensures that all discussions between stakeholders are evidenced and outcomes presented in a mutually accepted strategic plan. Outside of the combined authority, its use is more transparent, but again its applicability

and suitability are questionable. The lack of guidance over its applicability and troubles with its inception into the planning environment have dogged its value. As was mentioned by interviewees, the negotiations that it is designed to ensure occur have already been in motion, before the introduction of the Duty. Furthermore, it has been parachuted in at a time when LPA across the country are at wildly different stages of writing their local plan. For those areas where a local plan has been in the works before the Duty arrived, there appears to have been confusion and disdain towards the policy as to how authorities are meant to evidence negotiations that have occurred before its inception.

Chapter 6 - VFI Survey Analysis

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the quantitative data collected through the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) will be assessed and broken down by several demographic groupings, as well as analysis of the data at individual neighbourhood forum level. Descriptive statistics will be reinforced with reliability and correlational testing to assess the validity of the results. In addition to the VFI question set, the contextual planning questions that each forum were posed are also analysed to further support the findings of the main part of this survey, and to ascertain various traits in volunteers at this level; trust, openness to outside input and willingness to volunteer outside of citizens own borders will be explored.

A widely used instrument in the field of voluntarism, this is nevertheless the first time that the VFI has been used in the realm of urban planning, to the best of the researcher's knowledge. The 30 questions of the VFI were preceded by three introductory questions that were to elicit certain demographic characteristics of the volunteers in the sample, namely gender, age group and economic status. Following the VFI, several contextual questions more embedded in the language of planning were asked of the participants in order to further entrench the VFI into a survey that was, at its core, designed to elicit reasons for volunteering in a planning related activity, rather than other general forms of voluntarism. In all, 112 participants across the various neighbourhood forums and town councils were involved in the study.

Twelve Neighbourhood Planning Forums (hereafter, NPFs) were selected as case studies for this component of the research. A core principal of case study selection was the aim of achieving an even geographical spread across England, using the geography of the English core cities and their hinterlands to guide selection. An even split of rural and urban groups was achieved, 6 each, whilst there was a slightly uneven number of groups representing those NPFs formed for the sole purpose of creating a neighbourhood plan (7), and those plans that were managed and developed by an existing town or parish council (5). This chapter will begin with some basic descriptive statistics to illustrate the make-up of the NPFs, before a more thorough breakdown of the data.

6.2 Contextual statistics

In total, 112 individuals across the 12 NPFs participated in the study, originating from a variety of differing professions and age groups. There was a wide difference between groups in terms of total members who were actively leading the forums (Table 6.1).

Table 6-1 Participating Neighbourhood Forums and Councils

| Name of NPF | Core City | Urban/Rural | Forum/Council | No. of participants |
|-----------------------------|------------|-------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Beeches, Booths & Barr | Birmingham | Urban | Forum | 7 |
| Birkenhead & Tranmere | Liverpool | Urban | Forum | 6 |
| Birkenhead North | Liverpool | Urban | Forum | 12 |
| Blackrod | Manchester | Rural | Council | 6 |
| Denton South | Manchester | Urban | Forum | 15 |
| Kippax | Leeds | Rural | Council | 3 |
| Linby | Nottingham | Rural | Forum | 7 |
| Mill Hill | London | Urban | Forum | 17 |
| Oxspring | Sheffield | Rural | Council | 4 |
| Stanton Drew | Bristol | Rural | Council | 7 |
| Stapleford | Nottingham | Urban | Council | 10 |
| Whitburn | Newcastle | Rural | Forum | 18 |

As Table 6.1 illustrates, there is no archetypal size of forum. Though the guidelines for NPFs state that each forum should be comprised of at least 21 members, in reality it appears that steering committees tend to be a lot smaller. Whilst every member of a committee was not present at all meetings at which the research took place, it was conceded by several members of different forums that steering groups tended to be smaller than the original 21 figure.

Evidence from the surveyed NPF shows that older members of the community are disproportionately over-represented. As Table 6.2 shows, over a third of participants were of retirement age, whilst only 2.7% of the sample were aged under 30. This would appear to

suggest that those members of the community who are willing to get involved in neighbourhood planning are generally older, and that volunteering in this type of activity is not as appealing to younger people. This is an important finding as other studies that have used the VFI methodology have discovered that volunteering in other domains is disproportionately dominated by younger people primarily motivated by the desire to enhance their employability and signal “good character” to potential employers (Okun & Schultz, 2003; Gerstein, et al., 2004; Papadakis, et al., 2004; Houle, et al., 2005).

Table 6-2 Age groups of NPF participants

| What age group do you belong to? | Total | Percentage |
|---|--------------|-------------------|
| 18-24 | 0 | 0 |
| 25-30 | 3 | 2.7 |
| 31-40 | 9 | 8 |
| 41-50 | 14 | 12.5 |
| 50-64 | 41 | 36.6 |
| 65+ | 45 | 40.2 |

This finding is echoed by Table 6.3, which provides the percentage employment status of all those participating in the research. In total, 44.6% of participants were retired, whilst no participants considered themselves to be full time students. Interestingly however, a quarter of participants identified as being in full time employment. This appears to suggest that it is not just those who have more recreational time, such as those of retirement age, who are willing to give up their time to develop a plan. In terms of gender, there appeared to be no particular trend in participation numbers, with both sexes substantially represented (61 male members to 51 female).

These results however appear to illustrate an interesting pattern regarding exactly who is getting involved in neighbourhood planning. As can be seen from Table 6.2, 40.2% of active participants in the sample NPFs were aged over 65 years of age, the current UK retirement age. Yet this is not representative of each areas age profile. The mean average of over 65s living in these areas is just 17.9%, with the highest individual value for this age group being

28.8% in Linby (Table 6.4). This appears to indicate that the age profile of each NPF in the sample is not indicative of the age profile of the neighbourhoods that they are representing.

Table 6-3 Employment status of NPF participants

| What is your employment status? | Total | Percentage |
|--|--------------|-------------------|
| FT Employee | 28 | 25 |
| PT Employee | 14 | 12.5 |
| Self-Employed | 15 | 13.4 |
| Unemployed | 0 | 0 |
| FT Student | 0 | 0 |
| Retired | 50 | 44.6 |
| Other | 5 | 4.5 |

In other research where a disproportionately aged population has been seen to dominate the sample, the motivation for voluntarism was found to be seeking social interaction and upholding the status quo of their community (Bowen, et al., 2000; Greenslade & White, 2005; Yoshioka, et al., 2007), and echoes wider work on the subject of voluntarism in older communities (Stergios & Carruthers, 2002). This provides an important insight into the surveyed NPFs as the disproportionately older volunteers may well have been drawn to this form of activity for these reasons - aspects of voluntarism that are explored by some of the later questions employed in this modified version of the VFI.

This appears to be reinforced when assessing 2011 Census data for Economic Activity for the sample NPF areas (Table 6.6). As Table 6.3 indicates, nearly half of those participants in the investigation listed themselves as being retired (44.6%), whilst there were 0 participants who identified as being students or unemployed. Yet compared to census data, again this is not a true reflection of the demographic makeup of each of the areas in the study. Each of the NPF areas have a general spread of economically active and inactive citizens, with no particular spikes in certain groups (Table 6.6). The MSOA of Wirral 011 (Birkenhead North) has the lowest rate of economically active residents aged 16-74 (55.8), and intuitively the highest level of economically active residents, at 44.2%. In all of the participant NPF areas,

the resident retired population figures are nowhere near the 44.6% representative mean figure that are actively involved in the development of plans in each respective forum or council. The parish of Blackrod, Greater Manchester, has a retired population figure of 21%. This figure is less than half of the 44.6% of retired persons who are represented across all of the NPFs in this study. Furthermore, as Table 6.5 indicates, the representation of retired residents responsible for the neighbourhood plan in Blackrod is nearly 4 times that of the actual figure of retired residents living in the parish (83.3% compared to 21.0% of parish residents as recorded in the 2011 Census, Table 6.6). Again, this would appear to suggest that neighbourhood planning is most appealing to those citizens who may have more time to spare, the prime example here being the retired.

That is not to say however that those citizens in employment are not becoming involved in neighbourhood planning. Just under half of the participants in this study (49.9%) listed themselves as being in some form of employment, be it full time, part time or self-employed work. The majority of these residents identified as having full time work commitments (25% of the whole sample). This appears to be more representative of the areas that each NPF represents. FT employees make up the largest group of economically active citizens in all 12 case study areas ranging from 24.2% (Wirral 021/Birkenhead & Tranmere) up to 42.4% in Stapleford (Table 6.6). It also indicates that those in full time work still appear to show a willingness to volunteer with developing a neighbourhood plan. Indeed, 3 of the 12 NPFs sampled had their greatest share of contributors coming from those in employment; Denton South, Linby and Mill Hill, all three of whom had the lowest share of retirees present compared to the other sample groups.

Two groups were notable for having zero representation on the forums/councils sampled; namely, the unemployed and students. Particularly in the case of the urban NPFs, such an absence is unrepresentative of their respective communities, certainly with regard to unemployed residents. The urban areas exhibit the highest levels of unemployment, particularly the MSOAs representing Birkenhead North and Birkenhead & Tranmere, with values of 10.1% and 9.3% respectively. These values correspond to large sections of these communities, yet none are represented on the forums in these areas. Again, in the case of students, figures for this group are higher in the urban areas, particularly Mill Hill and Beeches, Booths and Barr, but there is no representation of these citizens in any of the NPFs. This would appear to suggest that becoming involved in neighbourhood planning is not a priority for these groups. This could potentially be an issue in neighbourhood planning in

general, and not limited to those in this study. There is potential for those on the steering groups of their respective NPFs to be unrepresentative of the demographic profile of their locality, but instead have their work reflect their own personal sense of community (Goodman, et al., 1998). It should be noted at this point that all of the NPFs in this investigation did exhibit a high degree of professionalism in their approach to their own unique plans, despite being at various stages of the process, and community engagement was a theme that appeared to run through all of them.

Table 6-4 Age profiles of NPFs (2011 Census)

(*BBB, Birkenhead North and Birkenhead & Tranmere's areas do not strictly cover a pre-designated legislative boundary, so estimates are made here using the closest possible matching scale)

| NPF area | Scale | 0-17 (%) | 18- 29(%) | 30- 44(%) | 45- 64(%) | 65+(%) |
|---|--------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Perry Barr (Beeches, Booths & Barr)* | Ward | 24.8 | 19.7 | 20.6 | 21.3 | 13.7 |
| Wirral 021 (Birkenhead & Tranmere)* | MSOA | 26.5 | 20.1 | 21.1 | 22.2 | 10.2 |
| Wirral 011 (Birkenhead North)* | MSOA | 29.6 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 22.4 | 10.6 |
| Blackrod | Parish | 18.0 | 11.9 | 18.5 | 29.4 | 22.5 |
| Denton South | Ward | 21.2 | 14.5 | 17.9 | 26.1 | 20.5 |
| Kippax | Parish | 20.6 | 12.7 | 20.6 | 28.2 | 17.8 |
| Linby | Parish | 14.8 | 8.2 | 15.5 | 32.8 | 28.8 |
| Mill Hill | Ward | 25.9 | 15.1 | 22.6 | 23.4 | 13.2 |
| Oxspring | Parish | 23.5 | 10.4 | 20.2 | 31.0 | 14.9 |
| Stanton Drew | Parish | 22.1 | 7.7 | 17.9 | 28.5 | 23.8 |
| Stapleford | Parish | 22.1 | 14.3 | 20.7 | 26.1 | 16.6 |
| Whitburn & Marston | Ward | 19.2 | 11.4 | 17.6 | 29.9 | 21.9 |
| Mean average | | 22.4 | 13.6 | 19.4 | 26.8 | 17.9 |

Table 6-5 Participants in study by employment status (%)

| NPF Area | FT Emp (%) | PT Emp (%) | Self- Emp (%) | Unemp (%) | FT Student (%) | Retired (%) | Other (%) |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------|--------------|
| BBB | 14.3 | - | 28.6 | - | - | 28.6 | 28.6 |
| B'head & T'mere | - | - | 16.7 | - | - | 83.3 | - |
| Birkenhead North | 25.0 | 25.0 | - | - | - | 50.0 | - |
| Blackrod | - | 16.7 | - | - | - | 83.3 | - |
| Denton South | 40.0 | 20.0 | 6.7 | - | - | 26.7 | 6.7 |
| Kippax | 33.3 | - | - | - | - | 66.7 | - |
| Linby | 28.6 | 14.3 | 28.6 | - | - | 14.3 | 14.3 |
| Mill Hill | 23.5 | 11.8 | 41.2 | - | - | 23.5 | - |
| Oxspring | - | - | - | - | - | 100.0 | - |
| Stanton Drew | 14.3 | 28.6 | 14.3 | - | - | 42.9 | - |
| Stapleford | 50.0 | - | - | - | - | 40.0 | 10.0 |
| Whitburn | 27.8 | 11.1 | 5.6 | - | - | 55.6 | - |

Table 6-6 Economic Activity of all persons in each NPF area (MSOA, ward and parish level, 20111 Census)

| Economic Activity | Whitbur n | St'ford | Stanton Drew | Oxspring | Mill Hill | Linby | Kippax | Denton South | Blackrod | Wirral 011 | Wirral 021 | Perry Barr |
|---|--------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Economically active | 65.5 | 71.7 | 71.2 | 72.8 | 71.4 | 67.3 | 71.8 | 63.4 | 69.5 | 55.8 | 64.9 | 67.7 |
| <i>In employment</i> | 58.2 | 64.5 | 67.0 | 68.3 | 64.2 | 61.9 | 66.4 | 54.9 | 64.2 | 42.9 | 53.2 | 55.8 |
| <i>Employee: Part-time</i> | 13.2 | 15.4 | 15.8 | 14.5 | 11.3 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 12.6 | 14.7 | 14.4 | 15.0 | 12.9 |
| <i>Employee: Full-time</i> | 38.2 | 42.4 | 33.5 | 41.1 | 35.2 | 27.4 | 43.5 | 36.0 | 41.1 | 24.2 | 32.7 | 36.4 |
| <i>Self-employed</i> | 6.8 | 6.7 | 17.7 | 12.7 | 17.7 | 20.2 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 8.3 | 4.3 | 5.5 | 6.4 |
| <i>Unemployed</i> | 4.7 | 4.6 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 6.2 | 2.5 | 10.1 | 9.3 | 5.9 |
| <i>Full-time student</i> | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 6.1 |
| Economically inactive | 34.5 | 28.3 | 28.8 | 27.2 | 28.6 | 32.7 | 28.2 | 36.6 | 30.5 | 44.2 | 35.1 | 32.3 |
| <i>Retired</i> | 19.3 | 15.3 | 17.5 | 16.7 | 9.0 | 23.2 | 17.7 | 18.6 | 21.0 | 11.9 | 10.0 | 11.9 |
| <i>Student (including full-time students)</i> | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 3.2 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 9.4 |
| <i>Looking after home or family</i> | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 1.9 | 8.7 | 7.0 | 4.8 |
| <i>Long-term sick or disabled</i> | 5.5 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 7.6 | 3.4 | 13.8 | 10.0 | 3.6 |
| <i>Other</i> | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 2.6 |
| <i>Unemployed: Age 16 to 24</i> | 1.5 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 1.5 |
| <i>Unemployed: Age 50 to 74</i> | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| <i>Unemployed: Never worked</i> | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.3 |
| <i>Long-term unemployed</i> | 1.9 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 2.2 |

With regard to differences in participation between those groups classed as urban or rural, and council as opposed to forum for that matter, there appears to be no real pattern in differences in those participating. As mentioned earlier, the steering groups were comprised of a relatively close split of 61 males and 51 females across the 12 NPFs. Furthermore, there appears to be no archetypal “rural” or “urban” steering group in terms of age range and occupation, as both different types of group. For example, whilst some urban forums had high proportions of retired citizens in their steering group (e.g. Birkenhead & Tranmere at 83.3%), others had lower levels of retired residents as opposed to self-employed (e.g. Mill Hill with 23.5% retired compared to 41.2% self-employed). Similar findings were uncovered when comparing plans developed by councils as opposed to designated forums. For example, whilst Blackrod, a rural town council, had a steering group made up of 83.3% retired residents, Stanton Drew, another rural plan led by the town council, had a lower level of retired members present at the steering meeting (42.9%). This illustrates the point that there is no archetypal NPF profile, whether rural or urban, council or forum led. Though older age groups appear to be more involved in this form of legislative community engagement, as would be expected with them being more time-rich than other groups, it cannot be taken for granted that it will be these citizens who will be responsible for the development of a neighbourhood plan. Other groups do appear to be committed to this mechanism as well, though not all, with obvious gaps in representation of the unemployed and students.

6.3 Volunteer Function Inventory

With regard to the VFI, there were some particularly stronger results for certain motivational factors over others, as can be seen from Table 6.7. A Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 was used for each question. 30 questions in total were asked, 5 for each of the 6 motivational factors. With that, the minimum score each factor can score is 5, with the maximum being 35.

Table 6-7 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs

| | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|-------------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Mean | 8.47 | 12.71 | 11.12 | 17.62 | 21.18 | 29.1 |
| N. | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| SD | 5.69 | 7.44 | 6.17 | 7.58 | 7.24 | 5.13 |

As can be seen from Table 6.7, the Values category is the highest scoring motivational factor ($M=29.1$, $SD=5.13$) followed by the Understanding category ($M=21.18$, $SD=7.24$). The means were calculated by the total score each person had per motivation.

The above statistics show that the career motive was the least important factor for study participants ($M=8.47$, $SD=5.69$). This result chimes with earlier findings that suggest that the majority of those participating in the surveyed NPFs were retired and, therefore, not seeking to volunteer in order to enhance their employability. Furthermore, the Career factor remained a lowest scoring factor throughout the entire study, but for a couple of minor exceptions covered in this chapter. Whilst many other studies that have used the VFI have reported high results for this category, particularly in younger age groups (Clary, et al., 1996; Dávila & Díaz-Morales, 2009; Eppler, et al., 2011; Gage III & Thapa, 2012), the data from this investigation reinforces previous studies that intuitively demonstrate that Career motives are unimportant to older groups who may be in employment already, or have retired (Greenslade & White, 2005; Caldarella, et al., 2010; Brayley, et al., 2014; Brayley, et al., 2015).

The strongest motives for becoming involved in the study were Understanding and Values. At first glance; this would suggest that learning to understand the neighbourhood planning system, and a sense of place association were key motivators behind the decision to become involved in neighbourhood plan making. Again, this seems to dovetail with the original contextual findings. As the vast majority of surveyed individuals were over 50 years of age, along with many of these participants being retired or in full time employment, it is clear that they would not be involved in the forum for career gains. Furthermore, an attachment to their home area and to understand policies that can shape these localities can be seen as a rational motivator to becoming involved in neighbourhood planning.

When the results are broken down by gender, it is apparent that there are no particular differences between motivations for males and females. Values is still the highest scoring factor (Male: $M=28.31$, $SD=5.08$; female: $M=30.04$, $SD=5.08$), suggesting that place connection is just as important to males as it is for females. The order of importance of factors is the same for both genders, with both listing Values as the most important factor, followed in order by Understanding, Social, Enhancement, Protective and Career, with the latter viewed as the least important motivator for NPF voluntarism. Perhaps the only difference of note between genders is the gap between Career and Protective, the two lowest performing factors. Whilst for females the gap between these two factors was nearly

4 points, for males this is reduced to under 2, suggesting that male participants hold career motivations on their decision to become involved in neighbourhood planning, though again, these motivations are the weakest of all factors.

Table 6-8 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs by gender

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|--------|------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Male | Mean | 9.03 | 12.25 | 10.69 | 17.08 | 20.56 | 28.31 |
| | N | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| | SD | 6.35 | 6.89 | 5.87 | 7.80 | 6.86 | 5.08 |
| Female | Mean | 7.80 | 13.25 | 11.63 | 18.25 | 21.92 | 30.04 |
| | N | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 |
| | SD | 4.75 | 8.09 | 6.53 | 7.33 | 7.67 | 5.08 |

These initial findings appear to be backed up when the data is broken down further again. After separating the motivational factors based on age groups, it is evident that for younger age groups, the Career factor is comparable to the other factors. Career figures for the 25-30 group (M=12.33, SD=4.16) and 31-40 group (M=15.00, SD=5.77) are significantly higher than the other age groups, suggesting that neighbourhood planning may hold a small motivational influence on younger age groups. As age groups increase, the mean value of Career decreases, with the lowest figure of all factors by age being 6.84 (SD=5.49) for those classed as 65 and over (Table 6.9). This is to be expected, as those who are older are less likely to change career or may have already retired, therefore not needing to gain experience through volunteering for personal employment gain. Another finding of note is the low mean figure of 8.67 (SD=4.04) for the Protective factor in 25-30 year olds. The Protective factor is related to a motivation to volunteer in order to protect the ego from the difficulties of life, to act a distraction from other things that may be occurring in an individual's life. This low score, the lowest of any factor outside of Career, would appear to suggest that participation in the forum for this age group does not stem from a need to be distracted from other issues in life. Again though, the Values factor is has the highest mean figure for all age groups, hinting at a degree of strong place association as a motivation for becoming involved in the process.

The data was then separated based upon employment status to investigate whether and discernible differences from the overall pattern of scoring could be observed. The resulting dataset can be seen in Table 6.10.

Table 6-9 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs by age group

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|-------|------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| 25-30 | Mean | 12.33 | 14.33 | 8.67 | 13.67 | 21.67 | 27.33 |
| | N | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| | SD | 4.16 | 8.50 | 4.04 | 5.86 | 8.02 | 9.29 |
| 31-40 | Mean | 15.00 | 19.00 | 16.33 | 19.33 | 24.67 | 31.44 |
| | N | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| | SD | 5.77 | 6.98 | 8.53 | 7.40 | 4.82 | 3.64 |
| 41-50 | Mean | 8.93 | 12.57 | 11.71 | 19.00 | 23.64 | 30.50 |
| | N | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| | SD | 3.81 | 7.80 | 6.03 | 8.45 | 8.80 | 4.13 |
| 50-64 | Mean | 8.39 | 12.24 | 10.71 | 16.37 | 20.37 | 29.37 |
| | N | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
| | SD | 5.54 | 7.60 | 5.95 | 7.05 | 7.84 | 5.26 |
| 65+ | Mean | 6.84 | 11.80 | 10.42 | 18.24 | 20.42 | 28.07 |
| | N | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| | SD | 5.49 | 6.91 | 5.69 | 7.94 | 6.38 | 5.17 |

Table 6-10 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs by employment status

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|---------------|------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| FT Employee | Mean | 9.07 | 13.96 | 11.71 | 18.00 | 22.54 | 30.21 |
| | N | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| | SD | 4.74 | 8.11 | 6.73 | 8.01 | 8.74 | 5.02 |
| PT Employee | Mean | 8.29 | 12.14 | 11.21 | 18.14 | 20.50 | 29.36 |
| | N | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| | SD | 4.08 | 8.00 | 5.95 | 6.96 | 7.19 | 5.76 |
| Self-Employed | Mean | 11.67 | 11.53 | 10.53 | 14.60 | 20.93 | 28.60 |
| | N | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| | SD | 6.88 | 7.34 | 4.90 | 7.57 | 6.50 | 5.15 |
| Retired | Mean | 6.80 | 11.76 | 10.58 | 17.80 | 20.18 | 28.22 |
| | N | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| | SD | 5.23 | 6.66 | 5.86 | 7.79 | 6.60 | 5.12 |
| Other | Mean | 12.80 | 20.20 | 14.60 | 21.20 | 26.20 | 32.40 |
| | N | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| | SD | 9.55 | 7.40 | 10.41 | 2.86 | 5.54 | 2.19 |

Concerning employment status, the Values and Understanding average mean figures emerged as the most influential factors in citizens volunteering, whilst Career and Protective

factors recorded the lowest values (Table 6.10). However, it should be noted that for those listed as Self-Employed, the Career Value (M=11.67, SD=6.88) exceeded that of Protective (M=10.53, SD=4.90) and Enhancement (M=11.53, SD=7.34), suggesting that becoming involved in neighbourhood planning might be beneficial for those working for themselves, potentially through interacting with communities in their area that they may not usually come across e.g. community groups, local agencies. Also evident was a higher than average score for Enhancement and Career factors from those who listed themselves as 'other' for employment status. Upon analysing the data, these individuals noted that they considered themselves carers or parents. With this in mind, Career factors may be higher as this motivation may assist in the traditional sense of volunteering seen in other studies, and allow volunteers to use the experience of being involved in a form of legislative work in order to improve employability, should the individual plan to move into employment. Additionally, the same group may find Enhancement a potential motivator as involvement in the NPF may be a different, more formalised environment than what they are usually used to. Again, this is more akin to the traditional template of volunteering previously studied, and is linked to improvement of oneself for personal reasons.

The differences between whether NPFs are run by existing councils or designated forums are more negligible. The results of breaking down this data are shown in Table 6.11.

Table 6-11 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs by type of leadership model

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|----------------|-------------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Forum | Mean | 8.94 | 13.61 | 11.88 | 17.94 | 21.77 | 29.01 |
| | N | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| | SD | 6.02 | 7.83 | 6.57 | 7.65 | 7.47 | 5.51 |
| Council | Mean | 7.20 | 10.23 | 9.03 | 16.73 | 19.57 | 29.33 |
| | N | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| | SD | 4.51 | 5.68 | 4.37 | 7.45 | 6.40 | 3.99 |

The difference between the Values factor is negligible between forum and council. However, the differences between the other categories is more noticeable. In particular, Career, Enhancement and Protective factors, though remaining the three weakest motivations for volunteering in neighbourhood planning, are significantly higher for those part of a forum rather than a council. Enhancement in particular is over 3 points higher (Forum: M=13.61, SD=7.83; Council: M=10.23, SD=5.68) suggesting that those who have created a forum for their plan are motivated to volunteer their time for enhancing their own skills more than

those who sit on a pre-existing councils. This can be expected due to the different nature and purpose of each governing body. Whilst forums are set up with the sole purpose of developing of a neighbourhood plan, councils serve various functions. Creating a neighbourhood plan is one of a series of duties that council representatives have a duty to deliver, so creating the plan is not a single activity that would allow an already active councillor to further broaden their skills.

In a similar vein, the data was broken down to show the split between the urban and rural neighbourhood planning groups, and this can be seen in Table 6.12. Again, the difference between both groups in terms of their scoring for the biggest motivational factor, Values, is negligible. As with the council/forum divide however, the difference in values between urban and rural groups is more pronounced. Again, this is more evident in the lower scorers of the VFI, namely Career, Enhancement and Protective factors.

Table 6-12 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for sampled NPFs by location type (rural or urban)

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|-------|------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Urban | Mean | 9.10 | 13.52 | 11.58 | 18.00 | 21.85 | 28.97 |
| | N | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 |
| | SD | 5.58 | 7.52 | 6.50 | 7.94 | 7.66 | 5.08 |
| Rural | Mean | 7.53 | 11.49 | 10.42 | 17.04 | 20.18 | 29.29 |
| | N | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| | SD | 5.78 | 7.23 | 5.64 | 7.06 | 6.52 | 5.25 |

The results suggest that those from an urban area feel more strongly regarding these motivations to volunteer their time for a neighbourhood plan. This is an intriguing result. Though it could be argued that

6.4 Volunteer Function Inventory by individual group

Following the above analysis, the data was then broken down further to show values for each individual NPF (Table 6.13). From this dataset, we can observe some interesting patterns emerging. Firstly, the Values factor remains the highest motivator for all 12 of the individual groups. This factor is most closely tied to notions of place attachment, and gives credence to the concept that citizens are more motivated to volunteer their time for the benefit of their own locality. This should come as no surprise, as there is plenty of evidence to support this theory of place attachment, and the bonds that communities develop with

their physical environment (Shumaker & Taylor, 1983; Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Florek, 2010).

The results show variation across the sample NPFs however for other factors in the VFI. This is most evident in the mean values for the Social factor. Denton South record a Social mean of 23.40 (SD=7.55), whilst in Stapleford this mean figure descends to 14.10 (SD=7.61). However, there appears to be no real pattern across the sample groups with regard to this factor. Both Stapleford and Denton South are classed as urban areas and exhibit totals that are at different ends of the scoring spectrum. Conversely, Blackrod (Social M=14.50, SD=9.18) and Stanton Drew (Social M=20.43, SD=5.00) are both classified as rural areas, but again have scores that are different ends of the scale. A discernible pattern is also difficult to make out when NPFs organised by councils as opposed to forums are compared. It could be feasibly expected that members of a forum devised with the sole aspiration of creating a neighbourhood plan could be, in part, motivated to join the group as a way of developing social ties with others. Such a motivation should logically be lower in councils where members are to meet for items other than that of a neighbourhood plan. Yet, councils involved with this study still recorded high mean values for this factor, so much so that two of the highest mean figures for the Social factor were recorded in Oxspring (M=19.75, SD=4.79) and Stanton Drew (M=20.43, SD=5.00). This appears to illustrate that social ties are not just a motivator for those who are forming a new, plan-orientated collective, but also to those who are already a part of an existing legislative body.

Such variation across NPFs, be they rural or urban, forum or council led, is evident across the other motivational categories also. Enhancement and Protective factors show themselves to be the 2nd and 3rd least important motivations for participants in NPFs across the sample. Protective motives relate to ways of protecting oneself from difficulties in life, using volunteering as a way to distract the mind from other issues that may be occurring. Enhancement meanwhile relates to ways of allowing a person to develop and grow through empowering themselves through voluntarism, by being valued as a volunteer. For 11 of the 12 groups, Protective notions recorded a lower mean score than that of Enhancement (Blackrod being the exception). This suggests that rather than allowing citizens to use the forum as a means of distracting themselves from potential issues in life, it is more of a means of allowing them to better themselves and potentially improve their own personal livelihood, by meeting new people and improving self-esteem by being involved in a group project designed to help others.

Table 6-13 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations by individual NPFs

| | | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|-----------------------------|------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| BBB | Mean | 7.29 | 11.14 | 11.00 | 20.14 | 19.71 | 28.57 |
| | N | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| | SD | 2.43 | 5.52 | 7.92 | 4.02 | 7.80 | 4.96 |
| Birkenhead & Tranmere | Mean | 10.67 | 14.67 | 13.83 | 18.50 | 24.00 | 29.50 |
| | N | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| | SD | 7.17 | 4.03 | 4.71 | 6.50 | 7.24 | 3.94 |
| Birkenhead North | Mean | 7.42 | 11.33 | 7.83 | 15.67 | 18.50 | 26.00 |
| | N | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| | SD | 3.53 | 6.41 | 5.62 | 8.26 | 8.11 | 7.37 |
| Blackrod | Mean | 5.17 | 6.17 | 7.67 | 14.50 | 17.33 | 30.50 |
| | N | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| | SD | 0.41 | 2.40 | 3.39 | 9.18 | 3.08 | 4.04 |
| Denton South | Mean | 9.60 | 17.60 | 16.73 | 23.40 | 25.93 | 31.47 |
| | N | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| | SD | 7.28 | 9.30 | 7.28 | 7.55 | 8.30 | 4.17 |
| Kippax | Mean | 5.00 | 8.67 | 7.67 | 17.33 | 22.33 | 28.67 |
| | N | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| | SD | 0.00 | 3.21 | 2.52 | 10.41 | 4.04 | 4.73 |
| Linby | Mean | 8.29 | 8.86 | 7.86 | 14.71 | 22.29 | 29.57 |
| | N | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| | SD | 4.92 | 7.34 | 2.41 | 4.68 | 7.48 | 5.71 |
| Mill Hill | Mean | 9.88 | 13.18 | 10.47 | 16.12 | 21.59 | 29.06 |
| | N | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| | SD | 5.78 | 7.86 | 4.16 | 8.03 | 6.75 | 4.37 |
| Oxspring | Mean | 5.00 | 12.25 | 8.50 | 19.75 | 20.25 | 28.75 |
| | N | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| | SD | 0.00 | 5.74 | 2.65 | 4.79 | 8.06 | 3.77 |
| Stanton Drew | Mean | 8.00 | 11.29 | 10.71 | 20.43 | 18.71 | 30.00 |
| | N | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| | SD | 6.03 | 5.96 | 5.12 | 5.00 | 8.99 | 4.86 |
| Stapleford | Mean | 9.40 | 11.60 | 9.30 | 14.10 | 20.40 | 28.60 |
| | N | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| | SD | 5.38 | 6.87 | 5.44 | 7.61 | 6.35 | 3.81 |
| Whitburn | Mean | 8.83 | 14.67 | 13.11 | 16.83 | 20.50 | 28.72 |
| | N | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| | SD | 7.64 | 8.37 | 7.10 | 7.75 | 6.24 | 6.34 |

However, it should be noted though that, overall, these two factors do not resonate with individuals as a core motivator for involvement in plan making. Rather, behind the Values factor, Understanding figured as the other central motivational dynamic. In 10 of the 12 sampled groups, Understanding recorded the second highest mean values, with the exceptions being Beeches, Booths & Barr and Stanton Drew. Even in these two areas, the Understanding factor's average mean value still scored comparatively highly with other values across the board, 3.94 for Beeches, Booths and Barr and 3.74 for Stanton Drew. All in all, this result appears logical; in order to develop a plan, citizens need to gain more of an insight into the planning system, and this process can allow them to gain more of a perspective on how the system operates, and how it can influence their own locality.

6.5 Reliability and Correlation

The use of the VFI has been widespread across different disciplines, and the consistency of its factors has been robust, with values of coefficient alphas reported as above 0.80 (Clary, et al., 1992). In another study, Allison et al. (2002) register coefficient alphas to be satisfactory, with values ranging from 0.75 to 0.87. For this present investigation, coefficient values for the individual VFI factors were good: VFI Career ($\alpha = .81$), VFI Enhancement ($\alpha = .86$), VFI Protection ($\alpha = .77$), VFI Social ($\alpha = .80$), VFI Understanding ($\alpha = .81$) and VFI Values ($\alpha = .75$).

Pearson Correlations were executed to assess the validity of the individual VFI categories, and to examine how accurately the functions of the VFI predicted volunteer motivation. The results of this correlation analysis are displayed in Table 6.14. In all but two cases, all of the correlations among the categories for volunteering were positive and significant ($p < .05$). The exceptions to this rule were the correlation between the Values and Enhancement categories ($r = .168$, $p = .077$) and the Values and Career categories ($r = -.096$, $p = .313$). With regard to the correlation between Values and Career categories, this result echoes that of previous studies testing motivations to volunteer using the VFI (Okun & Schultz, 2003; Asghar, 2015). The strongest positive correlation was between the Protective and Enhancement categories ($r = .76$), whilst the weakest positive correlation was between the Protective and Values categories ($r = .17$). The median correlation between all of the motives is 0.48; as was expected, the six motives for volunteering were reasonably correlated with each other.

Table 6-14 Correlation between the six subscales of the VFI (total score of reasons for each voluntarism category)

| | | VFI | Career | Enhancement | Protective | Social | Understanding | Values |
|----------------------|----------------------------|--------|--------|-------------|------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| VFI | r | - | | | | | | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | | | | | | |
| Career | Pearson Correlation | .60** | - | | | | | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | | | | | | |
| Enhancement | Pearson Correlation | .84** | .61** | - | | | | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | .000 | | | | | |
| Protective | Pearson Correlation | .84** | .57** | .76** | - | | | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | .000 | .000 | | | | |
| Social | Pearson Correlation | .77** | .25** | .48** | .55** | - | | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | .007 | .000 | .000 | | | |
| Understanding | Pearson Correlation | .79** | .29** | .56** | .54** | .54** | - | |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | .002 | .000 | .000 | .000 | | |
| Values | Pearson Correlation | .48** | -.09 | .17 | .23* | .43** | .44** | - |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | .313 | .077 | .014 | .000 | .000 | |
| M | | 100.19 | 8.47 | 12.71 | 11.11 | 17.61 | 21.18 | 29.10 |
| SD | | 28.80 | 5.69 | 7.44 | 6.17 | 7.58 | 7.24 | 5.13 |
| α | | .82 | .81 | .86 | .77 | .80 | .81 | .75 |

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

6.6 Contextual Planning Questions

Following the completion of the VFI, participants were then asked to answer some short contextual questions that were more related to the sphere of planning. These questions were designed with neighbourhood planning, and its procedures in the real world, very much at its heart. These questions helped to give more weight to the findings from the first two sections of contextual statistics and the VFI. It also gave the survey more weight as a neighbourhood planning orientated piece of research. As a standalone questionnaire, the VFI can appear abstract and unrelated to a specific form of volunteering. The addition of these questions after this section helped to mitigate this scenario.

6.6.1 Frequency of meetings

Firstly, participants were asked to indicate how often they attended meetings of their forum. As the groups surveyed all formed part of the steering group of their respective NPFs (with the exception of Whitburn and Birkenhead North, whose meetings were a more public affair involving interested members of the community), it was soon garnered that meetings between different groups occurred at different intervals. Table 6.15 illustrates this point.

Table 6-15 Total frequency of meetings attended

| Frequency of meetings attended | Frequency | Percent |
|--------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Every Month | 71 | 63.4 |
| Every Two Months | 24 | 21.4 |
| Every Three Months | 6 | 5.4 |
| Sporadically | 11 | 9.8 |
| Total | 112 | 100.0 |

The vast majority (63.4%) of participants indicated that they attend meetings on a monthly basis, with a further 21.4% commenting that they attended meetings every two months. Again, as these surveys were conducted with the steering groups of each NPF, it was indicated to the researcher that these answers signposted the frequency with which each respective group decided to hold meetings. With regard to Whitburn and Birkenhead North, the meetings within which the survey took place were wider community events. With this,

the proportion of regular steering group attended present was lower, as can be seen in Table 6.16.

Table 6-16 Frequency of meetings attended by individual NPF

| | Monthly | | Every 2 Months | | Every 3 Months | | Sporadically | |
|----------------------------------|---------|-------|----------------|------|----------------|------|--------------|------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| BBB | 4 | 57.1 | 3 | 42.9 | - | - | - | - |
| Birkenhead & Tranmere | 3 | 50.0 | 1 | 16.7 | 1 | 16.7 | 1 | 16.7 |
| Birkenhead North | 3 | 25.0 | 8 | 66.7 | - | - | 1 | 8.3 |
| Blackrod | 6 | 100.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Denton South | 13 | 86.7 | 2 | 13.3 | - | - | - | - |
| Kippax | 3 | 100.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Linby | 5 | 71.4 | 1 | 14.3 | 1 | 14.3 | - | - |
| Mill Hill | 12 | 70.6 | 3 | 17.6 | 2 | 11.8 | - | - |
| Oxspring | 3 | 75.0 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 25.0 |
| Stanton Drew | 6 | 85.7 | 1 | 14.3 | - | - | - | - |
| Stapleford | 10 | 100.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Whitburn | 3 | 16.7 | 5 | 27.8 | 2 | 11.1 | 8 | 44.4 |

These results appear to indicate the importance that groups attach to neighbourhood planning; every group had members who noted that they meet once a month in order to develop their respective plans. For a voluntary cause like neighbourhood planning, this is a frequent committal of time and resources.

6.6.2 Trust within the coalition

After this question, a series of Likert scale questions were asked. The frequency of these meetings can be attributed to developing a neighbourhood plan as quickly and efficiently as possible. Linked to this is the issue of trust; rather, by bringing members of the community

together regularly for this cause, individuals will be able to familiarise themselves with each other more hastily, learning each other's strengths, weaknesses and also their thoughts on the development and direction of their respective plan. Such familiarity should allow individuals in the groups to build trust with each other as they seek to progress their neighbourhood plan. This notion informed the next question to be asked; "Working together as part of the neighbourhood forum generates trust between coalition members". Results are shown below in Figure 6-1.




Figure 6-1 Trust between coalition members

As can be seen, nearly two thirds of respondents felt that working together with each other in the neighbourhood forum generated trust between them. Conversely, less than 10 percent of participants disagreed with this notion. This appears to link in with previous studies, which highlight how trust can emerge in groups who share similar values and norms (Esses, et al., 1993), and this can lead to increased levels of trustworthiness between members (Tjosvold, 1986; Tjosvold, 1988). Myerson et al. (1996) comment on how individuals from different backgrounds and employment can develop trust that is essential to complete tasks, through the belief that everyone in the shared task holds similar goals and that everyone involved stands to benefit from its completion. This chimes with the theme of neighbourhood planning, and fits the notion that "trust is still most easily engendered by regular face to face discussions over an extended period" (Bloomfield, et al., 2001, p. 503).

6.6.3 Motivation to volunteer outside of local community

One of the key concepts that the research was aimed at illuminating was the question of place association, and whether or not citizens were getting involved with neighbourhood planning over a concern for their own built environment. Again, this appears intuitive, and there is plenty of research that investigates the bonds that communities forge with their localities (Shumaker & Taylor, 1983; Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Florek, 2010). However, it is also interesting to assess whether this place attachment is only applicable to citizens own local area, or whether individuals have an inherent desire to develop and maintain areas that would not be considered “their own”. With this in mind, participants were asked the following question; “You would be motivated to help with Neighbourhood forums that may have been set up further afield, for example, perhaps in another region of the country”. Answers were obtained via a 5-point Likert scale, and the results are presented in Figure 6-2.




Figure 6-2 Motivation to volunteer outside of own neighbourhood plan

As is evident, there was only a minority of citizens who reported that they would be willing to assist in an outside neighbourhood plan to their own, with only 22.3% of the sample stating that they would agree with the statement. Meanwhile, a majority of 52.7% admitted that they would be unwilling to assist in the development of a neighbourhood plan elsewhere. Again, this reinforces research on the meaning of place, and how certain areas

can create a sense of attachment for communities that other places do not (Hummon, 1992; Low, 1992; Pellow, 1992).

6.6.4 Outside input into the neighbourhood plan-making process

The next three questions were designed to elicit how much input various groups in each respective neighbourhood area had in the plan making process. Neighbourhood plan areas can vary in size and style, yet almost universally they will be home to a wide array of different interests, be they personal or professional.

With this in mind, the following three questions were posed to participants:

- The forum is open to outside input from the local community.
- The forum is open to outside input from local councillors.
- The forum is open to outside input from developers.

Again, these questions were to be answered using a 5 point Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). The results are displayed in Figure 6-3.




Figure 6-3 Responses to various outside input

As would be expected, 87.5% of participants agreed or strongly agreed that they felt that their group was open to outside input from the local community. This is to be expected, as neighbourhood plans are designed to give power back to local people so that they can have their say in how the area is managed. Such plans have to go to a public referendum. If the public are not able to voice their opinions on what goes into the plan, then there is the potential for the plan not to pass such a referendum, counterintuitive to what the plan-makers final goal is. With respect to council planners, this openness to their input is reduced somewhat, but is still a relatively high approval of 71.4% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that planners input is readily welcomed by NPFs. However, with regard to developers, the results show that participants are not so ready to welcome input. 45.6% of respondents recorded that they agree or strongly agree that developers input is readily welcomed by the sampled NPFs. On the other end of the spectrum, 35% of participants across the study indicated that they don't believe that their respective forums are open to input from developers. This appears to indicate that citizens are less trusting of developers, and what their plans may be for their respective areas. This is not totally unexpected, as there has long been an erosion of public trust in both institutions and private institutions (Swain & Tait, 2007), and this has also afflicted planning systems and planners themselves (Sylvester, 2002). In particular, professional bodies have been criticised for alienating the views of those who are not considered specialists. For some this has been understood as a form of elitism that has proven unpopular with the general public (Freidson, 2001).

6.6.5 Influence on the neighbourhood and final question

Following this, two questions were asked of respondents concerning their desired influence on the neighbourhood. Namely, these were:

- To what extent have you become involved in the plan to potentially limit land development in the area
- To what extent have you become involved in the plan to influence the style and location of development in the area

Again, these questions were answered via a 5-point Likert scale. The essence of these questions was to uncover what type of influence participants in neighbourhood planning wanted to exert over their respective areas. Neighbourhood planning is designed to give communities more control over the development of their areas, in line with national and local policy. However, there have been concerns that this vehicle may be used for more self-

interested reasons by communities. Indeed, the scheme has been described as NIMBY (not in my back yard) charter (O'Connor, 2010; Walker, 2010). This is a key issue in macro-level politics, and hence required visiting in this research. The results of these questions are shown in Figure 6-4.




Figure 6-4 Influence on neighbourhood development

In terms of citizens becoming involved with neighbourhood planning to limit development, the results are particularly mixed. Those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with notions that they were looking to limit development make up 35.2% of the result, whilst those who stated that they were looking to check growth in their area make up 42.3%. This is obviously a contentious issue between participants in NPFs. whilst some participants appear to give credence to the arguments of those who believe neighbourhood planning to be a 'NIMBY charter', it is not quite as clear cut as this. The evidence shows that there are others who are not necessarily involved to constrain development. This is linked to the second question, with the results serving up a clearer picture of citizens' development goals. In total, 70.5% of respondents commented that they felt obliged to become involved in the process in order to have an influence over development. This is a critical point, as it appears to go against the grain of the NIMBY criticism of the policy. Rather than trying to stop development, a strong majority of the respondents expressed a belief that they would rather try to influence the

type of improvements being made in their area. This appears to reflect the governments' original plans for this localist policy:

“Neighbourhood planning gives communities direct power to develop a shared vision for their neighbourhood and shape the development and growth of their local area. They are able to choose where they want new homes, shops and offices to be built, have their say on what those new buildings should look like and what infrastructure should be provided, and grant planning permission for the new buildings they want to see go ahead” (DCLG, 2014).

Certainly then, there are mixed causes for how citizens wish to manage their areas through their plan. However, based on the evidence, it would be unwise to dismiss these reasons as purely NIMBYism. Whilst NIMBYism has been viewed as opposition to big business, reflecting “the role of place in the mobilisation and empowerment of community resistance against the interests of capital” (Lake, 1993, p. 88), the results here suggest that communities are, to some degree, open to development in their locality. The key here is that they are seeking active influence over what such development will be.

As a final question, respondents were invited to give their core reason for joining their neighbourhood plan team. For ease of analysis, five core reasons were listed. These five option statements, the most applicable one to be ticked, were:

- a) I am happy to volunteer my time for the community
- b) I want to maintain services that I may use one day
- c) I have friends who are involved in the forum
- d) It keeps me active
- e) There is nobody else to do the work that the forum entails

These questions were included as they give a wide spread on general reasons for choosing to becoming involved in neighbourhood planning, and for volunteering large amounts of time for this cause. They also follow a similar theme in tone to the questions of the VFI, and can add a further weight to the outcome of that particular section of the survey. Frequencies for responses to these questions were calculated and the results are shown in Figure 6-5.




Figure 6-5 Final question - overriding reason for neighbourhood plan participation

A considerable majority (61.6%) commented that their prime reason for becoming involved in the plan was that they are happy to volunteer their time to this cause. The second most popular reason was those respondents commenting that they wished to maintain services in their area, with the other 3 statements attracting few votes. This would appear to suggest that citizens are interested in their communities and local space, and echoes the high performance of the Values factor in the VFI. The Values factor applies to those inherent feelings of expressing altruistic values through voluntarism, and the high proportion of respondents giving this reason does appear to resonate with the VFI. Conversely, the low scoring performance of options 'c' and 'd' again echo the results of the VFI. Only 1 person expressed that their main reason for involvement was through friends being on the forum, and only 3 people stated that staying active inspired them to join the group. Such low frequencies for the selection of these options chimes with the earlier results of the VFI. These two options sit most comfortably with the Social and Protective factors, two of the most notable low scoring categories in the VFI survey.

6.7 Summary

In this chapter then, the results of the macro scale investigation have been presented. The VFI and its accompanying survey has been thoroughly broken down by various groups, and each of the individual six factors of the VFI analysed to ascertain which values speak most to those individuals who have gotten involved in the plan making process. Differences in groups based on gender, age and employment status have been explored to give an overview of the types of citizen who are actively involved in neighbourhood planning at present.

The results of the Volunteer Functions Inventory have been presented and broken down by different demographic groups. Results have then drilled down into to observe patterns and differences between plans prepared by existing town councils and those coming from specifically designated neighbourhood planning forums. Patterns have also been observed between those forums from urban and rural settings, and the VFI scores of the individual NPFs assessed to monitor any anomalous and interesting results. It is clear that, for those individuals in this study who are involved in the neighbourhood planning process, particular values are more important to them than others. Specifically, this study has shown that the Values (volunteering as a means of expressing ones altruistic attitudes) and Understanding (volunteering as a means of gaining knowledge, skills and abilities) factors are most importance to those who have taken part in plan making at the neighbourhood level. Conversely, the Career (volunteering as a means to enhancing job opportunities) and Enhancement (volunteering to help the ego grow and develop) factors scored lowest in all of the forums studied in this investigation, suggesting that these factors are of little importance to those who have become citizen planners.

This chapter has ended with an analysis of more planning specific questions, a line of investigation that has allowed the study to adopt a more planning-centric stance than would have been achieved if a mere abstract VFI had been employed on its own. Embedding the VFI in the language of planning in this way has allowed the research to gather a richer source of data, and has allowed participants to express their opinions on neighbourhood planning from a planning-centric point of view, in addition to the personal values that the VFI has allowed them to express. The results of this chapter, though different in scale and style to that of the interview analysis section, will complement the data garnered from the other half of this study, and will now be cross examined in the discussion section.

Chapter 7 - Discussion

7.1 Introduction

Firstly, at this juncture, it is important that the research objectives and questions from earlier are revisited. The objectives were:

1. To critically review existing literature on theories of cooperation in local governance, and establish the conceptual and policy framework of the research through a policy review of post-war policies enacted in England.
2. To ascertain the importance of trust, both in its emergence and longevity, in local authority planning practice.
3. To investigate what the most significant drivers are in community participation in neighbourhood planning practice.
4. To synthesize the results of the empirical work within the research to inform policy recommendations and future research in this area of planning.

Furthermore, speaking directly to objectives 2 and 3 from above, the research questions were as follows:

- a. With respect to local authority planning practice, how does trust become established in coalitions of actors?
- b. To what extent is the 'Duty to Cooperate' a necessary condition for local authorities to coalesce into a coalition?
- c. What is the role of leadership in ensuring coalition stability?
- d. What are the behavioural dynamics that explain community participation in planning, and why do those who volunteer in neighbourhood planning choose to do so?
- e. To what extent does a sense of place attachment drive community participation at the neighbourhood level?
- f. To what extent does the composition of neighbourhood planning forums accord to the perception that they are skewed towards communities who are defending against unwanted development?

From the analysis chapter then it is clear that there are several themes that require discussion, some that apply only at the level of neighbourhood planning, others at the higher level of local authorities and some that apply to both. Themes that have emerged from the

analysis of the data collected lend themselves to language of behavioural insights and of game theory. A significant topic that has come to light during the analysis is that of trust, and how it emerges between different group members, or *players* in the language of behavioural sciences. Data at both levels of investigation speak to this issue, and the findings made will be discussed here, particularly in how it allows cooperation to develop between parties. In addition to this, at the level of local authorities, the importance of leaders in the coalition will be addressed, highlighting how an unofficial 'leader' in the case of Greater Manchester helps to keep the coalition together at that level, without an implicit necessity from central government in the form of the Duty to Cooperate.

With regard to neighbourhood planning, two further topics will be under the spotlight in this chapter. Firstly voluntarism and its drivers will be discussed. The analysis illustrates that there are several reasons why citizens are motivated to volunteer, especially within the realm of neighbourhood planning. Secondly, and wholly linked to voluntarism is the notion of place attachment. The analysis shows that this is one of the key drivers in recruiting volunteers to write a neighbourhood plan. Finally, the notion of using planning legislation at both levels will be discussed. Though not a direct finding of the investigation, at both levels, this topic has still materialised from the analysis as playing a discreet role in why coalitions of actors look to form together in the interests of managing the area that falls under their jurisdiction.

7.2 How does trust become established in coalitions of actors?

Perhaps the most insightful finding, with respect to the game theory literature, is the notion that trust emerges from repeated interactions. Ordinarily, this would appear to be logical and somewhat expected finding. Research has shown that trust can emerge and be strengthened over time (Lubell, 2005; Lewicki, 2006) and, conversely, can be lost over time (Chanley, et al., 2000) through various interactions and activities. Yet, the fact that trust can be lost over time, or that it may not be present from the outset, can be seen in the fact that coalitions have occurred that have not endured, or at least have had frayed relationships between partners. As Tavits (2008) points out, coalitions can breakdown as a result of defections, either by one or several parties, with partners blaming each other for being uncooperative, or through a realisation that their differences mean that a termination of their collaboration is best for all involved. A notable example of this is the 23rd Government of Ireland in 1992, a coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Labour Party that fell in 1994, with the

resulting loss of trust and cooperation between the two parties hindering future interactions between them (Mitchell, 1999).

This then shows that trust and the cooperation that it breeds between parties, especially those of a political affiliation, is not necessarily a given, no matter how long they may have been interacting with each other. All of which makes the cooperation between the constituent councils of Greater Manchester all the more impressive. From being governed by the GMC, to setting up AGMA and moving on to form the combined authority that we see today, it is clear that there is a genuine appetite for cooperation between the authorities of the county. In game theoretical terms, the authorities of GM can be seen 'optimistic' in their character, in that they place more weight on potential positive outcomes of joining a coalition than they would on an expected outcome by potentially not joining a coalition (Eichberger & Kelsey, 2014). In planning terms, entering into the GMCA can be seen a gamble (albeit a calculated one) by Greater Manchester, as this was the first combined authority of its type in England. With no direct model on which to base itself upon, this can be seen as being a bold move by GM, reflecting the optimism of its members that they are in the best position to govern themselves without the need for a central mechanism to do this for them. Particularly with regard to planning, this has seen the use of the Duty to Cooperate marginalised to a mere paper trail as opposed to a necessity to interact.

Following the abolition of the GMC in 1986, GM's authorities took immediate action to maintain their cooperative efforts despite the absence of a formal layer of government, thus creating AGMA. It was driven by an appreciation that the boundary lines between the authorities of GM bore little meaning between the various districts (Kenealy, 2016). The entire area had long been steeped in a shared history of industrial manufacturing. Yet from this, trust between the authorities has emerged to the level that they have engaged with each other in a formal form of governance that, at that point, was unprecedented in the political landscape of England. This appears to mirror the theory of games pointed out by Stewart & Plotkin (2016). In their research they have shown that, particularly in smaller groups, players with longer memories of interacting with each other show greater cooperative tendencies, with such cooperation being based upon more stable strategies.

It has been suggested that this form of voluntary cooperation between parties can only occur in a climate where the role of the state is rolled back, and cooperation between individual participants can then be allowed to happen organically. Taylor (1987) contests that increased levels of state intervention leads to an increased reliance on the state, as voluntary

cooperative behaviour stagnates, allowing the role of the state to grow in its absence – a cyclical series that further undermines local cooperatives. As Taylor puts it:

“We might say that the state is like an addictive drug: the more of it we have, the more we ‘need’ it, and the more we come to ‘depend’ on it” (Taylor, 1987, p. 168).

This viewpoint chimes with the situation that has unfolded in Greater Manchester. With the abolishment of a county council in 1986, the authorities took it upon themselves to bind together in a coalition voluntarily under the umbrella of AGMA. This reduction of the state appears to have fostered the need for cooperation between the authorities, and conversely for the ‘need’ of the state that Taylor postulates, the cycle appears to move in the opposite direction; that is, voluntary cooperation between authorities has bred more cooperation, and has nurtured the devolved political state of affairs that we witness in Greater Manchester today.

The issue of ‘free riding’ here appears to be mitigated by the trust and structures that each of the authorities place within each other. Game theoretical literature suggests that if a group member can benefit from the actions of its group mates, but that individual contribution is costly, then there is an incentive for this individual to ‘free ride’; that is to contribute minimal or no effort to the collective cause. Free riding is assumed to be the self-interested choice when a group is focussed on producing a common good (Kim & Walker, 1984). Most studies tend to show that free riding is a common occurrence (Isaac, et al., 1984; Arglye, 1991; Isaac, et al., 1994; Brunner, 1998), yet in each of these cases free riding is shown to be less common than cooperation. If free riding is the prevalent logic of all players in the game, the public good is not produced and all members of the coalition will suffer as a result (Gavrillets & Fortunato, 2014); overcoming this problem in collective action has been a major topic in the literature (Olson, 1965). It has been shown that dominant partners in a group can seemingly act in an altruistic fashion towards their group mates by contributing the necessary effort for the group to succeed in the production of the public good, despite the increased cost to itself (Gavrillets & Fortunato, 2014). This outcome of behaviour by a dominant individual in the group is consistent with Olson’s (1965) conclusion that such players who attain the greatest share of the public good endure a disproportionate share of the costs. This leads to a “systematic tendency for ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small” (Olson, 1965, p. 29).

However, such a situation appears to have been avoided in Greater Manchester. All of the constituent members of the GMCA play an active role in the running of services and functions in the overall combined authority, in addition to the role that they play for their respective citizen base. Each authority has a role to play as a lead in various schemes around the region, such as housing, homelessness and infrastructure (Salford), the economy (Manchester) and green city region (Stockport), headed up by the leader of each council (GMCA, 2018). Such responsibilities represent the game theoretic mechanism of an 'assurance contract'. By giving each member of the coalition a bespoke duty that it is responsible for, the GMCA can ensure that all of its constituent members are contributing to the authority, and in turn, unable to free ride. Furthermore, this can also be seen to resemble a 10 player Stag hunt game: all ten members must work together to ensure that they receive the maximum pay off for the entire group. If one or members decide to defect, in that they do not contribute to the work of the wider group, the payoff for all will be reduced. For example, if one authority decides not to contribute to the housing need of the combined authority, this may impair their ability to meet their own Objectively Assessed Need within their own boundary lines, while the wider combined authority itself will not be able to maximise its entire land mass to meet the housing need of the 10 districts.

It is clear then that game theory can illustrate how trust and cooperation has emerged within the GMCA and its individual local authorities. Yet these same game theoretical reasoning's for trust and cooperation emerging can also be applied to the lower scale of neighbourhood planning also. As Taylor (1987) argues, the reduction of the state can nurture a space for voluntary cooperation to exist. This appears to be the case at the neighbourhood level, where localism and the introduction of the 'Big Society' has created a legislative space for grassroots participation in planning to occur. By removing the 'need' for the state to govern localised areas, this has created a gap for ordinary citizens to step up and form together to take more ownership of their neighbourhoods. The theory that trust and cooperation emerges (Stewart & Plotkin, 2016) is reinforced by the participants in this study. The majority of surveyed citizens at the micro level of investigation indicated that it was their belief that regular interaction with the other members of their group helped to build trust in one another, and has allowed them to carry their plans forward. Whilst other neighbourhood plans have fallen by the wayside, these groups are still actively carrying on with their respective developing plans.

Previous studies on the iterated interactions between players have most notably been analysed through a Prisoners Dilemma. Players in this game can either cooperate or defect (not cooperate), and highlights the conflict between achieving an outcome that is best for all concerned against the 'rational' pursuit of individual objectives (Fang, et al., 2002). Games of this type modelled by researchers show that, in one-off games, rational players will always choose to defect, as this offers the best individual payoff. Should they cooperate, but the other player(s) defect, they stand to receive the lowest possible payoff. However, the best overall payoff for all players would be received by all participants agreeing to cooperate. In iterated (repeated) instances of this classic game-theoretical parlour game, the literature has shown that, over time, trust emerges and all players choose to cooperate with each other more often than not (Axelrod, 1980). The expectation of further interactions between players in the future creates a change of utility from a one-off game, creating conditions whereby cooperation is the more rational choice between participants (Axelrod, 1980; Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2001). Such a model can be applied to negotiations at the neighbourhood level, and that of local authorities that we have seen in the GMCA.

When individuals have come together at neighbourhood level, the results of the analysis have shown that they come together (and volunteered) for differing reasons. Logically, individuals will all have different outcomes that they want to see in their communities. For example, whilst some participants stated that they wished to limit development in their area, some have joined the forums to influence development that may be necessary within the physical environment, as stated in their respective local authority local plan of the NPPF. Similarly, individuals exhibit different attitudes towards their local councillors, communities and developers. With this, at the first meetings of their forums, it can be envisaged that different ideas will have been discussed as directions in which to take the plan of each individual neighbourhood, and disagreements over such issues will have occurred. Indeed, during the identification of case study areas phase of research, several forums that were contacted replied to inform that they were not currently active. This inactivity had several reasons, such as a lack of time to commit to the plan making programme, but an issue that reared itself several times was a lack of direction of each plan. This was owing to disagreements over what path particular plans should go in, and what individual citizens desired to be the outcome of their efforts. This lack of cooperation can be seen as 'defection' in the classical sense of the Prisoners Dilemma. However, plans that have lasted the course, such as those surveyed, can be seen as iterated games; over time, individuals have come to show increased levels of trust in each other the more and more they have worked together.

This can be confirmed by the results of the contextual questions after the VFI, in which the majority of participants felt that repeated meetings between group members allowed trust to flourish. Trust emerging then, through repeated interactions in this fashion and under no direct pressure from a governmental structure above, appears to hold true to previous research in this area (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Rapoport, 1988). Similar findings are found in meta-surveys on public good games literature (Dawes, 1980; Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995).

7.3 To what extent is the 'Duty to Cooperate' a necessary condition for local authorities to coalesce into a coalition?

Though this question has been explained in the preceding paragraphs, it will be touched upon here. The trust that has been exemplified as emerging in GMCA over sustained interactions between the authorities of Greater Manchester has largely made the use of the Duty to Cooperate redundant between the districts. The use of the GMSF as a joint Development Plan Document between the local authorities effectively replaces the need for the Duty. The GMSF in itself performs as a mechanism that helps to bind the coalition together: all members have to actively contribute to the spatial framework through allocating land for housing and other development projects. In game theoretic terms, this can be seen as another example of an 'assurance contract'. Assurance contracts represent a method of solving the free riding problem in coalitions; all parties agree to contribute to a public good in order for the good to be realised. The GMSF can be seen as this 'good' as all authorities need to fund it for it to be realised.

Rather, the Duty has been identified as a method of providing a paper trail in meetings with authorities outside of the GMCA. It has been rejected in favour of the GMSF within the coalition, but still serves a purpose outside of this environment. It has been established as a way of notarising meetings with authorities outside of the GMCA. Yet the fact that authorities do not have to agree with each other, merely be seen to communicate with each other, and hinders the use of the Duty as a tool in which to foster collaboration between authorities. In its long term guise, the Duty may serve a greater purpose as facilitating communication between combined authorities on a larger sub-regional scale than is present currently. Should the use of combined authorities' increase, with the formation of the North of Tyne Combined Authority suggesting that this may well be the case, the Duty could feasibly play a role in encouraging dialogue between these regions.

7.4 What is the role of leadership in ensuring coalition stability?

Throughout the interviewing process of GM planning representatives, the structure of how the authorities govern themselves was a key theme. The voting structures on key issues, in particular the unanimous system that is in place on issues of spatial strategy, allows for an equal share of power between the districts. Also, as highlighted earlier, the individual responsibilities that each local authority takes on to support the objectives of the wider combined authority ensures that there are no free riders in the coalition, but also that each has a significant lead role to play in the GMCA's remit.

However, collaborations are very rarely, if ever, truly equal (Shmueli, et al., 2008). Indeed, it was admitted by several of the participants that, despite the equal status in the GMCA that all authorities share, that there are leaders in the county. Manchester, and to a lesser degree Salford, emerged as leaders in the coalition, with several testimonies illustrating the central status that these two districts share, a kind of 'first among equals'. To a degree, this can be expected. Located within the geographical centre of the GMCA, these two districts are the traditional business centres and as such are the economic pull of the county. Further to this, Manchester itself is the most high profile of all of the districts, being the biggest urban area with a wealth of cultural, sporting and touristic amenities on offer that its neighbours cannot compete with. As a result, the impression given is that, though all authorities do have a say in the workings of the GMCA, Manchester itself has an unofficial leader's role.

Such a dynamic can be explained in game theoretical terms, and follows previous research carried out in this field. The notion of 'strength of will' (Selten, 1964; McCain, 2008; McCain, 2009a) is a concept in the literature that is related to the level of consistency in decision making that an individual actor can show. The more committed a player is to carrying forward on a chosen path (be that to 'defect' or 'cooperate' in game-theoretic expressions), even in the face of such a course of action being de-incentivised, the stronger their resolve is said to be. This is an important assumption, as it illustrates a way in which a coalition can stay bounded together, even when there may be better options available elsewhere for individual players. In this concept, the presence of strong willed leaders in the group to carry out a particular course of action can inspire loyalty in other members of the group. Through such a notion we see the emergence of leaders, individuals who can bring a coalition of actors together through strength of will:

"Suppose that the population includes individuals both with strong and weak wills, and that some of those with strong wills are honest. How then will coalitions form?

First there will be no mutually beneficial coalitions comprising only the weak willed. Such coalitions would accomplish nothing that would not be accomplished by the non-cooperative equilibrium. The typical coalition, then, will include at least a subset of the strong-willed individuals who adopt threat strategies that encourage the others to keep agreements and correlate their strategies so as to increase the value of the coalition ..." (McCain, 2009b, p. 163).

It can be argued that it is these strong willed types who pull and keep the coalitions together, even when a purely game-theoretic assumption would suggest that the outcome would be interruption to the collaboration. In planning terms this can be identified as:

"an agreement to work together can be reached for a number of reasons, not least of which may be intimidation of the powerless by the powerful, a perception of lack of other choices, or a dispirited lack of motivation to pursue other options" (Shmueli, et al., 2008, p. 361)

In short, it is these leaders who can go on to shape the rules of their coalition to ensure that the group sustains over time, when perhaps logically these collaborations should breakdown.

Now, this is not to say that individual partners in the GMCA should necessarily be viewed as 'strong' or 'weak', at least not in regard to their attitude. In fact, we have seen that individual authorities, outside of Manchester City Council, are willing to exhibit strong willed behaviour. A clear example of this is the posturing of Stockport to walk away from the draft version of the Greater Manchester Spatial Strategy (GMSF). Such actions do not fit with the typology of being a 'weak' willed actor in the coalition. Rather, the terms 'strong' and 'weak' are more befitting of the overall economic positions of the individual districts of the GMCA. Manchester, and to a lesser degree Salford, are at the centre of the GMCA. This is both geographically, but in economic terms too. They are the two districts, home to the two cities that exist within the county, that hold the most sway in terms of economic output (it is notable that it was Salford where the BBC decided to locate their northern headquarters) and in terms of cultural and sporting attractions (Manchester being home to Manchester City FC, with Manchester United being located nearby in Trafford). Such offerings ensure that these areas receive the greatest amount of footfall in terms of both commuters and tourists throughout the year. Meanwhile, other districts, particularly those in the north of the GMCA such as Bury and Rochdale, have lower populations and are seen as being less

culturally attractive than the two cities based in the heart of the region. Here, there is a situation whereby people who live in the outlying districts of GM commute into the city of Manchester for work. This is summed up by a briefing conducted in 2014:

“The net flows patterns for GM authorities can be summarised as follows:

- Manchester, Salford and Trafford all gain workers from authorities inside GM collectively and additionally are net gainers of workers from authorities outside GM.
- Rochdale, Bury and Stockport, gain workers from outside of GM but lose workers to the rest of GM in net terms.
- Tameside, Oldham, Bolton and Wigan are export of workers to other authorities in the conurbation and also net exporters of workers to authorities outside of the conurbation” (New Economy, 2014).

This concentration of economic activity in the centre of the GMCA creates an area where power is focussed around a key area of the combined authority, allowing Manchester in particular to become ever stronger. In this way, as it is the key source of employment, and logically in attracting new employers to locate their business here, Manchester can be seen as being the dominant partner in the coalition. This is not a necessarily new development, as Manchester has pushed itself forward previously (during the inception of Regional Development Agencies in the 1990s) as acting on behalf of the rest of Greater Manchester, and indeed of the North West of England (Deas & Ward, 2002). It can use this elevated status to manoeuvre its own agenda around the coalition. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it can influence joint plans that affect the entire combined authority to be in its favour, as was alluded to in the interviews (“some friction came up last year with the view that everything is centred on the centre, Salford and Manchester” Participant 10). Secondly however, is the realisation that, as a large economic driver not only in the GMCA but England itself, association with Manchester is beneficial for the other constituent members of the GMCA. These two reasons reflect the game-theoretic model of a ‘stronger’ player being able to exert their influence on the rest of the coalition in order to keep the group together.

Yet this is not to say that the other players in the coalition do not have powers themselves. Through a realisation that they need to be in the coalition, albeit seen as ‘weaker’ partners in the sense that they do not have the economic power of the stronger partner (Manchester), they can still influence decisions that occur. This can occur through a tit for

tit approach. Knowing that it is in the best interest of all to keep the coalition together, but particularly important to the 'stronger' player, the other partners in the coalition can take the approach of bargaining with the stronger members of the group to ensure that they will receive a mutual payoff to stay together as part of the grand coalition. Tit for tat posits that players in a game will cooperate with each other on their first interaction, and then will mimic each other's moves thereafter (Axelrod, 1984), and the theory has been championed as being able to provide the basis for cooperation in complex social situations (Martinez Coll & Hirshleifer, 1991; Binmore, 2007). In the case of Greater Manchester, this can be seen vividly. Manchester needs the support of its neighbouring districts as much as they need the coverage that the city can give to them. Knowing this, they are able to wield their own power of sorts, in that they can protest against any decisions that are made at the expense of their own interests. As Manchester influence continues to grow nationally, and across the North of England, it is logical to accept that the central district(s) of the GMCA will be the focus of new development, as corporations seek to locate there, and the council look to lure them in to further boost its economy. With this, they require the assistance of their neighbouring districts to provide land, resources and housing, amongst other services. Yet, if decisions are made in Manchester's favour *at the expense of* its neighbours, then these other boroughs may choose to be uncooperative – tit for tat. Evidence of such tactics can be seen by movements by Stockport council in 2017, threatening to leave the GMSF, a decision that would have derailed the entire development plan had it come to fruition. Indeed, other councils including Oldham were said to have been considering their position in the plan owing to its controversial plan for housing in some areas (Fitzgerald, 2017).

The 'grand coalition' of the GMCA then appears to be relatively stable, especially when compared to other combined authorities around the country. The game-theoretic concepts that have been discussed mirror the situation within the GMCA. The presence of a leader, in this case Manchester, acts as the 'strong' partner in the coalition that helps to bind the group together. A coalition of the rest of the authorities together would, in McCain's words, "accomplish nothing that would not be accomplished by the non-cooperative equilibrium" (2009b, p. 163). They simply do not have the popular or economic pull that Manchester does. However, as much as this may be, Manchester could not grow as much as it has without the cooperation of its neighbouring boroughs, in terms of providing a workforce, resources and land. These 'weaker' partners as such do wield a share of power that helps to keep the coalition in check, and as such, stable.

7.5 What are the behavioural dynamics that explain community participation in planning, and why do those who volunteer in neighbourhood planning choose to do so?

As would be expected, the analysis of the neighbourhood planning forums uncovered extensively why people choose to volunteer in this activity. The Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) set out to uncover the intrinsic human motivations that drive citizens to become involved in plan writing at the community level. Though in its normal guise a rather abstract approach to investigating prompts to voluntarism, the VFI was edited so that it spoke more to this very unique form of citizen participation. The six categories of the VFI – Career, Social, Enhancement, Protection, Understanding and Values – were explored across all of the case studies, and were reinforced with more bespoke planning-centric questions. His approach allowed the research to shed as much light as possible on reasons for citizens engaging in this activity, and how they conducted their business of writing their actual plan.

The results of the VFI appear to directly relate with the results of other studies that have used this approach to measuring voluntarism. The present study found that, overwhelmingly, the Values category was the key driver in attracting citizens to volunteer in neighbourhood planning, with Understanding being a consistent secondary driver across all of the groups surveyed. The Values motive is associated with those traits that allow citizens to express their altruistic and humanitarian values for the greater good, in this case for benefit of their community. The Understanding category is related to issues of allowing people to gain further knowledge about a particular subject (in this case, planning and citizens respective home environment) and to learn new skills. It is imperative to note at this point that, as the analysis in the previous chapter illustrates, the age demographic of those citizens involved in neighbourhood planning is overwhelmingly older than in other forms of voluntarism e.g. student clubs, sporting enterprises. Voluntarism takes many forms, and can appeal to a wide range of different groups based on gender, age or religion. That neighbourhood planning is predominantly attractive to older age groups, with perhaps more time on their hands in which to carry out this hefty piece of work, influences where this research sits in the wider field of voluntarism literature.

Previous research on voluntarism using the VFI in older populations appears to echo the findings of this current study. Brayley et al. (2014) found that, using a modified VFI, Values was the most powerful driver in motivating retirees to volunteer. The authors replaced the

Career function with that of 'Continuity', a category that examined the concept of continuity of work into peoples retired years. This function itself was itself a high scorer in terms of motivating people to volunteer. This seems intuitive, as following retirement, a large section of the retire community look to fill their time with activities to keep themselves active, with some even deciding to go back to work. In other research, Okun et al. (1998) found that career motivations decrease with age, but feelings of being useful in society increase. Further studies have focussed on the motivations of elder citizens volunteering in intergenerational programmes. Stergios & Carruthers (2002), using a sample of volunteers between the ages of 57 to 85 volunteering with children of primary school age, found that the three strongest motivations of these participants were Values, Social and Enhancement. Participants in this study described wanting to make a contribution to youth activities and of feeling connected to others as drivers for volunteering in this setting. The high scoring performance of Values in this sample of elder volunteers is consistent with this present study.

Within the wider scope of voluntarism research, the findings of this current study remains consistent with earlier studies. In a study of elder citizens who were trained in supporting and assisting their neighbours, Morrow-Howell and Mui (1989) implemented a qualitative approach to understand reasons for becoming involved with and enduring with this volunteer role. They reported the female volunteers stated altruistic and social reasons for involvement with the scheme, whilst male volunteers reported strong altruistic motives only for their participation. Altruism speaks directly to the notions of humanitarianism and responsibility to others that the Values function in the VFI represents, and appears to be consistent in explaining a key driver in elderly voluntarism. In a similar vein, Okun and Eisenberg (1992) researched elderly volunteers living in a retirement community, whose voluntary work was concerned with assisting with their fellow elderly neighbours. The authors report that the main drivers for voluntarism in this context among the participants were understanding and acquiring new skills, empathy for helping others, and meeting the needs of others. Again, these reasons speak directly to the VFI function of Values and Understanding, the two highest scoring motives in this current research. Again, this illustrates that this work is consistent with earlier findings in voluntarism amongst older communities.

The consistent low scores achieved by the Career factor in this research are coherent with previous studies that have shown that career-led reasons for volunteering decrease as the

age of the volunteer increases. Okun et al. (1998) found that career motivations in various volunteer schemes decrease with age. In other research by Okun and Schultz (2003), the Career and Understanding motives decrease in participants taking part in a global humanitarian charity, but Social and Values categories again increase as the strongest motivators. Studies in voluntarism in youth literacy programmes by middle age populations have revealed that Values and Understanding are the biggest driver behind citizen participation in this form of volunteering (Schmiesing, et al., 2005). The authors found that Career and Protective functions to be weak motivators for this activity.

Though the current study is, to the researcher's knowledge, the first such investigation to use the VFI in the context of neighbourhood planning, it is clear that the results are consistent with previous research in the field of voluntarism. As reported in a review of voluntarism literature, Maley et al. (2015), the VFI has been used with a variety of populations to understand the drivers of motivation to volunteer, and to continue in this role. Values has, consistently, been the most commonly reported motivator across a wide array of studies. In particular regard to voluntarism in older generations, this is certainly true, and is consistent with the findings of voluntarism of the majority of participants in neighbourhood planning forums included in this study.

7.6 To what extent does a sense of place attachment drive community participation at the neighbourhood level?

Linked to the findings of the VFI is the notion of place attachment. The analysis of the VFI found the Values category to be the most important inherent driver for voluntarism in neighbourhood planning. This category is tied closely to feelings of place attachment; the 5 questions that make up this category are closely associated with the places and peoples whom the volunteers are serving e.g. "I am genuinely concerned about the particular group I am serving" and "I feel compassion toward the people I serve". That citizens are interested in helping out the community that they live in is unsurprising, and this fits with previous research in this field. As Maley et al. (2015) comment, Values is consistently cited as being the key driver in volunteers that drove them to become involved in their respective activities in the first place.

The findings of this research suggest that place attachment is an overwhelming influence on whether or not citizens choose to volunteer. This is particularly indicative in this planning-situated form of voluntarism. The data gathered from the VFI on this subject is reinforced

by the planning-specific responses that were gathered from participants. This finding has profound effects on how neighbourhood planning can function across the country, and may go some way to explaining the geographical differences in neighbourhood planning activity across England. It is noted in the literature that substantial dissimilarities exist in terms of the scope, role and support that the voluntary sector receives across different national settings (Milligan, 2007). Milligan comments that whilst structural mechanisms can influence the level of voluntary activity across national, regional and local government scales, voluntary action can also be cultivated at the local level, based on specific needs that respective areas have. Neighbourhood planning is a direct nod to this theory. At the intra-national scale, researchers have uncovered a host of influences that have been vital in shaping the relationships between people, place, voluntarism and its spatial distribution. Firstly, variations in the type and level of need for voluntary action create differing pressures that can prompt this type of action, yet this action can become skewed away from areas that are most directly in need (Wolch & Geiger, 1983; Fyfe & Milligan, 2003b). Secondly, it has been highlighted how variations in culture and socio-economic conditions affect citizen willingness and ability to become involved in voluntary activity (Regulska, 1999; Milligan, 2001). Thirdly, a history of voluntary activity across different regions can lead to an uneven geographical spread in voluntarism that is less concerned with the contemporary need to this type of activity and is related more to the local tradition of voluntarism (Powell, 1992; Mohan & Gorsky, 2001; Bryson, et al., 2002).

In addition to the influences detailed above, it has also been noted that accessibility to voluntary organisations has an impact upon citizen uptake in voluntarism. In a study of Glasgow, Milligan and Fyfe comment on how access to voluntary centres can have a direct impact on voluntary activity, and that organisations situated within reasonable distance of key infrastructure in the city can utilise volunteer resources more effectively (Milligan & Fyfe, 2004). Furthermore, temporal changes in local policy that either target or remove assets from local communities has been shown to contribute to spatial inequalities of voluntary provision (Turok & Hopkins, 1998).

Yet, in the midst of all of this literature on voluntarism, a gap in the theory appears to exist. Whilst all of the literature highlighted above highlights the differences in geographical spread in voluntarism, and the structural barriers that exist to this activity, it does not address the issue of how place attachment can *drive* people to volunteer. Other research has touched upon how place attachment can alter people's perceptions of their locality, and

seek to theoretically contribute to solutions of local environmental problems (Kudryavtsev, et al., 2012). Walker and Chapman (2003) meanwhile have investigated intentions to volunteer in parks. A survey of 258 visitors to a park was conducted by the authors, who found that sense of place attachment had a positive impact on people's intention to volunteer.

Yet, after an exhaustive look into the literature, there appears to be a gap that this current research will fill. The concept of place attachment in motivating citizens to volunteer for a cause in their community is still relatively under researched, and it is on this idea that the VFI has uncovered some interesting patterns. More precisely, the use of the VFI in this study has shown that place attachment is one of the key drivers in recruiting volunteers to become involved in neighbourhood planning. The inception of this voluntarism measurement scale has allowed this research to provide a fresh angle on who is currently involved with neighbourhood planning. The contextual planning questions that were included alongside the VFI reinforce this finding. As the analysis illustrates, citizens were less likely to volunteer to assist in neighbourhood planning forums that were set up outside of their own locality. In addition to this, a large majority of the participants responded that they were happy to volunteer their time to their close community. These findings dovetail with the results of the VFI, illustrating that the strength of attachment that communities feel for their local area is a key driver in motivating them to volunteer for the service of said area.

7.7 To what extent does the composition of neighbourhood planning forums accord to the perception that they are skewed towards communities who are defending against unwanted development?

Though this research found mixed results with regard to NIMBYism, its presence in the literature regarding neighbourhood planning means that it is worthwhile discussing what this investigation uncovered in this regard, and how this sits with previous research on the topic. Neighbourhood planning has been described as a 'NIMBYs charter' (O'Connor, 2010), yet the results of this survey have found that this may not necessarily be the case. Neighbourhood plans occur in all different types of area, be they rural or urban, rich or poor, and are constructed by groups with differing ideas. Indeed, the plethora of different neighbourhood plans that have been developed make the assumption that they are a charter for citizens to defend their areas against unwanted development dubious at the very least.

The overwhelming reason that citizens in this study noted as driving their voluntarism is that of Values. As mentioned earlier, this is concerned with altruistic acts offered for the benefit of others, but is also grounded in notions of place attachment. People write plans to better serve the community that they live in rather than rely on the wider state (at this level, local authorities) to manage the development of their community. From this point of view, it can be deduced that there is potential for citizens to desire a home that is untainted by large developments. There are countless instances of local communities protesting against large-scale developments being built near their neighbourhoods, be they new housing estates, factories or waste facilities. Such moves can be seen as defensive, particularly when they are made in direct opposition to developments that are central to national economic objectives. Yet the theory for neighbourhood planning, as a political and legislative mechanism, being used to be inherently defensive by citizens is not universally supported by the findings of this research. Though some participants did concede that they had joined their neighbourhood planning forum to defend their area from outside development, a greater majority responded that they would rather have an input into where this development is situated, and how it can be incorporated into their respective localities in the most appropriate way.

Opposition to development at the local level is certainly not a new finding (Clifford & Warren, 2005), with the inclination to categorise such opposition as being due to self-interest (Sturzaker & Shaw, 2015). Yet several studies have shown that opposition to development, though in part driven by self-interest, is also borne of a mistrust of institutions, a duty to challenge unsuitable development and to challenge the perceived 'democratic deficit' in planning decisions (Ellis, 2004; Bell, et al., 2005; Sturzaker, 2011). Furthermore, it has been argued that a more community-led approach to planning can lead to a reduction in opposition levels in development (Parker, et al., 2010).

The results of this current investigation appear to support the idea that categorising neighbourhood planning as a simply defensive technique is a simplification. Rather, the landscape is a lot more complex than this. Whilst some participants responded that they were interested in limiting development, a greater majority declared that they wanted to have a say on what this development would look like. This is in fitting with existing research in this area. Sturzaker and Shaw (2015) found that in their case study of the Upper Eden Neighbourhood Development Plan (UENDP), the community were actively pursuing new housing development in their area. Elsewhere, Parker et al. (2014) found that a majority of

respondents in their 120 participant survey were driven to become involved in neighbourhood planning to have a greater say in how development in their area was to be completed, rather than in direct opposition to it, and that they were actively seeking to allocate sites in their area for housing development specifically.

The use of the VFI, in conjunction with the added contextual questions, has allowed this research to add to the literature on whether or not neighbourhood planning can be considered another tool for 'NIMBYs' to further defend their areas from potential development. The biggest motivational factors for participation in neighbourhood planning have been found to be Values (a way to express altruistic and humanitarian ideals) and Understanding (gaining knowledge and skills). From this, it can be interpreted that citizens are interested in looking after their own communities and physical environment and wanting to learn more about the planning system. Coupled with the decreasing levels of openness that forums responded as having towards council planners and developers, this would appear to point to NIMBYism as a driver in participation in the plan. Yet, the results are not as clear cut as this. Though levels of openness to council planners and developers did decrease when compared to levels of input being welcomed by the local community, the majority of participants still reported that they felt that their respective forums were welcoming of input from planners and developers. Added to this, that a majority of participants reported that they were a part of the forum to influence rather than to stop development indicates that they are not only welcoming of *appropriate* development in their community, but understand that the role of the neighbourhood plan is to facilitate local and national growth instead of flatly denying it.

7.8 Summary

This discussion then has shown that, at both levels, there are a myriad of factors that allow coalitions to flourish in the contemporary planning system. At local authority level, the emergence of trust through repeated interactions is a central tenet of any successful coalition. The authorities of Greater Manchester are a clear example of this, so much so that other regional and national scale partnerships are looking to adopt the model that has been fostered in the GMCA. The adoption of this template by the Northern Powerhouse is a direct nod to this. The strength of the coalition is also elevated by a leader of sorts within the group, in this case Manchester. As the most high profile of the authorities, Manchester has assumed a place of 'first among' equals among the group, and as such can be seen to influence

development in the wider area. Yet this is not to say that the other councils are powerless. Rather, they help to bind the coalition together by each having responsibility for key resources across the GMCA. These responsibilities act as 'assurance contracts', ensuring that there are no free riders in the partnership and that all parties have to pull their weight in order to keep cooperation between partners.

With regard to the neighbourhood level, this research has filled a gap in the literature by establishing the inherent drivers to voluntarism in this very formal setting of legislative plan writing. The importance of gaining an understanding of planning and the social and political issues that surrounds it, in addition to an altruistic motivation to serve the community, are the fundamental catalysts that drive citizens to participate in plan writing. Linked to this is the importance of place attachment to voluntarism. Whilst previous research has outlined the geographical imbalances of voluntarism, and how historical approaches to this activity can affect it, there has to the researcher's knowledge been no firm investigation as to how place attachment can drive citizens to volunteer. Furthermore, this research has been the first to apply the VFI to the realm of urban planning, and has shown how effective this toolkit can be in assessing why citizens participate. As the notion of voluntarism is so key to the success of this government project, with a belief that citizens do want to participate in planning, understanding the motivations that lie behind this activity are of crucial importance. This is a concept that this current study has started to answer.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

8.1 Summary

This thesis has provided insights into how the new forms of governance that we see in action today in the English planning system, and specifically the coalitions that allow the system to function, are faring. Through an experimental research methodology, the research has looked at how two levels of this 'new' planning system are operating. Firstly, at the macro scale, the investigation has illustrated the importance of trust between local authorities in the absence of a regional governing body. This trust has emerged over time, through repeated interactions (repeated games in game theoretic language) going back decades. Thus trust has been fostered through both informal and formal arrangements, with the voluntarily set up AGMA morphing into the more official operation of the GMCA that we see in practice in Greater Manchester today. The emergence of a leader over this time has also been examined, with Manchester recognised as being the most high profile local authority of all within the coalition. Yet this is not to say that this district is all conquering; rather, each authority appears to hold a relatively equal status in the grand coalition, with various instruments and responsibilities that each hold acting as 'assurance' mechanisms that no one authority will either 'free ride through the process of cooperation, nor will one truly dominate the others. Though Manchester has emerged as the most high profile amongst all ten of the constituent parties of the GMCA, it is recognised that it needs the other authorities in order to achieve its economic aims just as much as the others need it.

Secondly, at the micro scale of research, the use of the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) has allowed this investigation to uncover the driving forces that draw people to volunteer in the neighbourhood plan setting. The results of the VFI have been enriched by further contextual questioning of respondents in the neighbourhood plan setting to achieve a more holistic understanding of why people volunteer in this area of planning. Motivations, both personally inherent to each individual and their planning aims and objectives for their work, have been extricated using this experimental method, and has started the relatively untapped research topic of motivation to volunteer in the neighbourhood plan arena. This is an essential discussion to be had, as without a plentiful supply of citizens willing to become involved in this activity, this stratagem laid down by central government is doomed to fail. Understanding why citizens participate in this setting is essential for policymakers in order to ensure that this does not become a short term policy approach to development at the micro scale.

8.2 Conceptual contributions

This thesis has found a gap in the literature of local and community governance, and has attempted to fill this through an experimental approach to data analysis. Firstly, the literature review assessed the main theories of urban governance, namely Urban Growth Machines (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987), Urban Regime Theory (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989) and Communicative Planning Theory (Innes, 1995; Healey, 1997). A detailed account of how these theories have accounted for urban governance in the major cities of the world has been presented. Though they have undoubtedly helped to inform researchers and practitioners alike in how cities manage and develop themselves, their methodological inadequacies have been highlighted. All three theories are decidedly normative in nature; they describe how cooperation and coalition can be achieved between parties of different interests, but do so in a very idealistic fashion. They are unable to account for individualistic behavioural traits in actors who are part of any given coalition. The descriptive standpoint that both theses adopt regarding the subject of coalition formation is useful in so much that they prescribe that urban elites should come together to foster growth in their area. Yet they fall down in that little attention is paid to the actual behaviours of the individual components of groups that are formed. The heavily US-centric approach to urban politics that these two schools of thought take, embedded in a system that is radically different to that of England, also limits their power of explanation of how cooperation is fostered in the urban management setting that this current research is embedded. Such criticism of these ideologies have are not limited to this research (Shaw, 1993; Wood, 1996; Pierre, 2014; Davies, 2002b).

Similarly, communicative planning has its pitfalls. A major criticism levelled at it is that it does not take into account self-interest. Self-interest, as detailed by Allmendinger (2009) is always a possibility when individual actors are called together to engage in cooperative action. Communicative action seeks to achieve outcomes through discourse that is free from domination, individual strategizing and all parties being free and equal to express their opinion. This is a very utopian viewpoint and, though admirable, is not something that can be realistically achieved in any joint action or communication between parties in any sphere, let alone planning. In the planning context, different groups will almost always have differing ideas and agendas for being a part of a coalition. Public actors will look to act in the interest of their constituents who have voted them into power, whilst private groups can have a plethora of interests, whether that be building new developments in certain areas over others, or maximising profits through various differing schemes. At a micro level, members

of community action groups, which neighbourhood planning groups can fall into, may have differing agendas for what they want their group to achieve; this may be to stop development in their area, whilst others may seek to actively promote it to increase the profile of their locality. All in all, these differing agendas and motivations for forming collaborative working partnerships restrict the use of communicative action as a lens through which to study new forms of urban governance.

Against this then, a space has been created in the sphere of urban planning research to devise new ways of assessing how coalitions of actors come together at both the macro and micro scale. It is this space that has spurred this thesis to look to experimental methodologies to further understand the behavioural traits of coalitions at these two, very different scales. Behavioural economics, and one its essential tool kits of game theory have allowed this research to fill this gap at the local level. By using a qualitative approach of interviewing experts in the field of local planning, informed by the language of behavioural game theory, this research has unearthed particular traits that are common in the definitive example of continued and stable collaborative working; Greater Manchester. This research has viewed each of the authorities that make up the GMCA as individual actors, or *players* in game theoretic language, to assess how they interact with each other, and how cooperation has continued in the absence of a central government intervention. This research has illustrated how, when local authorities are allowed to govern themselves at the local scale, then the need for central mechanisms are made somewhat redundant. Though the Duty to Cooperate has been evidenced as providing a paper trail for negotiations between individual authorities, its importance has been superseded by the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework (GMSF), a Development Plan Document (DPD) managed locally by the GMCA with input from all 10 constituent authorities.

That the GMCA has emerged at all as the first combined authority of its kind is based upon the long term success of its intra-district partnership working. Such working is evidenced by the formation of AGMA after the abolition of the Greater Manchester County Council, a voluntary arrangement that has endured and been superseded by the GMCA. This thesis has been able to garner further insight into the behavioural traits that have made this long term partnership succeed over the passing decades, and how it has stabilised over this time. Using behavioural economics as the informing school of thought, data collection through interview analysis has unearthed how trust has been built up over time and through repeated interactions with each other. The structure of the GMCA, and indeed of AGMA before it, has

ensured that there are no free riders or dominant partners in this coalition. The joint task forces that were alluded to in interview testimony as being a central tenet of AGMA are an example of 'assurance contracts' between players in the grand coalition of all authorities. All authorities had to fund these task forces, and as a payoff, all had access to the resources and services they provide. Such 'assurances' have been carried over to the GMCA, with each authority being responsible for key services and departments within the GMCA. These responsibilities serve two purposes. Firstly, it limits the chances of authorities trying to 'free ride' as part of the coalition, as they all have to contribute a service that the rest of the coalition to use. Failure to do so may result in penalties being put upon the offending player. Secondly, this situation also creates a situation whereby no individual actor (authority) should gain total dominance over the group. Each authority has something to offer to the grand coalition, ensuring that all members have a voice in issues that cut across the entire combined authority.

In a similar vein, all authorities appear to understand that they cannot improve their individual payoff by opting out of the coalition, as they all rely on each other to achieve the maximum payoff possible for the combined authority (that is, economic development across the entire area). Such a finding has been possible through viewing the coalition through the lens of cooperative game theory. The core of a cooperative game dictates that there exists no feasible set of payoffs that would detract than that of the grand coalition (Binmore, 2007; McCain, 2015). The core forms the best set of payoffs for all involved whereby all players would be served no better by leaving the grand coalition, or by setting up a smaller coalition. Such a situation is apparent in Greater Manchester, despite dissimilarities amongst the individual authorities. Though Manchester has been cast as the leader of the group, there is an understanding that it requires the entire group in order for it to maintain its economic growth. Conversely, the other authorities are able to benefit from the high profile of being associated with Manchester in order to develop their own area. Indeed, it is only through this successful coalition that the GMCA has been formed here before anywhere else in England in the first place. Using the language of game theory has allowed this research to demonstrate how his working pattern has formed and stabilised over time. It is clear from this investigation that structures are required to be in place in successful coalitions that give all players a fair payoff *relative* to the situation that they find themselves situated. In this case, Manchester itself as a local authority may appear to receive more publicity and resources as part of the combined authority, yet all of the individual authorities benefit from this to receive their own payoff.

The behavioural science approach has also allowed this thesis to fill a gap in the literature on what drives individual citizens to participate in neighbourhood planning. Though previous research has found that the appeal of creating a plan is a stimulus for an uptake of the policy (Parker, 2017) and wishing to address local issues (PAS, 2015), there has been little investigation into what the inherent, personal reasons are for volunteering. Volunteering has been an area that is much studied across academia, so much so that there are entire journals dedicated to this area (Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly is just one of a number of journals in this field). Yet there has been no active engagement with personal reasoning for citizen planning in relation to neighbourhood planning in England. This thesis fills that gap.

By using the VFI, a widely used survey in various voluntarism backgrounds such as sports coaching (Busser & Carruthers, 2010), school based mentoring (Caldarella, et al., 2010), voluntarism in college students (Francis, 2011; Gage III & Thapa, 2012) and charitable organisations (Hager, 2011), this thesis has applied a trusted instrument in a new context. That personal motivators for voluntarism has not been tested in this way in the context of neighbourhood planning is not surprising. It is still a relatively new policy, having only been initiated in 2011. Regardless of this however, this is a gap that has been in need of bridging. The success or failure of neighbourhood planning will rest on the motivation of citizens to give up their time in order to write their respective plan. The importance of this should not be understated. With the stripping away of public spending that we have witnessed across the country, owing to the hangover from the 2008 global financial crisis, public funds have been ebbed away. Local authorities are having to tighten the purse strings and direct spending a very calculated way. Public services have been cut hastily, and it is common to witness newspaper headlines bemoaning the stripping away of public spending. Indeed, the 2018 Budget saw announcements for further cutbacks on spending across a range of services (Campbell, 2018).

Such a predicament creates space for citizens to rise to the task of creating plans that will inform how their local area will develop over the coming decades. Understanding what motivates people to become involved in this area of legislation then is vital. This research has found that strong altruistic feelings towards ones community, a desire to further understand the planning system and how it affects local communities, and strong senses of place attachment are the central drivers that have motivated existing citizen planners to become involved in this movement. Such findings are testament to the robustness of the

VFI, and reflect how this instrument can be used in a non-traditional voluntarist exercise. The contextual questions that were added to the VFI have without doubt allowed the main body of the survey to flourish in its objectives, further embedding it into the planning literature.

This research can help to inform policy at both levels. This study has shown that the model that Greater Manchester is using is working. Though there may be disputes between authorities, Manchester is certainly not alone in this. Owing to the nature of politics, disagreement can occur over a plethora of items. Yet Greater Manchester appears to be in as stable a condition as ever. That it is seen as the model for the Northern Powerhouse is testament to its success. The structures in place that enable trust to flourish, and give responsibility to individual districts for services that all in the coalition require, can be applied elsewhere. The methodology used in this study would allow researchers to assess whether similar models would bring about stability in city regions elsewhere in England. With regard to neighbourhood planning, the finding of this research can inform policymakers who are interested in increasing neighbourhood planning activity more evenly across the country. As has been noted, the geographical spread of neighbourhood planning is particularly uneven, with some counties reporting hundreds of plan applications (Cornwall and Wiltshire), whilst others have had little to no applications at all. In order to address this, the findings of this study can inform campaigns aimed at increasing participation. It is clear that the demographic groups most active in this activity are older, mostly retired. Promoting neighbourhood planning as a continuation of employment, but in a far less formal manner, may be a tactic that can encourage numbers in areas that are currently dormant.

8.3 Reflections on the research

Of course, no research can be seen to be absolutely perfect. The constant to-ing and fro-ing in academia, of critiques of work and critiques of critiques, is testament to this, and certainly this thesis is not exempt from this. Firstly, at the local authority level, the investigation was unable to consult with all ten districts of GMCA, Oldham being the noticeable exception. Though attaining the views of representatives from the other 9 authorities of the GMCA, and a representative of the central governing body itself, the research would have benefitted from being able to discuss the topic of the GMCA with all 10 districts. This would have given the investigation a truly holistic approach. Though none of the participants suggested that there were any particular issues regarding Oldham (indeed, this district came

across rather as a 'silent partner', with no real disputes with either the GMCA or its partner authorities mentioned by interviewees), it will not be known, certainly in this investigation, what the approach in Oldham was towards the GMCA.

The timing of the data collection of this research, tough impossible to predict, came at a point in time before the GMSF's publication was delayed. In July, the Office for National Statistics announced that population growth predictions for Greater Manchester were less than originally expected, prompting Mayor Andy Burnham to announce that the publication of the GMSF would be deferred until October. This was to allow for the full picture of the city region's housing need to be assessed. The ONS figures feed in to the Government's Sub National Housing Projections, which were released in September, weeks before the close of this research. Previously, Greater Manchester was working on a plan based on a figure of 211,000 homes needed over a 20-year period. Yet based on the changes to population predictions, the number of homes Greater Manchester is now understood to need to deliver is around 154,000. In light of this, some council members have questioned whether or not these housing figures should be altered, stating that a lower target of housing numbers is not conducive to sustained development across the combined authority.

Finally, owing to the nature of geographical activity in neighbourhood planning, the research was unable to use the optimum number of case studies for this research. The original aim had been to sample one rural and one urban neighbourhood planning forum/town council from the 8 Core City regions of England, plus London. This would have resulted in 18 neighbourhood plans being assessed. Yet inactivity in some areas of the country, as well as a lack of correspondence with some neighbourhood planning groups in other areas meant that this was figure was unattainable. For example, at the time of data collection, there had been very little activity in the North East areas surrounding Newcastle. This resulted in Whitburn being the only forum being used as a case study for this city in the study.

8.4 Further research

However, the limitations commented on above should not detract from what this research has uncovered. As has been mentioned, this has been an experimental investigation into the behavioural traits of actors who operate at the lowest levels of the form of planning governance that we see now in the contemporary English planning system. As such, this opens up several routes that future research can take.

Firstly, in the light of recent updates to the GMSF, it is proposed that studies can be taken to understand how the temporary breakdown of the GMSFs implementation has affected the working relationships of those members of the GMCA. The GMSF is a key project that binds the local authorities together. It is one of the core activities that has led to the formal establishment of the GMCA in the first place. Using the behavioural science template that this research has implemented, future research should look to understand whether or not the cooperation between the authorities of Greater Manchester has been undermined by what has been a crucial delay, and the disputes that it has caused between the individual parties.

The template of this present investigation can also be lifted to assess the behavioural traits of other collaborative organisations across the country. Several combined authorities are now in action in England, notably in Merseyside (Liverpool City Region Combined Authority) and the West Midlands (West Midlands Combined Authority). The insights that behavioural economics have given to this investigation in Greater Manchester can be applied elsewhere to find out how these comparable combined authorities function. More pertinently, the methodological framework can be used to assess whether the structures that are in place elsewhere, whatever they may look like, are conducive to stable and sustained partnership working, or whether these areas can stand to benefit from adopting the Manchester model of an unofficial leader and responsibilities being dispersed among all constituent authorities to act as 'assurance contracts' that bind the coalition together.

Finally, at the neighbourhood level, so much more is yet to be learned regarding why people choose to participate in this level of planning. Whilst this research has been focussed around the major urban areas of England, it may be beneficial for future research to focus on neighbourhood planning 'hotbeds' such as Wiltshire and Cornwall, counties that have seen a massive uptake in this policy. What makes these areas so popular for neighbourhood planning? Is there a particular drive from local authorities to utilise this policy? Or is there more of an inherent motivation from residents to partake in this activity? And what drives this. Conversely, as this research has alluded to, some areas of England have saw little to no activity in neighbourhood planning. Does this come from a lack of activity from each local authority in these areas, or is there an inherent ambivalence from residents to take the future of their neighbourhood into their own hands at a time when this form of citizen participation is being actively encouraged? Whilst this thesis has started to enlighten on why

residents are volunteering their time towards their communities through legislative action. There remains plenty more scope for investigation in this area.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Ethics forms for Local Planning Authority Research

Participant Information Sheet

The UK experiment with self-organisation in urban planning

You are being invited to participate in a research study into the newer forms of urban governance that have emerged in the UK over the past 20 years. Before you decide whether to take part in this research, it is important that you understand why the research is being conducted. Please take the time to read the following description of the research so that you are fully aware of the research aims. I would like to stress that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to take part in it if you want to.

Many thanks for reading this.

Purpose of the study

This research is investigating the newer forms of urban governance that have become more prevalent in the UK over the last 15 years. Such bottom-up forms of governance have gradually been recognised in addressing the shortcomings of the traditional centralised model that had been in place in the UK since the end of the Second World War. In particular, the three mechanism that are at the core of the research are:

- Neighbourhood Planning
- The Duty to Cooperate between Local Authorities

Consequently, a part of this research is chiefly concerned with how local communities have looked to work together to manage and improve their own respective areas through neighbourhood planning. The research is looking to ascertain what exactly it is that motivates communities to volunteer their time in order to have a greater say in how their neighbourhoods are managed. The method we are using to measure levels of voluntarism within different groups is the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), a theory devised by Clary and Snyder in the US in the 1990s. This tool assesses the motivations behind why various people choose to volunteer their time for a common cause.

Why have I been chosen to take part?

With your help, we hope to be able to answer some of these questions in order to attain a key insight into how groups of actors at all three scales identified above behave in relation to each other when they come together through a legislative body to administer urban policy. As a group of volunteers who have come together to take responsibility of a neighbourhood plan, you play a crucial role in the planning process in your area. It is the focus of the research to uncover how this coalition of actors have come together to effect change in your locality, why they have come together, and what conditions may be present that drive volunteers to come together to effect change, and we believe that your insights would prove invaluable to the research.

Do I have to take part?

Participation in the study is purely voluntary. You should only agree to take part in the study if you wish to. Furthermore, should you wish for your input to be removed from the study at any time, this will be carried out on your behalf without any disadvantages being incurred or explanation being sought.

What will happen if I take part?

We are looking to conduct a short survey with several neighbourhood forums in order to elicit what exactly are the motivations for people to come together and volunteer their time for the cause of a neighbourhood plan. In order to make this easier for all, it would be great if I were able to come along to a forum meeting in order to discuss aspects of neighbourhood planning. The survey would be quite short (10-15 minutes to complete in its entirety) and is PowerPoint based, so there is no need for pens and paper. Answers are submitted using small remote control devices (I will provide these) and answers are collected anonymously. The only identifier used in the research will be the name of the Neighbourhood forum, no individual member names will be published. I would also be happy to stay around and answer any questions regarding the research with forum members at that time.

What if I am unhappy or there is a problem?

If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let me know by contacting John Farrell on 07903397342 and we will try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to myself with then you should contact the Research Governance Officer at ethics@liv.ac.uk. When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researcher(s) involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make.

Will my participation be kept confidential?

All names and organisations will be anonymised throughout the process. I, as principal investigator, will be the only person with access to the data collected. The data will be stored on the University of Liverpool's secure internal drive for a period of up to 6 months, after which it will be permanently deleted from the drive.

What will happen to the results of the study?

Results garnered from the data will be published in the main thesis that will form the crux of this PhD research. Some results may also be applied to a number of papers that will be submitted to academic journals and conferences. Participants will remain anonymised through this process, and as such will not be identifiable from the results.

Who can I contact if I have further questions?

Any further questions about the research should be forwarded to John Farrell:

Tel: 07903397342

Email: j.c.farrell@liv.ac.uk

Signed: _____

Date:

Thank you for your time

Committee on Research Ethics

Participant Consent Form

The UK experiment with self-organisation in urban planning

John Farrell

1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet dated [] for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my rights being affected. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.
3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act, I can at any time ask for access to the information I provide and I can also request the destruction of that information if I wish.
4. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.

☐☐☐☐☐

Participant Name

Date

Signature

Researcher

Date

Signature

Principal Investigator:

Name: John Farrell

Work Address: Roxby Building, University of Liverpool, 74 Bedford St S, Liverpool, L69 7ZT

Work Telephone: 07903397342

Work Email: j.c.farrell@liv.ac.uk

Appendix 2 – Ethics forms for Local Planning Authority Research

Participant Information Sheet

The UK experiment with self-organisation in urban planning

You are being invited to participate in a research study into the newer forms of urban governance that have emerged in the UK over the past 20 years. Before you decide whether to take part in this research, it is important that you understand why the research is being conducted. Please take the time to read the following description of the research so that you are fully aware of the research aims. I would like to stress that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to take part in it if you want to.

Many thanks for reading this.

Purpose of the study

This research is investigating the newer forms of urban governance that have become more prevalent in the UK over the last 15 years. Such bottom-up forms of governance have gradually been recognised in addressing the shortcomings of the traditional centralised model that had been in place in the UK since the end of the Second World War. In particular, the three mechanisms that are at the core of the research are:

- Neighbourhood Planning
- The Duty to Cooperate between Local Authorities

The aim of this research is to investigate exactly how such coalitions come together in the first place, how they are sustained and whether or not there are particular conditions required for the coalition to remain stable i.e. are incentives required to guard against individual parties leaving the overall partnership? This will be carried out using interviews that will be informed by game theory, the toolkit of information economics. Game theory has been used in many disciplines such as politics, biology and economics to study conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers. Though this investigation will not incorporate the full mathematical underpinnings and experimental techniques that behavioural game theory can incorporate, it will nevertheless draw from some of the

assumptions that game theory makes with regards to how coalitions operate. For example, questions to be addressed include:

- How does the coalition first come to be?
- Is there a first mover in the process, or a group recognition of the need for partnership working?
- Are there other essential ingredients needed for the formation of a stable coalition?
- What keeps the coalition together? Are there particular incentives for the parties to remain together, or potential penalties for those who show a desire to leave?

Why have I been chosen to take part?

With your help, we hope to be able to answer some of these questions in order to attain a key insight into how groups of actors at all three scales identified above behave in relation to each other when they come together through a legislative body to administer urban policy. As a key member of a local planning authority, you play a crucial role in working with both the public and other local authorities, as well as other interests. It is primarily the work that is undertaken between various authorities that this part of the research is invested in, and we believe that the research will be able to learn more about relations between local authorities, particularly under the Duty to Cooperate, through an interview with yourself.

Do I have to take part?

Participation in the study is purely voluntary. You should only agree to take part in the study if you wish to. Furthermore, should you wish for your input to be removed from the study at any time, this will be carried out on your behalf without any disadvantages being incurred or explanation being sought.

What will happen if I take part?

It would be beneficial for the research if we were able to organise a semi-structured, informal interview to ascertain your views on how your local authority engages with neighbouring authorities, and how well (if at all) the Duty to Cooperate is working in your own experience. All interviews will be anonymised for data protection purposes, and are entirely voluntary in their nature. With your permission, a Dictaphone will be used to record the interview to assist with transcribing later on. However, it is vital to point out that all data will remain confidential.

What if I am unhappy or there is a problem?

If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let me know by contacting John Farrell on 07903397342 and we will try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to myself with then you should contact the Research Governance Officer at ethics@liv.ac.uk. When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researcher(s) involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make.

Will my participation be kept confidential?

All names and organisations will be anonymised throughout the process. I, as principal investigator, will be the only person with access to the data collected. The data will be stored on the University of Liverpool's secure internal drive for a period of up to 6 months, after which it will be permanently deleted from the drive.

What will happen to the results of the study?

Results garnered from the data will be published in the main thesis that will form the crux of this PhD research. Some results may also be applied to a number of papers that will be submitted to academic journals and conferences. Participants will remain anonymised through this process, and as such will not be identifiable from the results.

Who can I contact if I have further questions?

Any further questions about the research should be forwarded to John Farrell:

Tel: 07903397342

Email: j.c.farrell@liv.ac.uk

Signed: _____

Date:

Thank you for your time

Committee on Research Ethics

Participant Consent Form

The UK experiment with self-organisation in urban planning

John Farrell

1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet dated [] for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
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Signature

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Principal Investigator:

Name: John Farrell

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Work Telephone: 07903397342

Work Email: j.c.farrell@liv.ac.uk

Appendix 3 – Full VFI Survey

Neighbourhood Planning Forum – Volunteer Function Inventory

All questions are answered anonymously, and only the names of the Neighbourhood forums will appear in the PhD thesis and any papers submitted to academic journals. You are free to pull out of the research at any time, please feel free to contact the researcher at any point in time for this.

Part I – Introductory questions

a) What is your gender?

| | | | | | |
|------|--|--------|--|-------|--|
| Male | | Female | | Other | |
|------|--|--------|--|-------|--|

b) What age group do you belong to?

| | | | | | |
|-------|--|-------|--|-------|--|
| 18-24 | | 25-30 | | 31-40 | |
| 41-50 | | 50-64 | | 65+ | |

c) What is your employment status?

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Full time employee | |
| Part time employee | |
| Self-employed | |
| Unemployed | |
| Full time student | |
| Retired | |
| Other (please state) | |

Part II – Reasons for volunteering

Using the 7-point scale overleaf, please indicate how important or accurate each of the following possible reasons for volunteering is for you in volunteering to create a neighbourhood plan. Record your answer in the space next to each item

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Volunteering within the forum can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 2. My friends are also a part of the forum | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 3. I am concerned about those in the community who are less fortunate than myself | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 4. People I'm close to want me to take an active role in the forum | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 5. Volunteering in the forum makes me feel important | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 6. People I know share an interest in community service | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 7. No matter how bad I've been feeling, working with the forum helps me forget about it | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 8. I am genuinely concerned about the community I am serving | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 9. By being involved in the forum, I feel less lonely | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 10. I can make new contacts that might help my career | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 11. Helping those in the area who may not be able to get involved with the forum helps me to feel better | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 12. I can learn more about the cause for which I am working | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 13. Volunteering in the forum increases my self-esteem | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 14. Working in the forum allows me to gain a new perspective on things | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 15. Volunteering within the forum allows me to explore different career options | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 16. I feel compassion towards our area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 17. Others with whom I am close place a high value on service to our community | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 18. Working in the forum lets me learn things through direct, hands-on experience | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 19. I feel it is important to help others in our area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 20. Working with the forum helps me work through my own personal problems | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 21. Helping within the forum will help me to succeed in my chosen profession | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 22. I can do something for a cause that is important to me | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 23. Volunteering is an important activity to the people I know best | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24.The forum is a good escape from my own troubles | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 25.I can learn how to deal with a variety of different people and interests | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 26.Volunteering in the forum makes me feel needed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 27.Volunteering in the forum makes me feel better about myself | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 28.Experience within the forum will look good on my CV | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 29.Volunteering in the forum is a way to make new friends | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 30.I can explore my own strengths | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Not at all important for you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely important to you

Part III – Contextual planning questions

1. How often do you attend meetings at the forum?

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--|----------------|--|----------------|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Every month | | Every 2 months | | Every 3 months | | Sporadically (Please state) | |
|-------------|--|----------------|--|----------------|--|-----------------------------|--|

For Questions 2 – 8, please indicate how accurate each of the following statements is in your own personal view of the plan, using the Likert scale shown below. Record your answer in the space next to each item

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

| | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2. You would be motivated to help with Neighbourhood forums that may have been set up further afield, for example, perhaps in another region of the country. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Working together as part of the neighbourhood forum generates trust between coalition members. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. The forum is open to outside input from the local community. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. The forum is open to outside input from council planners. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. The forum is open to outside input from developers. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. To what extent have you become involved in the plan to potentially limit land development in the area? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. To what extent have you become involved in the plan to influence the style and location of development in the area? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

9. I am involved in the forum because **(please tick one option)**

- a) *I am happy to volunteer my time for the community*
- b) *I want to maintain services that I may use one day*
- c) *I have friends who are involved in the forum*
- d) *It keeps me active*
- e) *There is nobody else to do the work that the forum entails*

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☐
☐
☐

Thanks you for your participation in this research!

Appendix 4 – Interview Question Guidance

Interview Questions (Guidance only)

What position do you hold at the local authority?

What does this role involve?

Do you regularly communicate with other authorities that are within the GMCA?

And how about those who are outside of this group?

How did the GMCA first come to form?

The authorities of Greater Manchester are recognised as being a prime of example of successful cross border working relations, particularly when compared to some other examples e.g. Liverpool City Region. What do you believe is key to this? Is it the mechanisms that are in place, or a question of culture?

If it is a question of culture, is there way in which it can be cultivated?

Amongst all of the local authorities that make up the GMCA, do you feel that there are any leaders in the group? I.e. an authority whose voice is more powerful than others?


Do you feel that the presence of the GMCA helps to keep positive relations between the GM authorities? More so than with external authorities?

How is the GMCA kept together? Is it legally binding that all authorities are required to stay within the coalition?


Are there incentives/penalties for those who wish to leave the coalition?

What role does the Duty to Cooperate play inside and outside of the GMCA?

Appendix 5 – Maps of Neighbourhood Planning sample areas




Beeches Booths and Barr Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:
https://www.birmingham.gov.uk/downloads/file/6115/designated_neighbourhood_plan




Birkenhead & Tranmere Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.wirral.gov.uk/sites/default/files/all/planning%20and%20building/Local%20plans%20and%20planning%20policy/Neighbourhood%20planning/Birkenhead%20and%20Tranmere/Designation/Designated%20Neighbourhood%20Area%20for%20Birkenhead%20and%20Tranmere.pdf>



Birkenhead North Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.wirral.gov.uk/sites/default/files/all/planning%20and%20building/Local%20plans%20and%20planning%20policy/Neighbourhood%20planning/Birkenhead%20North/Forum%20Designation/Designated%20Neighbourhood%20Area%2009%20May%202017.pdf>




Blackrod Neighbourhood Plan Area




Kippax Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.leeds.gov.uk/Local%20Plans/Neighbourhood%20Planning/Kippax%20documents/Map%20of%20Kippax%20Neighbourhood%20Area.pdf>




Linby Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.gedling.gov.uk/media/gedlingboroughcouncil/documents/planningpolicy/linbyneighbourhoodplan/Draft%20Linby%20SEA%20Screening%20Final.pdf>




Mill Hill Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at: <http://millhillforum.org.uk/>




Oxspring Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.barnsley.gov.uk/media/8819/oxspring-neighbourhood-development-plan-proposal.pdf>




Stanton Drew Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

http://www.bathnes.gov.uk/sites/default/files/sitedocuments/Planning-and-Building-Control/Planning-Policy/NPP/stanton_drew_np_application_pack.pdf



Stapleford Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.broxtowe.gov.uk/media/3898/stapleford-town-council-application-for-neighbourhood-area-map.pdf>



Whitburn Neighbourhood Plan Area. Available at:

<https://www.southtyneside.gov.uk/article/57607/Whitburn-Neighbourhood-Planning>